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International Law and the Struggle Against 
Government Impunity in Africa 
 
 BY JOHN MUKUM MBAKU 
 
 ABSTRACT  
 
 In recent years, impunity has become pervasive throughout most 
African countries. In some African countries, impunity is due to the 
inability of national governments to bring perpetrators of human rights 
violations to account for their crimes. In others, impunity arises from the 
unwillingness of government to utilize the existing legal system to bring 
criminals, whether they are state- or non-state actors, to justice. Effectively 
combatting impunity in Africa must begin with the reconstruction of 
African States to provide democratic institutions, which are capable of 
adequately constraining the government and preventing civil servants and 
political elites from acting with impunity; and which make possible the 
bringing of all perpetrators of human rights violations, whether they are 
members of the government or not, to account for their crimes. While 
making certain that all African countries have legal and judicial systems 
that are capable of bringing to justice all individuals who commit 
international crimes in their jurisdictions is the first line of the fight against 
impunity in Africa, it is important to acknowledge the important role that 
international law can play in the anti-impunity effort. The international 
criminal justice system, as embodied in the International Criminal Court, is 
seen as an important and critical tool to fight threats to international peace 
and security. In addition, international programs, such as the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Set of Principles for the Protection 
and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, add 
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to the repertoire of tools available to those engaged in the fight against 





During the decolonization period, Africans blamed policies 
promulgated by European colonialists for the high rates of poverty among 
the various ethnocultural groups that inhabited each colony.1 Many Africans 
viewed colonialism as “an exploitative, repressive, and cruel system, 
established primarily to enhance the ability of Europeans to extract resources 
from Africa for the benefit of the metropolitan economies,”2 as well as 
Europeans located in the colony.3 Thus, the continent’s freedom fighters, that 
is, those who led the struggle against continued European colonialization and 
for independence, believed that independence would allow citizens to govern 
themselves and have full and effective control of their economic processes. 
Most importantly, it was generally believed that in the post-independence 
period, Africans would be able to produce their own laws and institutions 
and provide themselves with a governing process that minimized impunity 
and significantly enhanced the recognition and protection of human rights, 
including especially those of women, children, and religious and ethnic 
minorities.4 
 
As argued by Mbaku and Ihonvbere,5  
 
[m]any Africans, especially the historically marginalized and 
deprived (e.g., women, rural inhabitants, ethnic minorities, and those 
forced to live on the urban periphery), believed that independence 
was an opportunity to rid themselves of not only the Europeans, but 
also of their laws and institutions and then, develop and adopt, 
through a democratic process (i.e., a people-driven, bottom-up, 
participatory, and transparent institutional reform process), 
 
 1. John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere, Introduction: Issues in Africa’s 
Political Adjustment in the “New” Global Era, in THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 1–32 (John M. Mbaku & Julius O. 
Ihonvbere eds., 2003). 
 2. Id. at 1. 
 3. See JOHN M. MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 16–18 (2018). 
 4. See, e.g., Mbaku & Ihonvbere, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 5. Mbaku & Ihonvbere, supra note 1. 
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institutional arrangements based on their own values, aspirations, 
traditions, and customs.6 
 
This new set of institutional arrangements, developed exclusively by 
Africans and designed to reflect their values and interests, would enhance the 
ability of the government to pursue only public policies that enhance and 
promote the peaceful coexistence of each country’s population groups.  In 
addition, the new governance architecture would also effectively constrain 
state custodians (i.e., civil servants and political elites) and prevent them 
from acting with impunity and engaging in such activities as corruption and 
the abuse of the fundamental and human rights of citizens. There was hope 
that in the post-independence period, the various ethnocultural groups within 
each African country would be granted “a significant level of autonomy so 
that [each one of them] could pursue its values and interests but do so within 
the legal and political boundaries or constraints agreed to in an earlier period 
and elaborated in the constitution.”7 Independence, then, was seen by many 
Africans as bringing to an end, impunity by the Europeans—the latter 
included, not only the civil servants and political elites who ruled the 
colonies, but also European settlers, traders, entrepreneurs, miners, planters, 
and others who exploited, degraded, and infantilized Africans with 
impunity.8 
Unfortunately for many Africans, the decolonization process did not 
provide them with the opportunities to participate fully and effectively in 
constitutional discourse and design. The process, as argued by many scholars 
of decolonization in Africa,9 was undertaken reluctantly and 
opportunistically. In addition to the fact that European colonizers only 
reluctantly gave up their hegemonic control of the colonial territories, the 
 
 6. Id. at 2. 
 7. JOHN M. MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 8 (2018). 
 8. Consider, for example, the mistreatment of African groups by European settlers in 
the four British colonies that united in 1910 to form the Union of South Africa. That system 
of degradation, which was formalized into law in 1948 and given the name “apartheid” or 
“separate development,” was finally abolished when South Africa gained independence in 
1994 and established a non-racial democracy. See, e.g., DAVID DOWNING, WITNESS TO 
HISTORY: APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA (2004) (examining, inter alia, the forces 
contributing to the development of the system of apartheid, as well as the nature of life 
under the apartheid system for the country’s African citizens). 
 9. See, e.g., Robert Fatton, Jr., Liberal Democracy in Africa, 105 POL. SC. Q. 455 
(1990). See also JOHN M. MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA: THE PUBLIC 
CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (1997) (examining, inter alia, the failure of African countries to 
provide themselves with institutional arrangements that adequately constrain the state and 
minimize government impunity). 
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indigenous African elites were so eager to gain independence and seize 
control of the institutions of governance that their approach to the 
decolonization process was quite opportunistic. Fatton10 argues that “[i]t was 
only in the last decade of colonialism, when independence became a 
certainty, that the imperialist powers gradually began to institute democratic 
reforms in what had hitherto been structures of exploitation, despotism, and 
degradation.”11 Fatton12 argues further that: 
 
The transition from colonial despotism to liberal democracy was 
expedited in a few years without any fundamental transformation in 
the economic, cultural, or bureaucratic domains. The transition was 
in fact reluctant, repressive, and opportunistic. In addition, African 
leaders never fully accepted the precepts of the European political 
model, few were enthusiastic about it, and most tolerated it as a 
means to a different end. The African commitment to liberal 
democracy was shaky, hesitant, and ultimately short-lived.13 
 
The desire of many African elites to attain independence without fully 
and effectively transforming the critical domains—that is, the political, 
administrative, and judicial foundations of the state, in order to render them 
more suitable for governance in the post-independence society, was 
illustrated quite well by the nature of constitutional discourse in the U.N. 
Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration (“French 
Cameroons”).  As French Cameroons prepared for independence, a group 
called the Constitutional Consultative Committee (“CCC”) was constituted 
and charged with designing the new country’s constitution. Questioned later 
about why the CCC chose to ignore nation-wide dialogue on constitution-
making and instead, adopt de Gaulle’s constitution14 as a blue print for their 
post-independence laws and institutions, members of the CCC stated that 
adopting the French constitutional model was due to the wishes of then 
leader of government, Ahmadou Ahidjo, whose “government was more 
interested in producing almost any document and having it adopted as soon 
as possible than in encouraging wider discussion of its basic provisions—
 
 10. Fatton, supra note 9. 
 11. Id. at 357. 
 12. Fatton, supra note 9. 
 13. Id. at 357. 
 14. That is, the FRENCH CONSTITUTION OF OCTOBER 4, 1958, also referred to as the 
CONSTITUTION OF THE FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC. 
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thus, according to these critics, accounting largely for following the French 
model so closely.”15 
In fact, throughout Africa, many indigenous elites believed that the 
most important consideration was independence and that issues of 
constitutional discourse and design would be given a more robust hearing 
later, that is, in the post-independence period. Given the fact that the 
constitution is the basic law for every country and the foundation for all of 
the country’s governance institutions, the failure to engage all of each 
country’s relevant stakeholders in participatory, inclusive, and people-driven 
constitutional design did not augur well for effective governance in the post-
independence period.16 
French Cameroons gained independence on January 1, 1960, and took 
the name République du Cameroun.17 In 1961, the République du Cameroun 
united with the U.N. Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons to form a 
federation called the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Unfortunately, the 
process through which the constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon 
was designed and adopted was just as opportunistic and non-participatory as 
that of the République du Cameroun. As a consequence, the resulting Federal 
Constitution created a governing process characterized by an imperial 
presidency and virtually no mechanisms for citizens to check the exercise of 
government power.18 As a result of the failure of Cameroonians to provide 
themselves with institutional arrangements that adequately and effectively 
constrain the state, political economy in the country, since unification in 
1961, has been pervaded with government impunity, including high levels of 
corruption, the rampant abuse of human and peoples’ rights, notably those of 
women, children, and the country’s Anglophone minority.19 
 
 15. VICTOR T. LEVINE, THE CAMEROONS: FROM MANDATE TO INDEPENDENCE 227 
(1964). 
 16. Id. See also Victor T. LeVine, The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West 
Africa, 35 J. MOD. AFRI. STUD. 181 (1997). 
 17. LEVINE, supra note 15. 
 18. See also John M. Mbaku, Judicial Independence, Constitutionalism and 
Governance in Cameroon: Lessons from French Constitutional Practice, 1 EUROPEAN J. 
COMP. L & GOV. 357 (2014) (examining, inter alia, the weaknesses of Cameroon’sgovern 
ance institutions and how they have failed to minimize government impunity). 
 19. In fact, it was the continued exploitation and abuse of the minority Anglophones by 
the Francophone-dominated central government that forced some Anglophones to opt for 
violent mobilization, which has plunged the country into its worst constitutional crisis since 
unification in 1961. See, e.g., S. Eban Ebai, The Right to Self-Determination and the 
Anglophone Cameroon Situation, 13 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 631 (2009) (arguing, inter alia, that 
Anglophones in Cameroon have a right to self-determination); Piet Konings, The 
Anglophone Struggle for Federalism in Cameroon, in FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION 
IN AFRICA 289 (L. R. Basta & J. Ibrahim eds., 1999). See also INTERNATIONAL CRISIS 
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 A. The Evolution of Impunity as a Global Problem 
 
Shortly after independence, many African political elites soon 
abandoned even these poorly-designed and relatively weak constitutions and 
opted, instead, to rule without any legal constraints. As argued by LeVine,20 
“[i]n West Africa such documents were soon abrogated by the new 
governments, which generally preferred to rule without the constraints that 
they embodied.”21 Throughout many of these newly-independent countries, 
“a constitution more often than not became simply another instrument of rule 
if not discarded altogether. Many a replacement was simply octroyé, ‘handed 
down from on high,’ or cobbled together by a compliant constitution-writing 
conference or convention, and then adopted by a ‘controlled’ plebiscite.”22 
Although LeVine’s article was published in 1997 and it is now 2018, 
constitution making in many African countries remains as dysfunctional as it 
was then.23 
In countries, such as Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Cameroon, and Côte 
d’Ivoire, the single political party soon emerged as the only legal means 
through which citizens could participate in the political life of their 
countries.24 Despite the fact that the one-party state was promoted by its 
 
GROUP, REPORT NO. 250: CAMEROON’S ANGLOPHONE CRISIS AT THE CROSSROADS, 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250-cameroons-anglophone-cris 
is-crossroads. 
 20. Victor T. LeVine, The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa, 35 J. 
MOD. AFRI. STUD. 181 (1997). 
 21. LeVine, supra note 20, at 188. 
 22. Id. 
 23. While there are a few exceptions, including for example, constitutional exercises in 
South Africa and Kenya, most African countries continue to engage in top-down, elite-
driven, non-participatory and non-inclusive constitutional exercises. For example, in 2016, 
Côte d’Ivoire produced a new constitution for the Third Republic. In addition to the fact that 
the committee chosen to design the constitution was handpicked by the president and not the 
people (e.g., through nation-wide, fair, free, and credible elections), ratification of the 
constitution was undertaken through a highly controlled referendum, with the opposition 
virtually shut out of participation. See, e.g., John M. Mbaku, Citizenship and Political and 
Economic Participation in Africa, 43 N.C. J. INT’L L. 110, 165 (2018). 
 24. Kenya gained independence from Great Britain on December 12, 1963 under the 
leadership of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) in what was essentially a de factor 
one-party system. In 1982, Kenya became a de jure one-party state (see, e.g., CHARLES 
HORNSBY,  KENYA: A HISTORY SINCE INDEPENDENCE (2013) (providing, inter alia, an 
overview of post-colonial developments in Kenya). Malawi gained independence from 
Great Britain on July 6, 1964, with the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) as the only legal 
political party until 1993 when the state adopted a multi-party system (see, e.g., JOHN 
LLYOD LWANDA, KAMUZU BANDA OF MALAWI: A STUDY IN PROMISE, POWER AND 
PARALYSIS (MALAWI UNDER DR. BANDA) (1961 TO 1993) (2009) (providing, inter alia, an 
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proponents as a political mechanism to unite the country and enhance nation 
building, it actually exacerbated inter-ethnic conflicts and created many 
problems for governance. The domination of government by some 
ethnocultural groups, to the exclusion of others, caused the type of 
resentment that produced significant levels of sectarian violence, some of 
which deteriorated into civil war, as occurred in Liberia, Nigeria, 
Cameroon,25 and most recently, South Sudan.26  The single-party approach to 
governance significantly increased the power of the executive, and seriously 
 
overview of Malawi under Banda’s one-party system). Zambia gained independence from 
Great Britain in October 1964 under a multiparty system that was dominated by three 
political parties, United National Independence Party (UNIP), the ruling party; the Northern 
Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC), and the United Progressive Party (UPP). 
However, in February 1972, Zambia became a one-party state—all political parties, except 
for the UNIP, were banned (THE DYNAMICS OF THE ONE-PARTY STATE IN ZAMBIA (Cherry J. 
Gertzel, Carolyn Louise Baylies & Morris Szeftel eds., 1984) (providing a series  of essays 
that examines the impact of the one-party political system on political economy in post-
independence Zambia). On January 1, 1960, the U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroons under 
French administration gained independence and took the name République du Cameroun. 
On February 11, 1961, the U.N. Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British 
administration voted in a U.N.-controlled and administered plebiscite to unite with the 
République du Cameroun to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon. At unification in 
1961, the new Federal Republic was a multiparty state with several political parties. 
Nevertheless, in 1966, then Federal President, Ahamdou Ahidjo, cajoled all the political 
parties, except the Union des Populations du Cameroun, to join his Cameroon Union 
(Union camerounaise) to form the Cameroon National Union (CNU). From 1966 until 
1990, Cameroon was a single-party state with the CNU as the only legal political party (see, 
e.g., RICHARD A. JOSEPH, GAULLIST AFRIA: CAMEROON UNDER AHMADU AHIDJO (1978) 
(examining the evolution of political economy in Cameroon under its first president, 
Ahmadu Ahidjo). Côte d’Ivoire gained independence from France in 1960 under the 
leadership of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire—African Democratic Rally (Parti 
démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire—Rassemblement démocratique Africain (PDCI-RDA)). 
Côte d’Ivoire introduced multiparty politics in 1990 but the PDCI remained in power, 
having won elections decisively. However, the party lost its control of the government when 
Henri Konan Bédïé, who had replaced independence president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, 
who died in office in 1993, was ousted by military coup in December 1999 (see, e.g., ABOU 
B. BAMBA, AFRICAN MIRACLE, AFRICAN MIRAGE: TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE 
PARADOX OF MODERNIZATION IN IVORY COAST (2016) (examining, inter alia, political 
developments in Côte d’Ivoire since independence). 
 25. For example, the ruling Cameroon National Union, which was renamed in 1985 as 
the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), was dominated, since its 
emergence in 1966, by Francophones to the exclusion of Anglophones. See MARK D. 
DELANCEY, REBECCA N. MBUH & MARK W. DELANCEY, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF 
CAMEROON (6th ed. 2010). 
 26. See James Verini, How the World’s Youngest Nation Descended into Bloody Civil 
War, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 30, 2014, https://news.nationalgeographic.com/ 
news/special-features/2014/10/141001-south-sudan-dinka-nuer-ethiopia-juba-khartoum/; 
Endalcachew Bayeh, Republic of South Sudan: From North-South to Nuer-Dinka Conflict, 1 
INT’L J. RESEARCH 288 (2014). 
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weakened the judiciary and the legislature.  Perhaps, more important is the 
fact that in all of these countries, governance was characterized by significant 
levels of impunity, including corruption and the abuse of the fundamental 
and human rights of citizens, especially those of historically marginalized 
groups, such as women, children, and ethnic and religious minorities.27 
In a significant number of African countries, military elites intervened 
and took control over the structures of governance.28 Contrary to the 
pronouncements of these military elites in the immediate aftermath of the 
coups, which included claims that they had intervened to save the country 
from corrupt and opportunistic civilian-led regimes, the military regimes 
were, more often than not, characterized by levels of corruption and other 
forms of impunity that were actually higher than those obtaining in the 
civilian regimes that the military had overthrown.29 As argued by LeVine,30 
the intervention by military elites in African politics “epitomized the low 
estate to which constitutionalism had fallen during [the] 1963-89”31 period in 
Africa. Like their civilian counterparts, Africa’s military rulers “rejected 
constitutions and constitutionalism as the basis for organizing their societies 
and resolving conflict.”32 In virtually all countries that were ruled by military 
regimes, the governors totally rejected participation and inclusiveness and 
 
 27. See JOHN M. MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 99 (2018). 
 28. Africa’s first post-independence coup took place in Egypt on July 23, 1952, when 
the government of King Farouk was overthrown by members of the Free Officers 
Movement. Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser was considered the brains behind the coup 
operation. Nevertheless, General Muhammad Naguib was chosen as the post-coup leader 
because of Naser’s fear that he and his fellow soldiers might not be taken seriously because 
of their youth—all the young officers were under 35 years of age and hailed from peasant 
lower-middle-class backgrounds. Two years later, on February 27, 1954, Nasser overthrew 
Muhammad Naguib and took over control of the presidency of Egypt. Although military 
coups d’état have become less popular as a method of unconstitutional change of 
government in Africa, they remain a threat to each country’s constitutional order. For more 
on Nasser and the Free Officers Movement, see JOEL GORDON, NASSER’S BLESSED 
MOVEMENT: EGYPT’S FREE OFFICERS AND THE JULY REVOLUTION (1992) (examining, inter 
alia, the 1952 military coup in Egypt and the role played by Nasser’s Free Officers 
Movement). For a history of coups in Africa, see, e.g., A. B. ASSENSOH & YVETTE M. ALEX-
ASSENSOH, AFRICAN MILITARY HISTORY AND POLITICS: COUPS AND IDEOLOGICAL 
INCURSIONS, 1900–PRESENT (2001) (providing a historical overview of military coups d’état 
in Africa). 
 29. See, e.g., JOHN M. MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA: THE PUBLIC 
CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 91–110 (1997). 
 30. LeVine, supra note 20. 
 31. Id. at 190. 
 32. John M. Mbaku, What Should Africans Expect from Their Constitutions, 41 DENV. 
J. INT’L L & POL’Y 149, 149 (2013). 
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instead opted to rely on ad hoc decrees and other forms of coercion, all of 
which enhanced the government’s ability to act with impunity—the result 
was the massive abuse of the rights of citizens.33 
In virtually all the African countries in which the military had taken 
control of the apparatus of government, supposedly to rid their fellow 
citizens of corrupt and opportunistic civilian leaders,34 the military elites’ 
“own vision [of governance] tended to the strictly utilitarian; that is, seeing 
constitutions as conditional charters to ‘clean’ or ‘sanitize’ civilian 
régimes.”35 Although most of the military elites who had intervened in the 
politics of their countries claimed they did so to “rid their countries of 
corruption and other forms of impunity and deepen and institutionalize 
democracy, military rulers instead immediately switched to authoritarian 
forms of governance, all of which were characterized by the absence of 
avenues for popular participation”36 and significantly high levels of 
government impunity. 
By the early-1990s, when many grassroots movements emerged to push 
for transition to democratic governance in Africa,37 impunity had become 
quite pervasive throughout the continent.  In many of these countries, state- 
and non-state actors who were perpetrators of human rights violations 
routinely escaped prosecution and punishment because of governments that 
were unwilling or unable to bring these culprits to justice.  In many 
situations, such as the apartheid regime in South Africa, military and/or 
 
 33. See, e.g., SAMUEL DECALO, COUPS & ARMY RULE IN AFRICA: MOTIVATIONS & 
CONSTRAINTS 1–33 (1990) (examining, inter alia, the role played by the military in 
governance in Africa). 
34 Actually, these were the same sentiments expressed by Major Chukwuma Kaduna 
Nzeogwu and his fellow coup plotters in Nigeria in 1966. As part of his speech delivered to 
the nation on January 15, 1966, Major Nzeogwu stated that they had organized the coup to 
rid the country of “the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that 
seek bribes and demand 10 percent; those that seek to keep the country divided permanently 
so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, 
those that make the country look big for nothing before international circles, those that have 
corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and 
deeds.” Chukwuma K. Nzeogwu, Announcing Nigeria’s First Military Coup on Radio 
Nigeria (Sept. 30, 2010) (transcript available at https://www.vanguardngr.com/ 
2010/09/radio-broadcast-by-major-chukwuma-kaduna-nzeogwu-%E2%80%93-announcing-
nigeria%E2%80%99s-first-military-coup-on-radio-nigeria-kaduna-on-january-15-1966). 
 35. LeVine, supra note 20, at 190. 
 36. Mbaku, supra note 23, at 166. 
 37. Mbaku and Ihonvbere provide an overview of the transition to democracy that 
began in the early-1990s in Africa, See THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN 
AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE (John M. Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere eds., 2003); 
see also POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM 
COUNTRY EXPERIENCES (Julius O. Ihonvbere & John M. Mbaku eds., 2003). 
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civilian dictatorships in countries such as Nigeria, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia, the 
perpetrators were actually state actors, who had no incentives to prosecute 
themselves for their complicity in human rights abuses.38 
In some countries, impunity either directly by state actors or sponsored 
by them produced genocides and civil wars.  In Rwanda, for example, it was 
members of the Hutu-dominated government, who masterminded and carried 
out the genocide and ethnic cleansing that killed more than 800,000 Tutsi 
and their Hutu sympathizers in just 100 days during the period, April 7 to 
mid-July 1994.39 The genocide was finally brought to an end through the 
intervention of the Tutsi-backed Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”), led by 
Paul Kagame, Rwanda’s present (2018) president. During the apartheid 
regime, which operated officially in South Africa, from 1948 to 1994, the 
white minority government used the law and state institutions to brutalize the 
African majority, including imprisoning the latter’s leaders and forcing 
various African groups into economically unsustainable settlements called 
“homelands.”40 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the abuse of human rights by 
state- and non-state actors has continued unabated since the colonial period.41 
The Belgian colonial government, like colonialists in other parts of Africa, 
acted with impunity and routinely abused the fundamental rights of the 
Congolese people. Belgian Congo gained independence on June 30, 1960 
under the leadership of prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, and took the name 
 
 38. For more on the abuse of human rights in Africa, especially in the period leading to 
the 1990s, see BRIAN BAUGHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA (2014). 
 39. For more on the Rwandan genocide, see, e.g., SCOTT STRAUS, THE ORDER OF 
GENOCIDE: RACE, POWER, AND WAR IN RWANDA (2006) (providing an overview of the 
events leading to the genocide in Rwanda, as well as the genocide itself); LINDA MELVERN, 
A PEOPLE BETRAYED: THE ROLE OF THE WEST IN RWANDA’S GENOCIDE (2009) (examining, 
inter alia, the failure of the Western countries to act to stop the mass slaughter of Rwandans 
in 1994); GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1997) 
(examining, inter alia, events that contributed to the genocide in Rwanda). 
 40. For more on apartheid in South Africa, see SEAN CONNOLLY, APARTHEID IN SOUTH 
AFRICA (2003) (providing an overview of evolution and collapse of apartheid in South 
Africa); PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF A MIRACLE: THE END OF APARTHEID AND THE 
BIRTH OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA (1997) (examining events leading to the demise of South 
African apartheid and the emergence of a democratic, non-racial, post-apartheid South 
African state). 
 41. For impunity in colonial Congo, see, e.g., ADAM HOCSHCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S 
GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIA AFRICA (detailing King 
Leopold, II of Belgium’s exploits in Congo); CH. DIDIER GONDOLA, THE HISTORY OF CONGO 
(2002) (providing a detailed history of Congo, including pre-colonial, colonial and post-
independence periods). 
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Republic of Congo (République du Congo) but shortly afterwards, the new 
country was plunged into chaos—in addition to mutinies staged by soldiers, 
two provinces, Katanga and South Kasai, began efforts to secede and form 
their own sovereign and independent states. On September 5, 1960, then 
president of the Republic of Congo, Joseph Kasavubu, sacked prime minister 
Lumumba from office and created a constitutional crisis.  On November 25, 
1965, Joseph Mobutu, who had been appointed by Lumumba as chief of the 
new country’s army—the Armée Nationale Congolaise (Congolese National 
Army), overthrew the government and eventually declared himself head of 
state. Mobutu ruled the country from 1965 until 1997 when he was forced 
out of office by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Congo. Mobutu’s reign was characterized by a 
significant level of government impunity.42 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila ruled Congo from 1997 until his assassination by 
one of his bodyguards in 2001.43 A few days after his death, he was 
succeeded as president of Congo by his son, Joseph Kabila, who remains the 
president of the country to this day (2018). The governments of both Kabilas, 
like those of their predecessors, have been characterized by significant levels 
of impunity—both by state- and non-state actors.44 Of course, these are only a 
few examples of the situations in which African governments have engaged in 
impunity during the last several decades. There are, of course, many more.  It 
is only necessary, for purposes of this article, that we list just a few 
situations.45 
In the early-1990s, as many African countries were engaged in efforts to 
transition to democratic governance, the international community was 
becoming fully aware of the need to take action, at the global level, to deal 
 
 42. For impunity in Mobutu’s Congo, see, e.g., MICHELA WRONG, IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF 
MR. KURTZ: LIVING ON THE BRINK OF DISASTER IN MOBUTU’S CONGO (2009) (examining the 
pauperization of the Congolese peoples during the reign of Mobutu); David J. Gould & T. 
B. Mukendi, Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Remedies, 12 
INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 427 (1989) (examining corruption and kleptocracy in Mobutu’s 
Congo/Zaire). 
 43. For more on Kabia’s government, see FRANÇOIS NGOLET, CRISIS IN THE CONGO: 
THE RISE AND FALL OF LAURENT KABILA (2011) (providing an overview of Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila’s rise and fall in Congo). 
 44. For more on impunity in Congo under the Kabilas, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
WHAT KABILA IS HIDING: CIVILIAN KILLINGS AND IMPUNITY IN CONGO, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (1997) (a report from Human Rights Watch on impunity in the senior Kabila’s 
government); FRANK HALDEMANN & THOMAS UNGER, THE UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES TO 
COMBAT IMPUNITY: A COMMENTARY (2018) (indicating that the fight against impunity has 
become an important concern for the international community). 
 45. For impunity in Africa writ large, see generally PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES IN AFRICA (Chacha Murungu & Japhet Biegon eds., 2011) (providing an overview 
of efforts to deal with impunity in Africa). 
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with impunity and other threats to international peace and security. For 
example, in June 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then U.N. Secretary-General, 
authored a report titled An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-keeping.46 In his report, Boutros-Ghali attempted to 
provide a framework, which he believed could be used by intergovernmental 
organizations, to deal with impunity and other threats to international peace 
and security.  The report focused on four critical areas, as requested by the 
U.N. Security Council: (1) preventive diplomacy; (2) peacemaking; (3) 
peace-keeping; and (4) post-conflict peace-building.47 
Despite the U.N. Secretary-General’s report, the U.N. Security 
Council,48 remained reluctant to “issue . . . resolutions that [could be] 
perceived as infringing the sovereignty of Member States.”49 The failure of 
the United Nations to actively engage in dealing with threats to international 
peace, which included impunity by state- and non-state actors, contributed 
significantly to the failure of the international community to deal with violent 
sectarian conflict in many countries. Especially at risk during this period 
were citizens of many African countries, as evidenced by the extraordinary 
level of violence, some of it emanating from the state, in countries such as 
Angola,50 Democratic Republic of Congo,51 Liberia,52 Sierra Leone,53 
 
 46. See U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, U.N. Co. A/47/277 (June 17, 1992). Boutros-Ghali was 
an Egyptian diplomat and politician who served as the 6th U.N. Secretary-General from 
January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1996. For more on Boutros-Ghali and his term at the 
United Nations, see Stephen FRANKLIN BURGESS, THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER BOUTROS 
BOUTROS-GHALI, 1992-97 (2001). 
 47. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 46, ¶ 5. 
 48. This is the U.N. organ that is legally empowered, through the U.N. Charter, to 
maintain international peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 39–51. 
 49. Tim Murithi, The African Union’s Transition from Non-Intervention to Non-
Indifference: An Ad Hoc Approach to the Responsibility to Protect, INDEPENDENT 
PUBLISHERS GROUP (IPG), Jan. 2009, at 91. 
 50. For Angola, see PHIL Y.  NANGOLOH, ANGOLA: THE POLITICO-MILITARY CONFLICT 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY AND COMPLICITY (2002) 
(examining, inter alia, the complicity of international groups in government impunity in 
Angola). 
 51. The literature on impunity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is quite 
extensive. See, e.g., THE AFRICAN STAKES OF THE CONGO WAR (John F. Clarke ed., 2002) 
(presenting a series of essays that examines sectarian violence in the DRC, which has 
contributed significantly to the abuse of human rights in the country); G. NZONGOLA-
NTALAJA, THE CONGO: FROM LEOPOLD TO KABILA: A PEOPLE’S HISTORY (2002) (providing a 
rigorous overview of the DRC’s tortured history, including impunity by its various 
governmental regimes, from the colonial to the post-independence periods); SÉVERINE 
AUTESSERRE, THE TROUBLE WITH THE CONGO: LOCAL VIOLENCE AND THE FAILURE OF 
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Burundi,54 South Africa,55 and Rwanda.56 Since 2003, the government of 
Sudan, aided by various non-state militias, has massacred more than 300,000 
Darfuri men, women, and children in the Darfur region of western Sudan. 
The Darfur Genocide is often referred to as the first genocide of the 21st 
century.  In 2009, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) issued an arrest 
warrant for Sudan’s president, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir;57 another 
warrant was issued on July 12, 2010—these warrants charged al-Bashir with 
“five counts of crimes against humanity: murder, extermination, forcible 
transfer, torture, and rape; two counts of war crimes: Intentionally directing 
attacks against a civilian population as such or against individual civilians 
not taking part in hostilities, and pillaging; three counts of genocide: by 
killing, by causing serious bodily or mental harm, and by deliberately 
inflicting on each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about the 
group’s physical destruction, allegedly committed at least between 2003 and 
2008 in Darfur, Sudan.”58 
As the 21st century was being ushered in, the issue of how to deal with 
impunity and threats against international peace and security had gained 
 
INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING (2010) (providing a detailed examination of impunity by 
local groups). 
 52. For Liberia and Sierra Leone, see generally AMADU SESSAY, CHARLES UKEJE, 
OSMAN GBLA & OLAWALE ISMAIL, POST-WAR REGIMES AND STATE RECONSTRUCTION IN 
LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE (2009) (examining regime impunity in modern-day Liberia and 
Sierra Leone); YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AGAINST IMPUNITY: PROGRESS 
AND NEW CHALLENGES (2005) (providing evidence to show that the international struggle 
against impunity has been slow; reviews the International Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Cambodia Court). 
 53. For Sierra Leone, see SESSAY ET AL., supra note 52; BEIGBEDER, supra note 52. 
 54. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MOB JUSTICE IN BURUNDI: OFFICIAL COMPLICITY AND 
IMPUNITY (2010) (examining official impunity in Burundi, with particular emphasis on 
events that occurred in 2009). “L’Association burundaise pour la Protection des Droits 
Humains et des Personnes détenues” means the Burundian Association for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Detained Persons. 
 55. The literature on the apartheid system in South Africa and the atrocities that it 
committed against Africans and other non-white groups, is very extensive. We mention only 
a few: JOHN ALLEN, APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: AN INSIDER’S OVERVIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND 
EFFECTS OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT (2005) (examining apartheid in South Africa and its 
atrocities); NANCY L. CLARK & WILLIAM H. WORGER, SOUTH AFRICA: THE RISE AND FALL 
OF APARTHEID (2016) (examining apartheid from its imposition in 1948 to its demise in 
1994 and the regime’s atrocities against Africans and other non-white groups). 
 56. GODFREY MWAKIKAGILE, IDENTITY POLITICS AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN RWANDA 
AND BURUNDI: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2012) (examining the conflict between the Hutu 
and Tutsi that has been characterized by significant abuses of human rights and genocide). 
 57. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC–02/05–01/09-74, Opinion of Judge Steiner. 
 58. International Criminal Court (ICC), Al Bashir Case: The Prosecutor v. Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC–02/05–01/09, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir. 
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currency in many global forums.  For example, U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi 
Annan, who served the world body from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 
2006, made presentations to the U.N. General Assembly asking the latter to 
find ways to confront impunity and other threats to international peace and 
security. In 1999 and again in 2000, Kofi Annan “made compelling pleas to 
the international community to try to find, once and for all, a new consensus 
on how to approach these issues, to ‘forge unity’ around the basic questions 
of a principle and process involved.”59 Annan challenged the international 
community with an important question, one that implicated the failure of the 
international community, in general, and the United Nations, in particular, to 
fully and effectively respond to situations of government impunity in various 
countries around the world: “. . . if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to 
a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect 
every precept of our common humanity?”60 
In response to this challenge to the international community, the 
Government of Canada established the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (“ICISS”) and tasked it with dealing with 
a “whole range of questions”61 and these included “legal, moral, operational 
and political”62 questions and that the ICISS would consult with as many 
stakeholders as possible in an effort to seek solutions to these issues. The 
Government of Canada told the U.N. General Assembly that the completed 
report would be presented to the U.N. Secretary-General for further 
transmission to the General Assembly, with the hope that the international 
community could reach some common ground on how to deal with impunity 
and other threats to international peace and security.63 The ICISS established 
a new approach to dealing with threats to international peace and security, 
which was named the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”).  
R2P incorporates and embraces three important elements or 
responsibilities that speak directly to impunity and other threats to 
international peace and security: 
 
 
 59. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (Dec. 2001), The 
Responsibility to Protect, at VII, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 81. 
 63. Id. 
  
2019]         International Law and the Struggle Against Government Impunity in Africa 87 
 
A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and 
direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting 
populations at risk.  
B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling 
human need with appropriate measures, which may include 
coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and 
in extreme cases military intervention.  
C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military 
intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and 
reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention 
was designed to halt or avert.64 
 
 B. The African Union and Impunity 
 
During the last several decades, many African countries have been 
pervaded by the gross abuse of human rights.65  Violent sectarian conflict, 
some of which has evolved into genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity, have emerged in Africa during the last few decades as the most 
important threats to international security and peace.  In the early-to-mid-
1990s, it was the failure of regional, continental, and international actors to 
fight impunity and protect vulnerable populations against these international 
crimes, including especially during the Rwandan Genocide, that provided the 
impetus to the adoption by the United Nations, of the principle of 
responsibility to protect.66 
The commitment by the United Nations to the R2P specifically provides 
that (1) States have the responsibility to protect their populations from 
international crimes;67 and (2) States should cooperate with each other in 
their efforts to fulfill their obligations regarding the protection of their 
populations from international crimes. The U.N. went on to state that if, 
however, a State is either unwilling or does not have the capacity to fulfill its 
obligations under R2P, the international community will take action, either 
through peaceful means or the use of force if the former fails to resolve the 
 
 64. Id. at XI. 
 65. For an overview of human rights abuses in Africa, see BRIAN BAUGHAN, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN AFRICA (2014) (discussing, inter alia, the history of human rights abuses in 
Africa). 
 66. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, supra note 59. 
 67. These international crimes include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and ethnic cleansing. See, e.g., U.N. General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (last amended in 2010), July 17, 1998, http://www.refworld.org/docid/ 
3ae6b3a84.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2018) (providing a definition of international crimes in 
art. 5). 
  
88 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
  
problem.68  As stated in the ICISS Report, “[w]hen preventive measures fail 
to resolve or contain the situation and when a state is unable or unwilling to 
redress the situation, then interventionary measures by other members of the 
broader community of states may be required. These coercive measures may 
include political, economic or judicial measures, and in extreme cases—but 
only extreme cases—they may also include military action.”69 
Within time, Africans began to warm up to the principle of R2P. While 
it existed, the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) did not have any legal 
power to intervene in the internal affairs of Member States to deal with 
impunity and other threats to international crimes. Thus, the continent 
remained essentially unresponsive to impunity by state and non-state actors 
in many countries, including, the Rwandan Genocide.70 However, the 
African Union, the successor organization to the OAU, has been empowered 
to intervene in the internal affairs of Member States in respect of “war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”71 These provisions are 
contained in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and have 
been collectively referred to as Africa’s principle of “non-indifference” and 
the continent’s equivalent of the global R2P. 
The Chairperson of the African Union Commission from September 16, 
2003, to April 28, 2008, Alpha Oumar Konaré, advocated a policy that 
would take the AU from a culture of “non-intervention” to one of “non-
indifference.”72  In Africa, the responsibility for implementing the R2P 
principle is in the hands of the Peace and Security Council (“PSC”), which 
was established in 2014 through the Protocol Relating to the Establishment 
of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (“AU Protocol”).73 
According to Article 2(1) of the AU Protocol, “There is hereby established, 
pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act, a Peace and Security Council 
 
 68. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, supra note 59, at 29. 
 69. Id. 
 70. In fact, the OAU’s Charter specifically had a policy of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of its Member States. See Organization for African Unity (OAU), Charter of 
the Organization of African Unity, May 23, 1963, https://au.int/sites/default/files/ 
treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf  
 71. African Union (AU), Constitutive Act of the African Union (July 11, 2000), 
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/au-constitutive-act/au_act_2000_eng.pdf. 
 72. For an in depth discussion of the continent’s policy of “non-indifference,” see 
Ndubuisi C. Ani, The African Union Non-Indifference Stance: Lessons from Sudan and 
Libya, 6 AFRICAN CONFLICT & PEACEBLDG. REV. 1 (2016). 
 73. African Union (AU), Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union (July 9, 2002), https://au.int/sites/default 
/files/treaties/7781-treaty-0024_-_protocol_relating_to_the_establishment_of_the_peace_a 
nd_security_ council_of_the_af rican_union_e.pdf. 
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within the Union, as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, 
management and resolution of conflicts. The Peace and Security Council 
shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate 
timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.”74 
The PSC’s objectives and responsibilities are listed in Article 3 of the 
African Union Protocol—the PSC was established to: 
 
a. promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to 
guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, 
the well-being of the African people and their environment, as 
well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable 
development; 
b. anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where 
conflicts have occurred, the Peace and Security Council shall 
have the responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-
building functions for the resolution of these conflicts; 
c. promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict 
reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the 
resurgence of violence; 
d. co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention 
and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects; 
e. develop a common defense policy for the Union, in accordance 
with article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act; 
f. promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance 
and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international 
humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.75 
 
In undertaking these responsibilities, the PSC is to be assisted and 
supported by the AU Commission, as well as three dedicated bodies: The 
Panel of the Wise;76 the Continental Early Warning System;77 and the 
 
 74. Id. art. 2(1). 
 75. Id. art. 3(1)(a–f). 
 76. The Panel of the Wise is “one of the critical pillars of the Peace and Security 
Architecture of the African Union (APSA). Article 11 of the Protocol establishing the PSC 
sets up a five-person panel of ‘highly respected African personalities from various segments 
of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and 
development on the continent’ with a task ‘to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the 
Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention.’” See Panel 
of the Wise (PoW), AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY, http://www.peaceau.org/en/ 
page/29-panel-of-the-wise-pow. 
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African Standby Force.78 The PSC is also expected to be supported in its 
activities by the U.N.’s Military Staff Committee.79 The New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (“NEPAD”) is also expected to provide assistance to 
the Peace and Security Council.80 In addition, the AU’s various human rights 
institutions, including the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (“ACHPR”)81 and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(“ACHPR”),82 are also expected to actively participate in the fight against 
impunity in the continent. 
It has been argued that there may be a conflict between the right of the 
African Union to intervene in the internal affairs of Member States to deal 
 
 77. The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is one of the five pillars of the 
African Peace and Security architecture (APSA). The CEWS collects data and analyzes and 
provides advice to the PSC and other institutions with interest in peace and security in 
Africa. See The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND 
SECURITY, http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/28-continental-early-warning. 
 78. The African Standby Force (ASF) is an important tool for dealing with impunity 
and other threats to international peace and security in the continent. It is a multidisciplinary 
peacekeeping force, consisting of military, police and civilian contingents. The ASF 
operates under the direction of the African Union and supports the latter’s right to intervene 
in a member state in grave circumstances, as prescribed in Article 4h of the Constitutive Act 
of the African Union. For more information on the ASF, see The African Standby Force 
(ASF), AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY, http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-
standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1. 
 79. The Military Staff Committee is a U.N. Security Council subsidiary body, whose 
main function is “to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the 
Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of 
armaments, and possible disarmament.” United Nations Security Council Subsidiary 
Organs, United Nations Military Staff Committee, UNITED NATIONS (U.N.) (July 20, 2018), 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ subsidiary/msc & International Refugee Rights Initiative 
(IRRI), From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The African Union and the 
Responsibility to Protect, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AU%20 
R2P%20-%20final.pdf. 
 80. For more on NEPAD, see, e.g., AFRICA & DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM: THE NEPAD DEBATE (J. O. Adésinà, Yao Ghraham & A. Olukoshi eds., 
2006) (presenting a series of essays that examines the founding of the NEPAD and 
evaluating its performance). 
 81. For more on the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, see RACHEL 
MURRAY, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2000) (analyzing, inter alia, the applicability of international law to African 
situations). 
 82. For the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, see LUIS G. FRANCESCHI, 
THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS JUDICIAL SYSTEM: STREAMLINING STRUCTURES AND 
DOMESTICATION MECHANISMS VIEWED FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER PERSPECTIVE 
(2014) (examining the international judicial function in Africa with specific emphasis on the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights). 
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with impunity and other threats to international peace and the requirement 
that prior authorization be obtained from the U.N. Security Council before 
force is used in any Member State of the African Union. This issue is 
clarified by the A.U. in the Ezulwini Consensus.83 In the Ezulwini 
Consensus, the African Union argued that it was important for regional 
organizations to act quickly in the case of threats to international peace and 
then secure approval from the U.N. Security Council after the fact.84 
Since 2005, the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) has been recognized 
as the unanimous commitment of the U.N. and other global actors to prevent 
and deal with impunity and other threats to international peace and security.  
The global society’s commitment to the fight against threats to international 
peace and security was expressed, formally, in the U.N.’s 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document (“2005WSOD”).85 In paragraph 138 of the 
2005WSOD, the U.N. states that “[e]ach individual State has the 
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.”86 If States do not perform their 
responsibilities to protect their citizens as prescribed in the 2005WSOD, the 
international community, through the United Nations and specifically, the 
U.N. Security Council, “has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means . . . to help to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”87 
Additionally, if the peaceful approach fails to successfully and fully resolve 
the situation, the international community is “prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the [U.N.] Security Council, 
in accordance with the [U.N.] Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-
case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate.”88 
 
 83. The Ezulwini Consensus represents the common African position on the proper 
reform of the United Nations system. The Consensus was adopted at the Extraordinary 
Session of the Executive Council of the African Union in March 2005 in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. See African Union (AU), The Common African Position on the Proper Reform of 
the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus, EXT/EX.CL/2(VII) (Mar. 4-5, 2005). 
 84. For more on the Ezulwini Consensus, see HANDBOOK OF AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS (Tim Murithi ed., 2013) (examining, inter alia, Africa’s international relations in 
the post-Cold War world). 
 85. G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (Oct. 24, 2005). 
 86. Id. ¶ 138. 
 87. Id. ¶ 139. The international community is supposed to act in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. See U.N. Charter Chapters VI & 
VIII. 
 88. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 85, ¶ 139. 
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It is important to note that R2P is a political commitment and does not 
constitute a legally-binding obligation on the part of the U.N.’s Member 
States.  However, some level of legal legitimacy is granted R2P given the 
fact that it flows directly from binding international norms (e.g., norms 
assumed under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide and various emerging norms of customary international 
law). 
Formal and official recognition was granted to R2P by the U.N. 
Security Council (“UNSC”) in 2006 through Resolution 167489 and in doing 
so, the UNSC reaffirmed “the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
2005 World Summit Document regarding the responsibility of each country 
to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.”90 
When Ban Ki-moon became U.N. Secretary-General on January 1, 
2007, he gave his full support to R2P and, in 2008, he appointed Edward C. 
Luck as the U.N.’s first Special Adviser on the responsibility to protect.91 In 
announcing the appointment of Edward C. Luck as Special Adviser on R2P, 
Ban Ki-moon made the following statement: 
 
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is pleased to 
announce the appointment of Edward C. Luck as Special Adviser at 
the Assistant Secretary-General level.  Mr. Luck’s work will 
include the responsibility to protect, as set out by the Secretary-
General in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document.92 
 
Ban Ki-moon then produced several reports in which he articulated a 
three-pillar strategy for the implementation of R2P.93 The first of Ban’s 
pillars addresses the responsibility of each Member State with respect to the 
implementation of R2P.94 The Secretary-General went on to argue that the 
State is “critical to effective and timely prevention strategies.”95 The second 
 
 89. S.C. Res. 1674, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts (Apr. 28, 2006). 
 90. S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 89, ¶ 4. 
 91. U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Appoints Edward C. Luck of United 
States Special Adviser, U.N. Press Release SG/A/1120-BIO/3963 (Feb. 21, 2008), https:// 
www.un.org/press/en/2008/sga1120.doc.htm. 
 92. Id.  
 93. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
 94. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect, supra note 93, ¶ 11(a). 
 95. Id. 
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pillar deals specifically with the need for the international community to help 
States in carrying out and meeting their obligations. Stating that prevention is 
“a key ingredient for a successful strategy for the responsibility to protect,”96 
the second pillar “seeks to draw on the cooperation of Member States, 
regional and subregional arrangements, civil society and the private sector, as 
well as the institutional strengths and comparative advantages of the United 
Nations system”97 to prevent threats to international peace.  The third pillar 
deals with “the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a 
timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such 
protection.”98 
In 2009, the U.N. General Assembly (“UNGA”) granted formal 
recognition to R2P through its Resolution 63/308 of October 7, 2009.99 In 
doing so, the UNGA made reference to the World Summit Outcome 
Document100 and made known that it would “continue its consideration of 
the responsibility to protect.”101 The UNGA then undertook several 
interactive dialogues to deal with different aspects of R2P and its 
implementation. For example, the 2012 dialogue was dedicated exclusively 
to “timely and decisive responses and the 2013 dialogue was devoted to state 
responsibility and prevention.”102 
In 2011, then U.N. Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, presented a report 
to the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council103 in which he 
addressed the regional and sub-regional dimensions of the responsibility to 
protect in anticipation of the dialogue on the topic that was scheduled for 
July 2011 in the General Assembly.104 Ban went on to state that “[o]ver the 
last three years, [the U.N.] had applied responsibility to protect principles in 
[its] strategies for addressing threats to populations in about a dozen specific 
situations” and that “[i]n every case, regional and/or sub-regional 
 
 96. Id. ¶ 11(b). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. ¶ 11(c). 
 99. G.A. Res. 63/308, The Responsibility to Protect (Oct. 7, 2009). 
 100. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 85. 
 101. G.A. Res. 63/308, supra note 99, ¶ 2. 
 102. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE INITIATIVE, FROM NON-INTERFERENCE TO NON-
INDIFERENCE: THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 8 (2017), https:// 
reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AU%20R2P%20-%20final.pdf. 
 103. U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 27, 
2011). 
 104. Id. ¶ 1.  
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arrangements have made important contributions, often as full partners with 
the United Nations.”105 
 
 C. The Responsibility to Protect and Impunity 
 
The Responsibility to Protect is a commitment by the international 
community, working through the United Nations and its organs, such as the 
Security Council, to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. But, how is R2P related to impunity? Impunity 
usually arises from the failure by relevant public authorities, either through 
lack of capacity or political will, to bring perpetrators of crimes to account 
for those crimes.106 In many cases, impunity can arise when either state- 
or/and non-state-actors, who engage in various criminal activities are 
exempted from prosecution and punishment or allowed to escape the 
payment of fines assessed by a recognized tribunal.  In international law, 
generally, and in international human rights law, in particular, impunity may 
involve the failure of responsible parties107 to bring individuals engaged in 
the abuse of human rights to justice. The failure to fully and effectively 
prosecute those engaged in the violation of human rights can constitute a 
major infringement of the right of victims of such crimes to justice and 
redress of the wrongs done to them. In countries where the government or its 
agents or proxies are the perpetrators of human rights violations, it is often 
the case that those responsible for committing the various atrocities are not 
likely to be brought to justice. Of course, in countries, such as Somalia and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the central government no longer 
has control over most of the national territory, it may be quite difficult for the 
forces of law and order to bring perpetrators of international crimes to 
justice.108 
 
 105. Id. ¶ 4. 
 106. See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, Impunity: Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to 
Combat Impunity, Diane Orentlicher, Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity of Its 
Sixty-First Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005). 
 107. Such parties may include national governments, as well as, regional organizations, 
such as the African Union and the European Union. See, e.g, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES IN AFRICA (Chacha Murungu & Japhet Biegon eds., 2011) (presenting a series of 
essays that examines, inter alia, the failure of some African states to deal effectively with 
international crimes). 
 108. ABDULLAH A. MOHAMOUD, STATE COLLAPSE AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT IN 
AFRICA: THE CASE OF SOMALIA, 1960-2001 (2006) (providing an overview of the collapse of 
the Somalia state and its impact on governance); MICHAEL DEIBERT, THE DEMOCRATIC 
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Impunity is quite common and pervasive in States that have weak 
institutional arrangements.109 In such countries, state custodians (i.e., civil 
servants and political elites) are not properly constrained by the law and as a 
consequence, they are able to act with impunity. In a country, such as 
Cameroon, it is the case that security forces are protected by the government 
from being held accountable for human rights violations and other criminal 
activities. For example, security forces in Cameroon routinely arrest and 
torture individuals suspected of being homosexuals or engaging in same-sex 
intimacy but are not prosecuted for such human rights abuses.110 In addition, 
Cameroon’s security forces have been using laws against terrorism to torture 
and violate the human rights of journalists and other citizens. In their efforts 
to intimidate the media, Cameroon’s security forces arrest and detain 
journalists without probable cause, fail to bring charges against them, and 
beat and torture them with impunity.111 
Impunity in Cameroon can also be seen in the brutal treatment, by the 
country’s security forces, of Anglophones who are seeking relief from 
oppression by the Francophone-dominated central government. When 
Anglophone teachers and lawyers engaged in peaceful protests in late 2016 
to bring to light what they argued was oppression by the central government, 
the latter responded with brutal force—soldiers targeted civilians and killed 
many of them; other demonstrators were arrested and taken to police stations 
and tortured; and several villages were burned down and destroyed. Yet, 
 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO: BETWEEN HOPE AND DESPAIR (2013) (describing, inter alia, the 
challenges of governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo). 
 109. Such countries usually lack democratic institutions, as well as a tradition of fidelity 
to the rule of law. They are pervaded by high levels of corruption, have extremely weak 
judiciary systems, and political systems in which the state custodians (i.e., civil servants and 
political elites) are not adequately constrained by the law. As a consequence, these public 
servants routinely act with impunity. In the case of Africa, see generally JOHN M. MBAKU, 
CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CLEANUPS (2010) (showing that 
corruption is quite pervasive in countries with weak institutional arrangements). 
 110. Human Rights Watch, Guilty by Association: Human Rights Violations in the 
Enforcement of Cameroon’s Anti-Homosexuality Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mar. 21, 
2003, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/03/21/guilty-association/human-rights-violations-
enforcement-cameroons-anti. 
 111. See Cameroon Using “Anti-Terror” Law to Silence Media: CPJ, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 
20, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/cameroon-anti-terror-law-silen ce-
media-cpj-170920112612527.html. CPJ is Committee to Protect Journalists, a U.S.-based 
independent non-governmental organization that promotes press freedom throughout the 
world. Besides its headquarters in New York City, it has branches in many countries around 
the world.  
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none of the security forces were brought to justice for their criminal 
activities.112 
It is not surprising that Cameroon’s public sector is pervaded by 
impunity. The culture of impunity that has become pervasive in Cameroon 
starts from the top—the President of the Republic, Paul Biya, can be 
considered the chief priest of this insidious culture of impunity. In fact, in 
2008, Biya had the constitution changed to immunize himself from all crimes 
committed while in office.113 According to Article 53(3) of the Constitution 
of Cameroon, “[a]cts committed by the President of the Republic . . . shall be 
covered by immunity and he shall not be accountable for them after the 
exercise of his functions.”114 The immunity granted the president of 
Cameroon by the constitution does not make an exemption in the case of 
serious offenses, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic 
cleansing, and genocide. Hence, national law in Cameroon will not hold 
President Paul Biya accountable for the atrocities that his security forces 
have committed and continue to commit in the Anglophone Regions of the 
country.115  
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered into force 
on July 1, 2002,116 around the same time that the R2P was being debated and 
adopted by the international community. The Responsibility to Protect report 
by the Canadian-based International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (“ICISS”)117 was released in December 2001 and was given 
formal recognition by the United Nations in 2005.118 In the Rome Statute’s 
Preamble, one can find the following reference to impunity: “The States 
Parties to this Statute, [d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such 
 
 112. Stephanie Busari, Cameroon Security Forces Torturing English Speakers, Amnesty 
Says, CNN NEWS (June 11, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/11/africa/cameroon-
anglophone-torture-amnesty-intl/index.html. 
 113. Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, 1972; 2008 Amendments to the 
Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, Law No. 2008/1 of 14 April 2008 to Amend and 
Supplement some Provisions of Law No. 96/06 of 18 January 1996 to amend the 
Constitution of 2 June 1972.   
 114. Law No. 2008/1, supra note 113, art. 53(3). 
 115. The Republic of Cameroon is currently divided into ten regions. Two of these 
regions, the North West and South West Regions, comprise the former U.N. Trust Territory 
of Southern Cameroons under British administration or Anglophone Cameroon. 
 116. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_sta 
tute_english.pdf. 
 117. See Responsibility to Protect, supra note 59. 
 118. See Outcome Document, supra note 85. 
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crimes,”119 resolve to establish an International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The 
Rome Statute limited the jurisdiction of the ICC to the “most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole.”120 Specifically, the 
ICC has jurisdiction over the following international crimes: crimes of 
genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; and crimes of aggression.121 
Impunity, especially on the part of African governments, has led to the 
proliferation of these crimes in the continent. This has been the case, for 
example, in Rwanda,122 where government operatives led a genocidal and 
ethnic-cleansing campaign that resulted in the massacre of more than 
1,000,000 citizens; South Sudan,123 where thousands of people have been 
killed by government and opposition forces and yet, no one has been held 
accountable for the killings; and the Republic of Cameroon,124 where 
government forces have killed many Anglophones who are protesting 
oppression at the hands of the central government. 
 
II. THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST IMPUNITY 
 
A. Defining and Explaining Impunity 
 
Before we take a look at the global campaign against impunity, it is 
necessary that we provide a formal definition for the concept. In the United 
Nations Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
Through Action to Combat Impunity,125 impunity is defined as, “[T]he 
 
 119. Rome Statute, supra note 116, preamble. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., SCOTT STRAUS, THE ORDER OF GENOCIDE: RACE, POWER, AND WAR IN 
RWANDA (2006) (providing an overview of the events leading to the genocide in Rwanda, as 
well as the genocide itself). 
 123. See, e.g., HILDE E. JOHNSON, SOUTH SUDAN: THE UNTOLD STORY, FROM 
INDEPENDENCE TO CIVIL WAR (2016) (providing an overview of sectarian violence and the 
mass violations of human rights in South Sudan). 
 124. Denis Foretia, Cameroon Continues Its Oppression of English Speakers, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017 
/03/21/cameroon-continues-its-oppression-of-english-speakers/?utm_term=.be46db43f959; 
Ruth Maclean, Deaths and Detentions as Cameroon Cracks Down on Anglophone Activists 
–Dozens Die and Hundreds Jailed in Unrest after Calls for English to be Used in Regions’ 
Schools and Courtrooms, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2018/jan/03/deaths-and-detentions-as-cameroon-cracks-down-on-anglophone-
activists. 
 125. Comm’n on Human Rights, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of 
Detainees, Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and 
Political), Revised Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet Pursuant to Sub-Committee 
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impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of human rights 
violations to account—whether in criminal, civil, administrative or 
disciplinary proceedings—since they are not subject to any inquiry that 
might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, 
sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to their 
victims.” 
On April 17, 1998, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
(“UNCHR”) issued its Resolution 1998/53126 in which it emphasized “the 
importance of combating impunity to the prevention of violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law” and urged “States to give 
necessary attention to the question of impunity for violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law, including those perpetrated against 
women, and to take appropriate measures to address this important issue.”127 
The resolution also noted that it is “the expectation of impunity for violations 
of international human rights or humanitarian law”128 that encourages state- 
and non-state actors to engage in such violations and this is a major obstacle 
to the ability of the international community to protect the fundamental and 
human rights of individuals and minimize threats to international peace and 
security.  
In its resolution, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights also 
recognized the fact that “public knowledge” of the atrocities committed 
against victims of human rights violations and the nature of their suffering, as 
well as information about the perpetrators, represent “essential steps towards 
rehabilitation and reconciliation” and went on to urge “States to intensify 
their efforts to provide victims of human rights violations with a fair and 
equitable process through which these violations can be investigated and 
made public and to encourage victims to participate in such a process.”129 
These comments by the UNCHR speak directly to some of the principles 
enunciated by the United Nations for combating impunity.130 As will be 
discussed later, these principles speak to the importance of making certain 
that knowledge of violations of human rights, information about perpetrators 
of these violations, as well as the nature and the extent of the suffering 
endured by victims, is made fully available to citizens. Perhaps, more 
 
Decision 1996/119, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, at 17 (Oct. 2, 1997) (“Revised 
Final Report”). 
 126. Comm’n on Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/53: 
Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1998/53 (Apr. 17, 1998). 
 127. Id. ¶ 1. 
 128. Id. preamble.  
 129. Id. ¶ 2. 
 130. See Revised Final Report, supra note 125, at 5. 
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important, is that victims must be allowed to participate fully and effectively 
in the design and implementation of public policies to deal with impunity.131 
Major threats to international security and peace, such as serious crimes 
under international law, which include war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
including genocide, and grave breaches of international humanitarian law, 
can be directly linked to impunity. Individuals and groups are likely to 
engage in the commission of these international crimes if they are confident 
that they can do so with impunity. That is, they can participate in these 
criminal activities with virtually no risk that they would be held accountable 
for them.  Such an enabling institutional environment for impunity may exist 
in a State if, (1) as in the case of the Republic of Cameroon, the president is 
constitutionally immune from prosecution for all crimes committed while in 
office;132 (2) the government lacks the capacity to fully bring to justice 
violators of human rights; and (3) there does not exist the political will within 
the State to hold accountable perpetrators of violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law within their territories. Of course, as has 
been examined by several scholars, political will can be lacking where 
governance institutions are pervaded by corruption and civil servants and 
political elites are major beneficiaries of the various forms of corruption.133 
Before we proceed, it is important that we take a look at the evolution of the 
global campaign against impunity. 
 
B. Origins of the Global Campaign Against Impunity 
 
During its 43rd session in August 1991, the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights, requested that Mr. Louis Joinet, then Special 
Rapporteur on Impunity, carry out “a study on the impunity of perpetrators 
of human rights violations”134 globally. As argued by Joinet, the process 
through which the international community has gained awareness of the 
“imperative need to combat impunity” has actually metamorphosed through 
four stages.135 
 
 131. Id.  
 132. See Const. of the Republic of Cameroon, supra note 113, art. 53 §3. 
 133. See, e.g., JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, 
AND CLEANUPS (2010) (detailing the pervasiveness of corruption in many countries in Africa 
and how many political elites lack the will to deal with it). 
 134. Comm’n on Human Rights, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of 
Detainees, Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and 
Political), Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet Pursuant to Sub-Committee Decision 
1996/119, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, at 3 (June 26, 1997). 
 135. Id.  
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The first stage came in the 1970s, when various civil society 
organizations and legal experts, particularly in many of the dictatorships that 
pervaded Latin America, “mobilized to argue for an amnesty for political 
prisoners.”136	 According to then U.N. Special Rapporteur on Impunity, 
Louis Joinet, “[a]mnesty, as a symbol of freedom, would prove to be a topic 
that could mobilize large sectors of public opinion, thus gradually making it 
easier to amalgamate the many moves made during the period to offer 
peaceful resistance to or resist dictatorial regimes.”137 
The second stage occurred in the 1980s, when there was a proliferation 
of “‘self-amnesty’ laws proclaimed by declining military dictatorships 
anxious to arrange their own impunity while there was still time.”138 Victims 
reacted to the perverse laws—that is, those that were promulgated by 
opportunistic dictators—by organizing to develop the capacity to fight 
government impunity in their communities. In Latin America, this rise in 
anti-impunity organizations was evidenced by the “increasing prominence of 
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Latin American Federation of 
Relatives of Disappeared Detainees (FEDEFAM).139 
The third stage coincided with the end of the Cold War, which in 
Africa, was marked by the end of apartheid in South Africa and the collapse 
of many military dictatorships.140 It was at this time, specifically in the early-
 
 136. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 139. Id. ¶ 3. 
 140. The Cold War lasted from 1947 to 1991, with the collapse of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) and the end of socialism in Eastern Europe. In Africa, these 
changes in the geopolitical system resulted in the collapse of many dictatorships that had 
been supported with regular financial subventions and other types of support from the Cold 
War protagonists—the Western bloc under the leadership of the United States and the 
Eastern bloc under the leadership of the USSR. One of the most important post-Cold War 
changes in Africa was the collapse of the racially-based apartheid system in South Africa, 
which was officially inaugurated in 1948. Negotiations to officially end the policy of 
apartheid took place in South Africa during the period May 4, 1990 to April 27, 1994. On 
May 31, 1910, four British colonies in southern Africa gained independence by coming 
together to form the Union of South Africa. Although independent, the Union was a 
Dominion of the British Empire, governed as a constitutional monarchy, with the British 
monarch represented by a Governor-General. The Union Government was exclusively in the 
hands of the white minority—Afrikaners and English. The African majority was completely 
excluded from participating fully and effectively in governance. On October 5, 1960, 
through referendum, whose participation was limited to whites, a majority of the latter voted 
in favor of unilateral withdrawal from the British Commonwealth in order to establish the 
Republic of South Africa. In 1948, the Nationalist Party formally introduced the system of 
apartheid—a system of institutionalized racial segregation and discrimination—as the legal 
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1990s, that many African countries began their transition to democratic 
governance.141 Of great importance during this period was the conflict 
between the desire by former perpetrators of international crimes to be 
forgiven for all their crimes and the quest by victims for justice.  This 
conflict was fully in play in the struggle by South Africans to bring to justice 
those people who had committed various atrocities during the apartheid 
regime (1948-1994) and the desire by the perpetrators of apartheid-era 
crimes for the past to be buried.142 
Eventually, the international community began to recognize and 
appreciate the fact that in many countries around the world, the expectation 
of impunity for international crimes was enhancing engagement by both 
state- and non-state actors in violations of international human rights or 
international humanitarian law. Hence, there was urgent need to find ways to 
confront and combat impunity.  For example, on March 14, 2001, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) made a ground-breaking 
ruling in which it found that granting “amnesty for perpetrators of serious 
human rights violations was incompatible with the right of every individual 
to a fair hearing before an impartial and independent court.”143 For example, 
 
basis for the country’s governance institutions. Apartheid legislation was repealed in South 
Africa on June 17, 1991, and fully democratic, multiracial elections were held in 1994, with 
Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress winning the elections and taking control 
of the apparatus of government. Despite the fact that South Africa gained its independence 
from Great Britain on May 31, 1910, April 27, 1994, when the first democratic, non-racial 
elections were held in the country, is recognized as the country’s true independence day. 
See, e.g., GWYNETH WILLIAMS AND BRIAN HACKLAND, THE DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY 
POLITICS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (2013) (providing an overview of important historical events 
in South Africa). 
 141. For more information on Africa’s transition to democratic governance, see 
generally THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 
(John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere eds., 2003) (providing a series of essays that 
examines the transition to democratic governance in Africa); POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION 
AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY EXPERIENCES (Julius O. 
Ihonvbere & John M. Mbaku eds., 2003) (examining the transition to democratic 
governance in selected countries in Africa). 
 142. See, e.g., RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE (2001) (arguing that South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”), which was set up to deal with the 
human rights violations of apartheid, may not have met the needs of communities at the 
local level); TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: DID THE TRC DELIVER? 
(Audrey R. Chapman & Hugo van der Merwe eds., 2008) (arguing that the TRC was quite 
effective in offering victims of apartheid-era human rights violations the opportunity to tell 
their own stories and to provide policymakers with suggestions on how to prevent future 
human rights violations). 
 143. See also Final Report on Impunity, supra note 134, at 3-4. 
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in the case of Barrios Altos v. Peru,144 the IACtHR found that amnesty laws 
were incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights (“Pact 
of San José”).145 The IACtHR ruled as follows, “This Court considers that all 
amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of 
measures designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they 
are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible 
for serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, all of them prohibited because 
they violate non-derogable rights recognized by international human rights 
law.”146  
At the June 14-25, 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, 
representatives of 171 States adopted by consensus what was referred to as 
the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (“Vienna Declaration”),147 in 
which these States agreed on a common plan to strengthen the work to fight 
human rights violations around the world.148 In the Declaration, the States 
supported, albeit implicitly, the thinking of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in Barrios Altos v. Peru149 and other cases.150 Specifically, the 
States stated that “[t]he World Conference on Human Rights views with 
concern the issue of impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations, and 
supports the efforts of the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to 
examine all aspects of the issue.”151 
The Vienna Declaration also made several recommendations regarding 
impunity. For example, it recommended that “States should abrogate 
legislation leading to impunity for those responsible for grave violations of 
 
 144. Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C) No. 83, p. 17 
(Mar. 14, 2001). 
 145. Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights (San José, Costa Rica), 
American Convention on Human Rights,  Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. (Nov. 22, 1969). 
 146. Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note 144, ¶ 41. 
 147. World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna), Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action, Comm. H.R., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993). 
 148. Press Release, Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, World 
Conference on Human Rights (June 14–15, 1993, Vienna, Austria), https://www.ohchr.org/ 
en/aboutus/pages/viennawc.aspx. 
 149. Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note 144, at 14. 
 150. See also: Human Rights and the Fight Against Impunity and Corruption, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Res. 1/7 (Sept. 12, 2017) (linking the fight against corruption to the exercise 
and enjoyment of human rights and arguing that impunity fosters and perpetuates acts of 
corruption). 
 151. Vienna Declaration, supra note 147, ¶ 91. 
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human rights such as torture and prosecute such violations, thereby providing 
a firm basis for the rule of law.”152 
In August 1992, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights’ Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
(“Sub-Committee”) asked Mr. El Hadji Guissé153 and Mr. Louis Joinet154 to 
study the impunity of perpetrators of violations of human rights and present 
their report to the Sub-Committee. The preliminary report prepared by Mr. 
Guissé and Mr. Joinet was presented to the Sub-Committee in August 1993. 
The Sub-Committee then decided to split the work into two main categories 
and entrusted Mr. Joinet with the study of the impunity of perpetrators of the 
violations of civil and political rights and Mr. Guissé with the study of the 
impunity of perpetrators of violations of economic, social and cultural 
rights.155 
Mr. Joinet presented his final report, which is dated June 26, 1997,156 to 
the Sub-Committee at the latter’s 49th session in August 1997. A revised 
final report is dated October 2, 1997.157 Mr. Guissé presented his own report 
to the Sub-Committee at the 49th session of the Sub-Committee in August 
1997 and it is dated June 27, 1997.158 The final principles appear in Annex II 
of E/CH.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 and are titled “Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat 







 152. Vienna Declaration, supra note 147, ¶ 60. 
 153. Mr. El Hadji Guissé is a Senegalese judge who was elected as a Judge of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in January 2006 and served until 2012. He 
also served the United Nations in several capacities, including as Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Drinking Water in 1998. He was also a U.N. Special Rapporteur on the question of 
perpetrators of human rights violations (economic, social and cultural rights). See U.N. 
Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of 
Minorities, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Final Report on the 
Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights), Prepared by Mr. El Hadji Guissé, Special Rapporteur, Pursuant to Sub-
Commission Resolution 1996/24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/8 (June 27, 1997). 
 154. Mr. Louis Joinet was a U.N. Special Rapporteur on Impunity. 
 155. Question of Impunity, supra note 153, ¶ ¶ 10–12. 
 156. See Final Report on Impunity, supra note 134, at 1. 
 157. Revised Final Report, supra note 125, at 1. 
 158. Question of Impunity, supra note 153, at 1. 
 159. See Final Report on Impunity, supra note 134, at 15. 
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C. Overview of The Principles for the Protection of Human Rights 
Through Action to Combat Impunity 
 
In the Preamble to the Principles, the U.N. General Assembly recalls the 
Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “which states that 
disregard and contempt of human rights have resulted in barbarous acts 
which have outraged the conscience of mankind,”160 considers that “the duty 
of every State under international law to respect and to secure respect for 
human rights requires that effective measures should be taken to control 
impunity,”161 recalls the recommendation contained in paragraph 91 of Part 
II of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action,162 and “[d]ecides, . . . 
solemnly to proclaim the following principles for the guidance of States 
having to combat impunity.”163 
The Principles begin with a definition of impunity, which is centered 
around the existence, in each country, of the impossibility, de jure or de 
facto, of bringing to justice those who are complicit in human rights 
violations.164 In addition, a definition is given to “serious crimes under 
international law”—the expression “covers war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, including genocide, and grave breaches of and crimes against 
international humanitarian law.”165 Principles 1-4 come under the category 
named the “Right to Know”—every person has “the inalienable right to 
know the truth about past events and about the circumstances and reasons 
which led, through the consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, 
to perpetration of aberrant crimes.”166 This right is important and critical to 
the minimization of future recurrence. Principles 2-4 impose a duty on the 
State to remember and to preserve the collective memory and to guard 
against the development of “revisionist and negationist arguments”;167 
guarantees victims, their families and their loved ones, the right to know the 
truth about the “circumstances in which violations took place and, in the 
 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Paragraph 91 of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action states as follows: 
“The World Conference on Human Rights views with concern the issue of impunity of 
perpetrators of human rights violations, and supports the efforts of the Commission on 
Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities to examine all aspects of the issue.” 
 163. See Final Report on Impunity, supra note 134, at 15. 
 164. Id. Annex II(A). 
 165. Id. Annex II(B). 
 166. Id. at 16. 
 167. Id. 
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event of death or disappearance, the victim’s fate”;168 and demands that 
States take appropriate action to give effect to the right to know, including 
establishing extrajudicial commissions of inquiry and making certain that 
information gathered is preserved for posterity, through, for example, the 
establishment and maintenance of archives.169 
Principles 5-12 fall under the category “Extrajudicial Commissions of 
Inquiry” and provide information on the role of the extrajudicial 
commissions of inquiry; how to guarantee their independence and 
impartiality; their terms of reference; guarantees for persons implicated in the 
crimes being investigated, as well as for victims and witnesses; operating 
procedures for the commissions; and procedures for disseminating the 
information collected by the commissions.170 
Preservation of and access to archives is covered under Principles 13-
18. Generally, Principles 1-18 deal with the right to know, while Principles 
19-35 deal with the right to justice. This part of the Principles starts by 
reminding States that “[t]here can be no just and lasting reconciliation 
without an effective response to the need for justice” and that “an important 
element in reconciliation is forgiveness, a private act which implies that the 
victim knows the perpetrator of the violations and that the latter has been 
able to show repentance.”171 
Principle 20 deals specifically with the duties of States with regard to 
the administration of justice. Noting that “impunity is a failure of States to 
meet their obligations to investigate violations, take appropriate measures in 
respect of perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, to ensure that they 
are prosecuted, tried and duly punished,” as well as to “provide the victims 
with effective remedies and reparation for the injuries suffered, and to take 
steps to prevent any recurrence of such violations,”172 this principle argues 
further that each State must make available to victims “supplementary 
procedural rules,” which can enable a victim to “institute proceedings on his 
or her own behalf where the authorities fail to do so, or become an associated 
party.”173 This provision is especially important in Africa, where the State 
and its agents/proxies are often the source of the threat to international 
peace—that is, they are the perpetrators of human rights violations. 
Principles 21-25 deal with the distribution of jurisdiction for impunity 
and serious crimes under international law between national, foreign and 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 16–19. 
 171. Id. at 20. 
 172. Id. at 21. 
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international courts. These principles state that in order to avoid the need to 
refer situations to ad hoc international criminal courts, it is necessary for the 
global community to establish a standing international criminal court with 
jurisdiction binding on all Member States.174 Principles 22-25 deal with rules 
of procedure applicable in international courts, jurisdiction of foreign courts, 
measures to strengthen the effectiveness of treaty provisions on universal 
jurisdiction, and measures to determine extraterritorial jurisdiction in internal 
law.175 States are granted authority through Principle 25 “to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over serious crimes under international law 
committed outside their territory which by their nature are within the 
purview not only of internal criminal law but also of an international punitive 
system to which the concept of frontiers is alien” and this power can be 
exercised only in the case where it is not possible “to apply a universal 
jurisdiction clause to the country where the crime was committed.”176 
Articles 26-35 deal with restrictive measures justified by action to 
combat impunity. Emphasis is placed on safeguards against the “misuse to 
further impunity of prescriptions, amnesty, right to asylum, refusal to 
extradite, absence of in absentia procedure, due obedience, legislation on 
repentance, the jurisdiction of military courts and the irremovability of 
judges.”177 The overall objective of these principles is to minimize any 
attempts by perpetrators and their supporters, who may include national 
governments, from avoiding prosecution and punishment, if found guilty. 
The rest of the principles (36-50) deal with the right to reparation.  It is 
noted that any violation of human rights—whether by state- or non-state 
actors—“gives rise to a right to reparation on the part of the victim or his or 
her beneficiaries, implying a duty on the part of the State to make reparation 
and the possibility for the victim to seek redress from the perpetrator.”178 The 
State has an obligation under these principles to make certain that the 
victim’s right to reparation is upheld and the victim allowed to exercise it and 
if, necessary, with the help of the State. Where necessary, the State must 
provide the victim protection from intimidation and reprisals, as well as 
access to applicable international procedures, should he choose to exercise 
his right to reparation.179 
 
 174. The Rome Statute created such a court in 2002 called the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). See Rome Statute, supra note 116, at 8.  
 175. See Final Report on Impunity, supra note 134, at 21. 
 176. Id. at 22. 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 24. 
 179. Id. at 25. 
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These principles also impose a duty on the Member States to take 
appropriate measures to make certain that there is no repeat of the 
violations—that is, victims must not be victimized again. Thus, States must 
take measures to (1) disband parastatal armed groups; (2) repeal emergency 
provisions, which have enhanced or made possible violations; and (3) 
administrative or other measures vis-à-vis State officials implicated in 
serious human rights violations.180 
Since the Principles were submitted to the U.N. Commission for Human 
Rights in 1997, they have played “an influential role in strengthening 
domestic efforts to combat impunity.”181 In addition, the Principles have 
become very important references for the decision-making processes of, and 
have been affirmed by, various international criminal tribunals and human 
rights treaty bodies. For example, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (“IACHR”) held, in its review of the Supreme Court of 
Justice of Chile’s decision in Carmelo Soria Espinoza v. Chile,182 that 
although the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, established by 
Chile’s democratic government to investigate past violations of human 
rights, as well as look into “the situation of the disappeared detainees,”183 had 
covered a large number of cases and situations, it had, nevertheless, failed to 
investigate “criminal acts committed by State agents,”184 nor had it identified 
and punished those responsible and this was due to the Amnesty law. The 
IACHR concluded that “the State did not comply with its obligation to 
investigate and punish those responsible for violating the human rights of 
Carmelo Soria Espinoza and that the dismissal resulting from the application 
of amnesty, despite the incriminating evidence existing against them, 
demonstrates that the State also failed to comply with its obligation to 
punish.”185 
The first eighteen Principles deal with the right to know the truth—this 
right has garnered strong support and affirmation by many international 
human rights bodies. For example, the various institutions and organizations 
 
 180. Id. at 26–27. 
 181. Comm’n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Impunity: 
Independent Study of Best Practices, Including Recommendations, to Assist States in 
Strengthening Their Domestic Capacity to Combat all Aspects of Impunity, by Professor 
Diane Orentlicher, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/88 (Feb. 27, 2004), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/113/55/PDF/G0411355.pdf?OpenElement (“Independent 
Study”). 
 182. Carmelo Soria Espinoza v. Chile, Case 11.725, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 133/99 (Nov. 19, 1999), http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/Merits/Chile11.725.htm. 
 183. Id. ¶ 102. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. ¶ 106. 
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established under the American Convention on Human Rights, for example, 
have “recognized that the anguish that individuals experience as a result of 
uncertainty about the fate of close relatives who are direct victims of 
enforced disappearance in itself constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment and thus is a distinct violation of the relevant treaty.”186 States, 
then, are under obligation to investigate all situations involving violations of 
human rights, including the disappearance of detainees, and inform their 
relatives of their fate.187 
In addition, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights188 has recognized, consistent with Principle 36,189 the right “to 
know the full, complete, and public truth as to the events that transpired, their 
specific circumstances, and who participated in them” as “part of the right to 
reparation for human rights violations.”190 
Since the Principles were submitted to the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights in 1997, there have been significant advances in efforts by domestic, 
regional and international actors to combat impunity through the arrest and 
prosecution of those alleged to have committed serious international crimes.  
For example, in 2002, the Rome Statute established the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.191 In addition, there have 
been trials of senior Rwandan/Yugoslav officials before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)192 and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”),193 respectively.194 
 
 186. Independent Study, supra note 181, ¶ 14. 
 187. Id. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ accumulated jurisprudence on this 
subject is presented and affirmed in Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70 (Nov. 25, 2000), ¶ ¶ 159–66, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/ 
docs/casos/articulos/seriec_70_ing.pdf. See, specifically. 
 188. See, e.g., Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Roméro y Galdåamez v. El Salvador, Case 
11.481, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 37/00 (Apr. 3, 2000). 
 189. Principle 36 deals with the rights and duties arising out of the obligation to make 
reparations. See Final Report on Impunity, supra note 134, at 25. 
 190. Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Roméro y Galdåamez v. El Salvador, supra note 188, ¶ 
148. See also id. ¶ 147. 
 191. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 116, at 8. 
 192. For more on the ICTR and its work, see generally USTA KAITESI, GENOCIDAL 
GENDER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE LEGACY OF THE ICTR, RWANDA’S ORDINARY COURTS 
AND GACACA COURTS (2014) (examining, inter alia, the experiences of victims of genocidal 
and sexual violence have been addressed on a theoretical and practical level). 
 193. For more on the ICTY, see generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE ICTY (Gideon Boas & William A. Schabas eds., 
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D. Update and Revision of the Principles 
 
On April 21, 2004, through its Resolution 2004/72,195 the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights requested the U.N. Secretary-General “to 
appoint an independent expert, from within existing resources and for a 
period of one year, to update the Set of Principles196 to reflect recent 
developments in international law and practice, including international 
jurisprudence and State practice.”197 The expert hired to update the Principles 
was also required to take into consideration an independent study on 
impunity that had been undertaken earlier at the request of the U.N. 
Secretary-General (“Independent Study”).198 
In updating the Principles, the expert, Professor Orentlicher, noted that a 
central premise of the Principles is the need for the international community 
to develop and adopt a comprehensive approach towards fighting or 
combating impunity and in doing so, States have a very important and 
critical role to play.199 In line with that premise, Principle 18(1) of the 
original revised Principles,200 which recognizes various measures that States 
are required to take in order to meet their obligations to fight impunity, was 
made Principle 1. The new Principle 1 states as follows: 
 
 
2003) (examining, inter alia, the experiences of the ICTY in prosecuting perpetrators of war 
crimes and gross or systematic violations of human rights).  
 194. For more discussion of the Principles and how their existence has affected the 
struggle against impunity, see generally Independent Study, supra note 181; THE UNITED 
NATIONS PRINCIPLES TO COMBAT IMPUNITY: A COMMENTARY (Frank Haldemann & Thomas 
Unger eds., 2018). 
 195. Office of the [U.N.] High Commissioner for Human Rights, Impunity: Commission 
on Human Rights Resolution: 2004/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127 (Apr. 21, 2004), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/43f313869.html. 
 196. That is, the Set of Principles for the protection and promotion of human rights 
through action to combat impunity. See Revised Final Report, supra note 125, Annex II. 
 197. Id. ¶ 20. 
 198. Independent Study, supra note 181, at 1 (stating that the expert hired was Professor 
Diane Orentlicher, Professor of International Law at American University, Washington, 
D.C., who is also one of the world’s leading authorities on international human rights law, 
war crimes tribunals, and transitional justice).  
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Rights: Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat 
Impunity, Diane Orentlicher, Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity (“Report of the 
Independent Expert”), Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add. 1 
(Feb. 8, 2005), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/109/00/PDF/G051 
0900.pdf?OpenElement. 
 200. See Revised Final Report, supra note 125, at 22–23. 
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Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to 
investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the 
perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that 
those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and 
duly punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to 
ensure that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to 
ensure the inalienable right to know the truth about violations; and 
to take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of 
violations.201  
Another set of revisions targeted and reflected developments in State 
practice that inform effective approaches to and strategies for combating 
impunity. The updated Principles noted an important finding of the 
Independent Study,202 which affirmed the critical importance of the “broad 
participation of victims and other citizens”203 in the design and 
implementation of policies to combat impunity.  Note was made of the extent 
to which South Africa’s post-apartheid government went in making certain 
that victims of apartheid crimes were granted the facilities and wherewithal 
to participate fully and effectively in promulgating the law establishing the 
country’s truth and reconciliation commission.  But, why is the participation 
of victims in the design and implementation of anti-impunity policies 
critical?  
First, as the Independent Study204 determined, participation enhances 
public support for the policy and ensures its likely success. Second, allowing 
victims to participate in the design and implementation of policies to combat 
impunity helps make certain that any such programs reflect and respond to 
“victims’ actual needs.”205 Third, giving victims the power to participate can 
provide them with a new sense of belonging—since victims are most likely 
to be individuals who had previously been denied the protection of the law, 
participation in the design and implementation of policies to combat 
impunity can serve as a mechanism to finally bring them into the community 
of citizens that are fully protected by the law.206 Fourth, participation in 
public dialogue about how to fight impunity can provide the wherewithal for 
victims to “reclaim control over their lives and may help restore their 
 
 201. See Updated Set of Principles, supra note 199, at 7. 
 202. Independent Study, supra note 181 at 2. 
 203. Id. ¶ 11. 
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confidence in government.”207 Fifth, public policies to fight impunity that 
emerge from broad-based national consultation are more likely “to secure 
sustainable justice for the future, in accordance with international standards, 
domestic legal traditions and national aspirations”208 than those that are 
developed through a top-down, elite-driven and non-participatory process. 
Finally, public engagement, for example, through truth and reconciliation 
commission, can allow victims “to engage in a cathartic denunciation” of 
those who had committed mass atrocities against them.209 
To enhance the effectiveness of public policies to fight impunity, it is 
also important that the participation of women, especially in countries where 
women have traditionally been excluded from public discourse, be 
guaranteed—women must be allowed to participate at levels that are equal to 
those of their fellow male citizens.  For example, in constituting 
commissions of enquiry, including truth and reconciliation commissions, 
concerted efforts must be made to ensure that women are adequately 
represented.  Of course, given the history of discrimination against and 
marginalization of certain groups (e.g., religious and ethnic minorities) in the 
African countries, it is important that they be granted the opportunity to 
participate fully and effectively in the design and implementation of public 
policies, particularly those to combat impunity. 
Effective policies to combat impunity are those which are not based on 
a “one-size-fits-all” approach.  Instead, programs to fight impunity should 
take into consideration the needs of victims, their desire for justice, as well as 
local realities. That is why broad-based public consultation is very important. 
Of course, these Principles, it is noted, “are not legal standards in the strict 
sense, but guiding principles.”210 Nevertheless, while these Principles are not 
legal standards, they “reflect and comport with pertinent legal standards.”211 
The updated Principles introduced the phrase “truth commission”—the 
latter is a special type of commission of inquiry, which since the early-1990s, 
has increasingly become a major tool for dealing with the right to know. In 
the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, the truth and 
reconciliation commission emerged as a major tool that was used to help the 
people, particularly the victims, deal with the atrocities committed by the 
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apartheid regime.212 In addition, records about truth commissions, how they 
are established and how they function, can help other countries that find 
themselves in need of such commissions. For example, in establishing its 
own truth commission in 2002, Timor-Leste was inspired by South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) but made modifications to 
deal with what they argued were the TRC’s deficiencies. Accordingly, 
Timor-Leste’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
(“CAVR”), unlike South Africa’s TRC, did not permit immunity for serious 
crimes, such as murder or rape, and grants immunity for other crimes only on 
condition that the perpetrator agrees to and actually performs community 
service or makes a symbolic financial payment in addition to the 
confession.213 
Professor Orentlicher concludes her report by stating that since the 
Principles were submitted to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 
1997, “seemingly impregnable barriers to prosecution have been dismantled 
in countries that endured the depredations of dictatorship.”214 In addition, 
many States have “cooperated to ensure prosecution of officials at the highest 
levels of Government before international tribunals and national courts; a 
new breed of court, combining national and international elements, has 
entered the lexicon of institutions designed to render justice for atrocious 
crimes; and Governments and civil society have benefited from an expanding 
repertoire of tools for combating impunity and from a deepening reservoir of 
expertise and insight concerning the design and implementation of effective 
anti-impunity programs.”215 
It is clear that since the Principles were submitted to the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights in 1997, there have been significant 
advances, at both the international and national levels, in efforts to battle 
impunity. Nevertheless, there is need for States, particularly those in Africa, 
to engage in comprehensive institutional reforms in order to provide 
themselves with strong democratic institutions—specifically, an independent 
judiciary, a robust independent press, and a legislature that has enough 
 
 212. For more on South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, see generally 
TRUTH & RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: 10 YEARS ON (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Fanie 
du Toit eds., 2007). 
 213. For more on Timor-Leste’s truth and reconciliation work, see generally Post-
CAVR Technical Secretariat, CHEGAL: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TIMOR-LESTE 
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independence to fully check on the exercise of government power. In 
addition, and perhaps more important, is that each African country should 
seek to enhance the development of a strong and politically active civil 
society that can serve as an important check on the government. All these 
democratic institutions can ensure that those who commit international 
crimes are brought to justice.  Often, impunity arises from the decision, by 
political elites, not to prosecute certain individuals, many of whom are 
members or agents of the incumbent government, for their involvement in 
international crimes.  Hence, as part of the effort to fight impunity, States 
should provide themselves with governing processes that adequately 
constrain the state and prevent civil servants and political elites from granting 
themselves immunity from or amnesty for their criminal acts. 
 




Africa has had a long tradition of impunity—from the colonialists who 
brutalized defenseless villagers in as part of the effort to maximize the flow, 
from the continent, of scarce resources to the European economies, to 
modern-day dictators who continue to brutalize their fellow citizens in order 
to maintain a monopoly on power. While there are many examples from 
Africa’s history to illustrate the level of colonial brutality, we will mention 
only two. First, is King Leopold II’s brutal treatment of the peoples of 
Congo.  During the colonial period in what was then the Congo Free State,216 
the colonialists used significant levels of brutality to force Congolese people 
to collect rubber. For example, an eyewitness account of this brutality from a 
junior officer of the Force publique,217 is as follows: 
 
 216. The Congo Free State (l’État indépendant du Congo) was a large territory in central 
Africa that was ruled personally by Belgian’s King Leopold II from 1885 to 1908. It was 
operated separately from Belgium. In 1908, Belgium annexed the territory and converted it 
into a colony, which was renamed Belgian Congo. For more on the Congo Free State, see, 
e.g., MARTIN EWANS, EUROPEAN ATROCITY, AFRICAN CATASTROPHE: LEOPOLD II, THE 
CONGO FREE STATE AND ITS AFTERMATH (2002); ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S 
GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1999); HENRY 
WELLINGTON WACK, THE STORY OF THE CONGO FREE STATE: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE BELGIAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN CENTRAL AFRICA (G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons 1905). 
 217. The Force publique was a military force in the Congo Free State, as well as in 
Belgian Congo. At independence in 1960 the Force publique was converted into the 
Congolese National Army (l’Armée nationale congolaise). For more on the Force publique, 
see, e.g., BRYANT P. SHAW, FORCE PUBLIQUE, FORCE UNIQUE: THE MILITARY IN BELGIAN 
CONGO, 1914–1939 (1984); LOUIS-FRANÇOIS VANDERSTRAETEN, DE LA FORCE PUBLIQUE À 
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We were a party of thirty [which was sent] to a village to ascertain 
if the natives were collecting rubber, and, if not, to murder all, men, 
women, and children.  We found the natives sitting peacefully. We 
asked what they were doing. They were unable to reply, thereupon 
we fell upon them and killed them all without mercy.218 
 
Regardless of who the colonial power of record was, colonialism “was 
an extremely brutal, inhuman, and heartless system designed to maximize 
benefits accruing to Europeans in the colonies and the métropole.”219 
Michael Crowder, an expert on European colonialism in Africa, argues that 
during the colonial period, any efforts by Africans to resist their exploitation 
and domination by the Europeans was “visited by punitive expeditions that 
were often quite unrestrained by any of the norms of warfare in Europe.”220 
Crowder then cites as an example of the extent to which brutality was critical 
in the colonial enterprise, “the bloody suppression of the Maji Maji and 
Herero uprisings in German East Africa and South West Africa,” as well as 
various atrocities committed during the British-sponsored “suppression of the 
Satiru revolt in [the colony of] Northern Nigeria.”221 Additional evidence is 
found in the correspondences of Edward Lugard, brother of Lord Lugard—
the latter was, at the time, the British High Commissioner in the colony of 
Northern Nigeria and the architect of the British policy of indirect rule in 
West Africa.  Edward Lugard, on a visit to the colony of Northern Nigeria 
was taken aback by the level and nature of brutality visited upon defenseless 
women by colonial forces.  In a letter to his brother (Lord Lugard), which 
was dated May 21, 1908, Edward Lugard wrote that “they [colonial soldiers, 
military police, and regular police units] killed every living thing before 
them”222 and that “[w]omen’s breasts had been cut off and the leader spitted 
on a stake.”223 
There is no evidence that any of the perpetrators of these atrocities 
against defenseless Africans was ever held accountable for their deeds.  In 
fact, in many cases, as illustrated by the activities of the Force publique in 
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the Congo Free State, as well as in Belgian Congo, such brutality was 
actually a requirement of the job for soldiers and other paramilitary forces.  
Perhaps, more importantly, is the fact that those who engaged in such 
inhuman treatment of Africans were rewarded for their actions.224 
Of course, there was South Africa’s system of institutionalized racial 
segregation called apartheid.225 Officially established in 1948, apartheid was 
based on white supremacy and permanent black (or African) inferiority.  To 
make it work, the white minority government enacted an extraordinary 
number of laws, which ranged from the prohibition of marriages between 
blacks and whites to those that forcefully removed Africans from their homes 
and placed them in economically unsustainable “homelands.”226 That 
apartheid was characterized by extremely high levels of impunity is not in 
doubt. One need only read narratives provided through the post-apartheid 
truth and reconciliation process to gauge the extent to which apartheid’s 
security forces had killed, maimed, and generally brutalized Africans, with 
impunity.227 
Despite the significant improvements in governance that have taken 
place in the continent since many countries began to transition their political 
systems to democracy in the early 1990s, impunity still remains a major 
concern. The genocidal massacre of Tutsi and their Hutu sympathizers by the 
Hutu-majority government during a 100-day period in the summer of 1994, 
is just one example of the atrocities that continue to pervade African societies 
even into the 21st century and without the perpetrators being brought to 
justice.228 Below, we take a brief look at how some African countries have 
attempted to deal with impunity. Nevertheless, before we do so, we will first 
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take a look at truth commissions, which have emerged as the most important 
instrument for addressing the causes of conflict and providing 
recommendations on how affected societies can deal with impunity. 
 
B. The Truth Commission and Impunity in Africa 
 
A truth commission is a mechanism that can be used to administer 
justice, address the root causes of conflict, and provide policymakers with 
recommendations on how to deal with impunity. The first truth commission 
in post-independence Africa was one that was established in 1974 by then 
president of Uganda, Idi Amin, to investigate “enforced disappearances” 
under his regime.229 Since that time, the truth commission has emerged as “a 
means to investigate past human rights violations, uncover the repressive 
machinery of authoritarian regimes, and identity systemic socioeconomic 
injustices.”230 
Since the early 1990s, at least twenty-five truth commissions have been 
established in Africa. The ability of each of these truth commissions to 
uncover the truth has been affected significantly by their “institutional 
design.”231 For example, if the truth commission is granted subpoena power, 
as well as significant operating resources (e.g., money, skilled manpower), it 
is more likely than not, to access information on the committed atrocities.  In 
addition, those commissions that are granted the power to publicly name 
perpetrators are more likely to force accountability (even if only 
symbolically) and in doing so, secure some level of justice for the victims. 
But, what if the commission is empowered to grant amnesty to perpetrators? 
It has been suggested that giving it the power to grant amnesty can actually 
transform the commission, at least in the eyes of victims, into a supporter of 
impunity.232 Although South Africa’s post-apartheid Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) was empowered to grant “conditional 
amnesty in exchange for full disclosure of crimes,”233 most of the continent’s 
truth commissions have usually not been granted such power.  
Unfortunately, truth commissions, as they currently operate in Africa, 
have many limitations. For one thing, in order for them to function 
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effectively as tools to unearth the truth about past atrocities, as well as deliver 
some justice to victims, there must be political will—the government must 
not only be willing to support the commission’s activities, but it must also 
provide the necessary human and financial resources for the commission to 
carry out its duties, as well as provide an environment in the country within 
which truth-telling can easily be accomplished.234 As argued by the African 
Union Panel of the Wise,235 “there is a real danger that [truth commissions] 
are increasingly seen as a panacea, inserted into peace agreements in order to 
provide options for leaders seeking to avoid criminal accountability.”236 
Nevertheless, truth commissions remain a powerful tool to fight impunity. 
However, they can do so only if they are provided enough resources to do 
their jobs and there is necessary political support. At the very least, truth 
commissions can provide the necessary forum for societies afflicted by 
rampant human rights violations to investigate and uncover the truth about 
past and on-going atrocities, as well as provide victims with some level of 
justice, even if only symbolic.237 Of course, truth commissions can play an 
important role in national peacebuilding efforts, help build a culture of 
respect for human rights, and provide policymakers with important 
recommendations on how to create institutions that generally improve 
governance. As stated by the A.U. Panel of the Wise, “when properly 
executed, truth commissions can be one among a host of mechanisms for 
restoring the rule of law.”238 
Principle 31239 represents an important tenet of international human 
rights law, which is “the right to reparation on the part of the victim or his or 
her beneficiaries, implying a duty on the part of the State to make reparation 
and the possibility for the victim to seek redress from the perpetrator.”240 
This principle is given practical effect by Article 75 of the Rome Statute “in 
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the context of international criminal proceedings.”241 Reparations are 
considered very important because they place emphasis on victims and, in 
addition, represent “a critical transitional justice mechanism for repairing 
relations between national actors and victims.”242 In addition to the fact that 
the right to reparations can be found in many multilateral treaties, it is now 
accepted as part of customary international law.243 In a resolution adopted on 
December 16, 2005, the U.N. General Assembly outlined principles on the 
right to remedy and reparations.244 In its resolution, the U.N. General 
Assembly identified five components of the right to reparation: restitution 
(the victim should be restored to the original situation before the gross 
violations of international human rights law or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law occurred), compensation (payment should be 
made for any economically assessable damage), rehabilitation (which include 
medical and psychological care, as well as legal and social services), 
satisfaction (various measures, including cessation of continuing violations, 
public apology, and judicial and administrative sanctions against persons 
liable for the violations), and guarantees of non-repetition (these include 
effective civilian control of military and security forces, strengthening the 
independence of the judiciary, and promoting mechanisms for preventing 
and monitoring social conflicts and their resolution).245 
During the last several years, truth commissions or truth-seeking bodies 
have risen to play an important role in reparation regimes.  For example, 
truth-seeking commissions in South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Liberia have 
all made recommendations on reparations. Morocco and Malawi have 
created dedicated institutions for reparations and Morocco granted its truth 
commission the power to grant reparations directly to victims.246  
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 i. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
Since the early-1990s, many African countries have become “a vast 
testing ground for new policies to address impunity, seek truth and justice, 
and enable reconciliation in fractured societies.”247 One of the most 
instructive and informative transitions from a governmental regime pervaded 
by impunity to a democratic one is South Africa’s post-apartheid political 
system. In 1995, as South Africa was in the process of transitioning from the 
apartheid system, the government enacted the Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act (“PNURA”).248 Chapter 2 of the PNURA creates a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) as “a juristic person,” whose 
objectives would be “to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit 
of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past.”249 
Specifically, the TRC was tasked with “establishing as complete a picture as 
possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human 
rights which were committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the 
cut-off date.”250 
South Africans were eager to uncover the truth about the crimes and 
atrocities committed during the apartheid era and hold the perpetrators 
accountable for their actions.251 To ensure full disclosure, the TRC offered 
amnesty to perpetrators so that they could come forward on their own and 
testify.252 South Africa’s TRC released the report of its investigation in 1998, 
with two important conclusions: (1) the apartheid government had committed 
the majority of human rights abuses during the period 1960-1994; and (2) the 
African National Congress and other anti-apartheid groups also committed 
human rights violations.253 
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Besides offering victims an opportunity to seek and secure justice, 
South Africa’s truth and reconciliation process also involved more broader 
objectives, which included, inter alia, the construction of a solid foundation 
for democratic governance. It was critical for South Africans that there be 
reconciliation and accountability at the national level and the TRC provided 
the medium through which these important goals could be achieved or 
actualized. Of course, there was fear, especially among vulnerable groups, 
primarily those which had been abused and exploited during the apartheid 
regime, that these atrocities could be visited upon them again. Hence, TRC 
was expected to make recommendations on how post-apartheid society could 
make certain that such crimes and atrocities were never committed again. 
With respect to post-apartheid South Africa, the key to making certain that 
apartheid-era crimes would never be repeated, lies in the country’s strong 
democratic institutions—an independent judiciary, a strong, robust, and 
politically-informed and active civil society, and an independent press. These 
institutions provide a check on the exercise of government power and ensure 
that anyone, including even high-ranking officials of the state, who engages 
in behaviors that violate human rights, is brought to justice. 
Despite the fact that the TRC succeeded in laying the foundation for a 
strong and robust democracy in South Africa, it was criticized by many 
citizens, especially those who had been severely impoverished by apartheid, 
for not dealing fully and effectively with the socioeconomics impacts of 
apartheid. Specifically, critics of the TRC argued that it had totally failed to 
hold the beneficiaries of the apartheid system—who included individuals and 
business enterprises—accountable for their complicity in this regime that had 
committed numerous atrocities against millions of people.254 The TRC was 
designed specifically to foster national and political reconciliation and not 
individual reconciliation. Hence, victims took the TRC to task for “raising 
expectations about its ability to foster individual reconciliation.”255 Critics 
have argued that there were other problems that rendered the TRC less 
effective as a tool for administering transitional justice. First, the TRC lacked 
“comprehensive reparations and redress,”256 and as a consequence, many 
victims of apartheid continue to wait for justice. Second, the threat to 
prosecute those perpetrators who did not come forward to testify was limited 
and ineffective. In 2005 and 2007, the ANC Government of South Africa 
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implemented two policies,257 which paved the way for perpetrators of crimes 
under apartheid to have a second chance at amnesty. However, local and 
international civil society groups, working together, and in cooperation with 
various victims’ groups in South Africa, “secured a legal victory that ruled 
that the state should be compelled to fulfill its constitutional obligation to 
investigate cases from the apartheid era, including compliance with the TRC 
principle of victims’ participation in the granting of pardons.”258 
 
 ii. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) was 
established in November 1994 by the United Nations Security Council and 
empowered to prosecute the perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law.259 According to Article 
1 of the U.N. Security Council’s Resolution 995, which established the 
ICTR,  
 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to 
proscute persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and 
Rwadan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the 
territory of neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994, in accordance with the provisions of the present 
Statute.260 
 
In December 2015, the ICTR delivered its 45th and final judgment and 
then made preparations to formally close.261 Although the ICTR was not the 
only institution set up to judge those who were responsible for killing over 
800,000 Tutsi and their Hutu sympathizers, it was the first international court 
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to render judgment on the crime of genocide.262 Nearly four years after the 
gruesome massacre took place, Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former teacher, school 
inspector, and mayor of Taba, was convicted of nine counts of genocide and 
crimes against humanity.263 The ICTR went on to convict many more 
perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide, including Jean Kambanda, who 
became the first head of a government to be convicted of genocide by an 
international court.264 
Among the people who were indicted by the ICTR, were political elites, 
businessmen, and high-ranking military leaders and civil servants. About 
two-thirds of them were convicted and sentenced and, as much as, 3,000 
witnesses appeared before the tribunal to give their personal testimony of 
crimes against humanity. According to information provided on the official 
ICTR website,265 by April 2018, the ICTR had indicted 93 individuals; 
concluded proceedings for 80 accused individuals; transferred 30 convicted 
individuals to a State266 to serve their sentence; 2 were awaiting transfer to a 
State to serve their sentence; 22 had completed serving their sentence; 6 had 
died while serving their sentence; 1 had died before being transferred to a 
State to serve their sentence; 3 had died before judgment was passed; 14 
were acquitted; and 2 had their indictments withdrawn.267 
The ICTR’s work was a major tool against impunity in Africa.  In 
addition to the fact that the ICTR was the first international court to 
recognize rape as “a means of perpetuating genocide,”268 it also made history 
in Africa by convicting a head of government, former Rwandan prime 
minister, Jean Kambanda, for crimes against humanity.269 Thus, the ICTR 
can be viewed as an international legal institution that sent a powerful 
message to African government officials and other actors that they would no 
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long be able to commit serious international crimes or commit serious human 
rights violations with impunity. Viewed positively then, one can argue that 
the ICTR’s judgments sent a message to anyone who “commit[s] genocide or 
other atrocities” that, regardless of their political, economic, or social 
standing, they will no longer go unpunished; they will be brought to justice, 
even if the national government is either unwilling or unable to do so. 
However, the ICTR’s critics argue that this was a very expensive 
experiment in transitional justice that provided only marginal benefits.  For 
example, they argue that the ICTR spent $2 billion and only managed to 
produce a small number of convictions, especially given the scale of the 
massacres—nearly one million Rwandans were brutally massacred in just 
100 days. Perhaps, more important is the fact that many critics argue that the 
ICTR delivered nothing to each victim’s family or the survivors of the 
genocide.270 In addition, many ordinary Rwandans argue that as important as 
the process was, there was a disconnect between them and what was taking 
place in Arusha—they were not provided the opportunity to fully participate 
in and witness the proceedings. Also, many of them believed that the 
sentences handed out by the ICTR were not harsh enough, especially given 
the brutal nature of the atrocities committed.271 
Some critics have argued that the ICTR’s concentration on genocide 
crimes committed against the Tutsi population by the Hutu-dominated 
government forced it to neglect investigating atrocities committed by Tutsi-
backed groups throughout the country during the civil war.  These critics 
argue that the failure of the ICTR to investigate and prosecute crimes 
committed by the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (“RPF”) during 
the civil war was a major failing of the international tribunal.272 Despite these 
alleged shortcomings, it is important to recognize the fact that the legal 
precedents set by this international court will become important tools for 
fighting impunity.  These precedents have now become part of the 
international community’s and Africa’s human rights jurisprudence.  
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IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST 
IMPUNITY IN AFRICA  
 
A. The International Criminal Court and Impunity in Africa 
 
When the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)273 began criminal 
proceedings against Congolese militia leader, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, in 
2009,274 it appeared that the international community had finally taken 
concrete steps to fight impunity in Africa and other parts of the world.  
Unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and other 
temporary and specially-created international courts, the ICC is the world’s 
first permanent international criminal court. It is empowered to bring to 
justice individuals who are alleged to have committed serious international 
crimes, which include the violation of human rights.275  
The ICC’s efforts to fight impunity have been praised by human rights 
advocates, especially in Africa.276 Since it came into being in 2002, the ICC 
has focused disproportionately on African situations and that has drawn 
criticisms from many Africans, who see the international tribunal as an 
instrument of modern imperialism.277 When the ICC attempted to prosecute 
two sitting African heads of state—Sudan’s Omar Hassan al-Bashir and then 
Libyan strong-man, Muammar al-Qaddafi—the African Union declined to 
enforce arrest warrants against the two leaders. Since both countries were not 
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signatories to the Rome Statute, jurisdiction was obtained through a 
resolution from the U.N. Security Council.278 Within Africa, controversy also 
arose over the ICC’s attempts to prosecute top Kenyan officials in 
connection with the gross human rights abuses that occurred in the country in 
the aftermath of the 2007 presidential elections. Although Kenya is a State 
Party to the Rome Statute, Kenyan officials argued that dragging their 
leaders to trial in The Hague could create a serious constitutional crisis and 
seriously damage the country’s already fragile peace and security.279 
In 2016, former U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, who was also a 
former Ghanaian diplomat, granted an interview to the Financial Times280 in 
which he rejected accusations by several Africans that the ICC is an anti-
African international institution.281 He went on to say that he believed 
strongly that most ordinary Africans want their leaders held accountable for 
their actions. Specifically, he said that Africans “want justice” and “if they 
can get it from their own courts,” that is good. Nevertheless, if they cannot 
get justice from their own courts, then “an international court,” such as the 
ICC, is, for them, a court of last resort.282 
The truth of the matter is that, as long as African countries remain 
unable to fully and effectively deal with impunity—that is, hold fully 
accountable anyone who commits international crimes—the ICC will remain 
relevant to the continent. Although both the ICC and the African Union are 
interested in fighting impunity on the continent, the two institutions have, 
nevertheless, “gradually developed a significant rift.”283 The AU has accused 
the ICC of practicing or pursuing “selective justice” as it has, until recently, 
only concentrated on African cases.284 Mbaku285 argues that “[w]hile the 
ICC’s previous prosecutions are based on solid legal grounds, it would be 
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unwise for the Court to ignore the voices of those who argue that the ICC is a 
tool of Western imperialism.”286 
Given the fact that it is likely to take many years for African countries 
to develop both the legal capacity and the political will to deal fully with 
impunity, cooperation with the ICC and other international institutions, 
including especially those which are dedicated to promoting the recognition 
and protection of human rights, is critical to ensuring that victims of serious 
and gross human rights violations receive justice.287 Regardless of its short-
comings, the ICC remains an important part of Africa’s legal architecture for 
combating impunity in the continent. 
The ICC, of course, is not the only institution dedicated to fighting 
impunity.  There are others, working at both the international, regional, and 
national levels, to make certain that any individual who engages in the gross 
violation of human rights is brought to justice.  In other words, there are 
other institutions, besides the ICC, that are fighting or have fought impunity 
in Africa.  Below, we take a look at some of them. 
 
B. Charles Taylor and The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
In 2000, the Government of Sierra Leone made a request to the United 
Nations to provide the country with a “special court” to address serious 
crimes that had been committed against civilians and U.N. peacekeepers 
during the country’s civil war, which took place from 1991 to 2002.288 After 
negotiations between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations, the world’s first “hybrid” international criminal tribunal289 was 
created and granted power to hold accountable those individuals “bearing the 
greatest responsibility” for serious crimes committed in Sierra Leone “after 
30 November 1996, the date of the failed Abidjan Peace Accord.”290 The 
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Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) was “the first modern international 
tribunal to sit in the country where the crimes took place, and the first to have 
an effective outreach program on the ground.”291 
The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone292 specifically 
empowered the Prosecutor to bring charges for war crimes,293 crimes against 
humanity, other serious violations of international humanitarian law, and 
certain serious violations of Sierra Leonean law.294 In March 2003, the 
Prosecutor brought 13 indictments against leaders of the Revolutionary 
United Front (“RUF”),295 the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(“AFRC”), the Civil Defense Forces (“CDF”), and then-President of Liberia, 
Charles Taylor.296  
In June 2003, the Prosecutor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
unsealed the indictment against Charles Taylor, which charged the latter with 
war crimes.  Initially, the Prosecutor had indicted Taylor on 17 counts of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, which were committed during the 
conflict in Sierra Leone. However, the indictment was later amended and 
Taylor would stand trial for 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Taylor’s Indictment and Warrant of Arrest was formally unsealed 
on June 12, 2003.297 On August 11, 2003, Taylor stepped down as President 
of Liberia and went into exile in Nigeria and remained there until he was 
arrested by Nigerian authorities on March 29, 2006 and subsequently 
transferred to the Special Court for Sierra Leone that same day.298 
 
 291. Id. 
 292. U.N., Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Jan. 2002), http://legal.un.org 
/avl/ha/scsl/scsl.html. 
 293. Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional 
Protocol II. 
 294. Specifically, the Malicious Damage Act (1861) and the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children Act (1926). 
 295. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was a rebel army that wedged a failed 11-
year war against the government of Sierra Leone. The RUF’s brutal war against the 
government of Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 to 2002. Three of the RUF’s most senior 
surviving leaders—Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao, were convicted of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in 2009. See MARINA AKSENOVA, COMPLICITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (2016); CHARLES CHERNOR JALLOH & SIMON MEISENBERG, THE 
LAW REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: VOLUME III: PROSECUTOR V. 
CHARLES TAYLOR (THE TAYLOR CASE) xxxv (2015). 
 296. See JALLOH and MEISENBERG, supra note 295.  
 297. Prosecutor v. Taylor (Case No. SCSL-03-01-A), Judgment (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01-A-1389.pdf. 
   298.    Nigeria’s decision to arrest and handover Taylor to the SCSL was significant since 
such cooperation, at the national level, is important for combating impunity in the continent. 
This was a powerful message for other fleeing senior government officials accused of 
complicity in human rights violations that they cannot hide in other African countries as a 
  
128 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
  
In Taylor’s indictment, five counts dealt with crimes against humanity 
(murder, rape, sexual slavery, other inhumane acts, and enslavement); five 
other counts charged violations of Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II (acts of terrorism; violence to life, health and physical or mental 
well-being of persons, in particular murder; outrages upon personal dignity; 
violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in 
particular cruel treatment; and pillage). One count charged other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law (conscripting or enlisting 
children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups, or using them 
to participate actively in hostilities).299 
The Trial Chamber convicted Charles Taylor on all eleven counts of the 
Indictment and “found him individually criminally liable under Article 6(1) 
of the Statute for aiding and abetting the commission of crimes, charged in 
all eleven counts, between 3 November 1996 and 18 January 2002 in the 
Districts of Bombali, Kailahun, Kenema, Kono, Port Loko and Freetown and 
the Western Area.”300 The verdict in Taylor’s trial was announced on April 
26, 2012—the SCSL unanimously ruled that he was guilty of 11 counts of 
“aiding and abetting” war crimes and crimes against humanity.301 Taylor, 
thus, became the first, albeit former, head of state to be convicted by an 
international tribunal since Karl Döenitz302 was convicted at the Nuremberg 
Trials.303 
Charles Taylor was subsequently sentenced to 50 years in prison.  He 
appealed his sentence to the Appeals Chamber and the latter upheld the 
verdict of the Trial Chamber.304 Reacting to the verdict, the Government of 
Sierra Leone stated that “[i]t [i.e., the verdict] is a step forward as justice has 
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been done, though the magnitude of the sentence is not commensurate with 
the atrocities committed.”305 
When Charles Taylor was captured in Nigeria and handed over to the 
SCSL, many Africans argued that this was a positive development for the 
fight against impunity in the continent. Then U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi 
Annan, stated that “the capture and trial of Mr. Taylor will send a powerful 
message to the region and beyond that impunity will not be allowed to stand 
and that the rule of law must prevail.”306 Dr. Alex Vines, Head of the Africa 
Program at Chatham House (U.K.)307 and a former U.N. sanctions inspector 
in West Africa during the 2001-2003 period, stated in 2012 that “[a] key 
reason for almost a decade of peace in both countries [i.e., Liberia and Sierra 
Leone] was the containment of Charles Taylor through U.N. sanctions, 
military action, and the indictment by the Special Court.”308 The indictment 
by the SCSL forced Taylor to resign as President of Liberia and seek refuge 
in Nigeria, giving Liberia the opportunity to begin the rebuilding process.  
His resignation and departure also significantly reduced his illegal activities, 
not only in Liberia, but also in Sierra Leone. Of course, Nigeria later arrested 
him and extradited him to the SCSL. 
Among the non-governmental organizations that closely followed the 
Taylor trial is Human Rights Watch (“HRW”).309 In July 2012, HRW 
released its study of the Taylor trial titled “Even a ‘Big Man’ Must Face 
Justice: Lessons from the Trial of Charles Taylor”310 in which it stated that 
the Taylor trial sent a strong signal “that the world has become a less 
 
 305. Quoted in Liberia Ex-leader Charles Taylor get[s] 50 Years in Jail, BBC NEWS 
(May 30, 2012), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18259596. 
 306. Michael Fleshman, Africa Ending Impunity for Rights Abuses, AFRICA RENEWAL 
(January 2007), https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2007/africa-ending-
impunity-rights-abuses. 
 307. Chatham House is the common name for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs. It is a non-profit and non-governmental organization based in London. Chatham 
House is one of the world’s top think tanks in the area of international affairs. In the Global 
Go To Think Tanks Report, it is ranked only second to The Brookings Institution. For more 
on the Chatham House’s founding and its purposes, see generally SIR STEPHEN KING-HALL, 
CHATHAM HOUSE: A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGINS, PURPOSES, AND METHODS OF THE 
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1937). 
 308. Alex Vines, The Importance of the Charles Taylor Verdict for Africa, CHATHAM 
HOUSE—THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Apr. 26, 2012), https:// 
www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/182995. 
 309. Human Rights Watch is an international non-governmental organization that 
conducts research on human rights and advocates for the recognition and protection of 
human rights throughout the world.  
 310. Even a ‘Big Man’ Must Face Justice: Lessons from the Trial of Charles Taylor, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/25/even-big-man-
must-face-justice/lessons-trial-charles-taylor (last visited Oct. 25, 2018). 
  
130 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
  
hospitable place for the highest-level leaders accused of committing the most 
serious crimes.”311 The report went on to say that “the Taylor trial reflects a 
major departure from the impunity that heads of state traditionally enjoyed 
when implicated in genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”312 
The Taylor trial was important for West Africa, a region in which, for 
many years, a group of “powerful individuals who either [led] armed groups 
or [wielded] significant political power,” had been able to commit various 
atrocities without fear of being held accountable.313 When the SCSL brought 
Taylor to trial, this represented the first time that a “big man” has “been 
taken into custody and forced to answer for alleged international crimes at 
trial.”314 
As determined by HRW, despite the trial’s limitations, it did provide 
some notable benefits for Sierra Leone and Liberia. First, outreach programs 
conducted by the SCSL in affected areas, including the creation of audio and 
video summaries of the trial in local languages, helped communities in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone participate in and learn from the trial proceedings.  
In addition, the SCSL made it possible for civil society members from 
several affected communities to visit the SCSL in The Hague and then return 
home to share their experiences with their fellow citizens.315 
Second, the trial significantly enhanced the ability of the affected and 
other communities in West Africa to understand and appreciate the 
importance of accountability. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, HRW was told by 
many people that Taylor’s trial helped them appreciate the “value of 
justice.”316 While the trial has improved the people’s perception of 
accountability, particularly by those in government, these countries have a 
long way to go to provide themselves with institutions that force all civil 
servants and political elites to be accountable to both the constitution and the 
people. This is a problem that is not unique to Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Most countries in the continent are still burdened with laws and institutions 
that do not adequately constrain the State and hence, impunity remains a 
major governance problem.317 
Finally, many human rights activists have argued that the Taylor trial 
has contributed significantly to “promoting long-term respect for human 
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rights and the rule of law in the sub-region.”318 Specifically, according to one 
human rights advocate, “[The trial has] helped . . . change the historical 
concept that leaders are above the law and [challenge] the acceptance that 
leaders and elected officials can use war and violence as way[s] to carry out 
their personal agendas.”319 If there is one lesson that Africans should learn 
from the trial, conviction and sentencing of Charles Taylor, it is that “[t]he 
supremacy of law is the heart and foundation for a democracy; it is the mark 
of a free society; it is the most important characteristic of a governance 
system.”320 
 
C. The Case of Hissène Habré Before the Extraordinary African 
Chambers 
 
 i. The Case Against Hissène Habré 
 
Hissène Habré is a Chadian politician who served as President of the 
Republic of Chad from 1982 until he was ousted in 1990. Habré seized 
power in 1982 with help from the United States and France—the two 
Western countries saw Habré as important partner in their efforts to contain 
the ambitions of Muammar al-Qaddafi in the sub-region. On May 30, 2016, 
Habré was found guilty of crimes against humanity, summary execution, 
torture and rape by the Extraordinary African Chambers.321 
Habré served as President of the Republic of Chad from June 7, 1982 to 
December 1, 1990, when he was ousted by the country’s current president, 
Idriss Déby Itno. After he was deposed, Habré fled to Senegal where he was 
granted asylum and lived there until he was brought to trial in 2015 for 
international crimes he was alleged to have committed during his tenure as 
President of Chad. The effort to bring Habré to justice for his crimes began in 
1990 after he was ousted from power. During his tenure as president, it was 
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estimated that about 40,000 people were killed and another 200,000 people 
tortured by Habré’s Directorate of Documentation and Security (“DDS”).322 
After his ouster, the new government in Chad, under the leadership of Idriss 
Déby, created a commission of inquiry to look into Habré’s alleged crimes. 
After it finished its work, the commission recommended that the Chadian 
government bring to trial any person or persons responsible for serious 
violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law.  
Unfortunately, Habré could not be brought to trial in Chad because he was 
living in Senegal.323 
In 1999, the British House of Lords ruled on “head of state immunity” 
in the Pinochet case.324 Augusto Pinochet, former president of Chile, had 
traveled to the U.K. to seek medical treatment and while in London, a 
Spanish court had invoked universal jurisdiction to prosecute him for crimes, 
which he was alleged to have committed while he was head of state in 
Chile.325 Universal jurisdiction has been defined as “a form of jurisdiction in 
international law which grants the court of any state, the ability to bring 
proceedings with respect to certain (internationally defined) crimes, without 
regard to the location of the crime, the nationality of the offender, or the 
nationality of the victim.”326 
Under the concept of universal jurisdiction, domestic courts can 
prosecute “persons for specific treaty based international crimes that have 
been committed outside of their territory.”327 However, before the Spanish 
court invoked it against Pinochet, universal jurisdiction had never been 
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invoked against a former head of state before. The attempt to extradite 
Pinochet to face charges before a Spanish court raised many questions, 
particularly whether, as a former head of state, he was still protected by 
immunity from the national courts of a foreign State, such as Spain.328 The 
House of Lords rejected Pinochet’s claim to immunity from arrest and 
subsequently asked that he remain in custody in the U.K. until Spain could 
seek his extradition on charges of mass murder and terrorism.329 Many 
observers considered the ruling by the House of Lords to be ground-breaking 
for, it showed that former heads of state could be prosecuted for international 
crimes in the courts of other States based on universal jurisdiction.330 Spain, 
however, neverfiled an application to extradite Pinochet because the latter 
was deemed too sick to stand trial.331 
Although Pinochet was able to escape extradition to Spain to stand trial, 
leaving his victims without the justice that they deserved, the victims of 
Habré, however, were not willing to allow him to equally escape judgment. 
Inspired by the ruling in the Pinochet case, Habré’s victims in Chad 
contacted Human Rights Watch lawyers to see if the precedent set by the 
House of Lords could be utilized to bring Habré to account for his criminal 
activities while he was president.332 
But, why did Habré’s victims not appeal to the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”) to intervene and take control of the case against him? The ICC 
was authorized by the Rome Statute333 and became functional on July 1, 
2002. However, Article 11 of the Rome Statute, which deals with the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, states that “[t]he Court has jurisdiction only with respect to 
crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute.”334 Thus, it would 
not have been possible for Habré to be brought to trial at the ICC since the 
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period covered by his alleged crimes was June 7, 1982 to December 1, 1990, 
long before the Rome Statute entered into force. 
At this time, Reed Brody, a lawyer with Human Rights Watch, decided 
to begin the process of working with victim groups, primarily but not 
exclusively, in Chad to prepare a case, which they believe, could be brought 
against Habré in Senegalese courts by invoking the Pinochet precedent.  
Working together with several non-governmental organizations, “Brody and 
the victim groups travelled to Chad and collected vital victim testimony, 
documentation from Habré’s torture centers and other evidence that could be 
used in a trial against him.”335 In early 2000, Brody and the groups brought a 
case before the Dakar Regional Court, backed up by the evidence and 
documentation that they had collected in Chad.336 After all the evidence had 
been presented, a Senegalese judge indicted Habré on February 3, 2000, with 
acts of torture and barbarity.337 This indictment was significant in that it 
marked the first time a former African head of state had been indicted in 
another country for violations of human rights in his own country.338 
Nevertheless, the victory delivered to Habré’s victims by the Dakar 
Regional Court was short-lived.  On July 4, 2000, the Indictments Chamber 
of the Court of Appeal of Dakar ruled in favor of Habré and cancelled the 
indictment against him and barred any legal proceedings against him on the 
ground that “Senegalese law did not provide for jurisdiction over crimes 
against humanity or acts of torture committed by foreign nationals outside 
the territory of Senegal.”339 The ruling was later upheld on appeal by the 
Supreme Court of Senegal in a decision on March 20, 2001.340 
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Many observers believed that the decision, by Senegalese courts, to 
prohibit the prosecution of Habré for the crimes that he was alleged to have 
committed in Chad, was delivered under political pressure. It was argued that 
former Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade, was not in favor of holding 
Habré accountable for his crimes. For example, after Senegalese judge 
Demba Kandji indicted Habré for torture and barbarous acts and crimes 
against humanity on February 3, 2000, the Superior Council of the 
Magistracy, presided over by President Abdoulaye Wade, transferred Judge 
Kandji and effectively removed him from the Habré investigation. President 
Wade also proceeded to promote the president of the Dakar Appeals Court—
the latter was, at the time, considering Habré’s appeal. As already mentioned, 
later on July 4, 2000, the Dakar Appeals Court ruled in favor of Habré.341 
After the case against Habré was dismissed, President Wade asked 
Habré to leave Senegal. Nevertheless, before Habré could leave, Human 
Rights Watch and Habré’s victims took their case to the U.N. Committee 
against Torture (“UNCAT”), where they argued that Senegal was in breach 
of its obligations under the 1984 Convention Against Torture by not 
prosecuting him.342 The UCAT responded that Senegal should keep Habré 
until the problem could be resolved. This represented the beginning of a ten-
year stalemate in the case against Habré that was only broken when Macky 
Sall became president of Senegal in 2012. At this time, the International 
Court of Justice ordered Senegal to either prosecute Habré “without delay” 
or extradite him for trial elsewhere.343 
After the indictment against Habré was withdrawn by the Senegalese 
courts, twenty-one of Habré’s victims344 brought a complaint against Habré 
for genocide, crimes against humanity and torture under Belgium’s universal 
 
obliged to either prosecute or extradite any person within their territory who is suspected of 
having committed acts of torture.  
 341. See Office of the U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention Against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 
U.N.T.S. 1465. 
 342. The Trial of Hissène Habré: Time is Running Out for the Victims: Background, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Jan. 26, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/ 
habre0107/2.htm#_Toc156364880. 
 343. Marlise Simons, Senegal Told to Prosecute Ex-President of Chad, N.Y. TIMES, July 
20, 2012, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/world/africa/senegal-to-
prosecute-former-president-of-chad-hissene-habre.html (last visited July 30, 2018); World 
Court: Important Victory for Habré Victims: Senegal Should Bring Chad’s Former Dictator 
to Justice ‘Without Further Delay,’ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, July 20, 2012, https:// 
www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/20/world-court-important-victory-habre-victims. 
 344. These included three Belgian nationals. See Laura Bingham, Trying for a Just 
Result? The Hissène Habré Affair and Judicial Independence in Senegal, 23 TEMPLE INT’L 
& COMP. L.J. 77 (2009). 
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jurisdiction statute.345 On September 19, 2005, the Belgian judge who had 
been assigned to the Habré case, Judge Daniel Fransen, issued an arrest 
warrant against Habré.346 On the same day, the government of Belgium 
formally requested that Habré be extradited from Senegal so that he could be 
tried in Belgium.347 
When Belgium’s extradition request reached Senegal, the Dakar 
Appeals Court Indictment Chamber, on November 25, 2005, refused to hear 
the matter, claiming that it did not have the jurisdiction to rule on an 
extradition request involving a former head of state.  Under Senegalese law, 
the matter went directly to President Wade.348 On November 26, 2005, 
Senegal’s interior minister issued an order, which placed Habré “at the 
disposition of the President of the African Union.”349 On November 27, 
2005, Senegal’s foreign minister, Cheikh Tidiane Gadio, issued a 
communiqué, which stated that: 
 
The State of Senegal, sensitive to the complaints of victims who are 
seeking justice, will abstain from any act, which could permit 
Hissène Habré to not face justice. It therefore considers that it is up 
to the African Union summit to indicate the jurisdiction, which is 
competent to try this matter.350 
 
At the Assembly of the African Union Sixth Ordinary Session in 
Khartoum in January 2006, the AU established a Committee of Eminent 
African Jurists (“CEAJ”) and charged it with the duty of determining where 
Habré should be tried for the alleged crimes that he committed while serving 
as president of Chad.  Senegal, of course, remained a possible venue for the 
trial.351 The CEAJ issued its report on May 1, 2006.352 Specifically, the 
 
 345. Id. at 86. 
 346. Id. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 342. 
 347. Human Rights Watch, Belgique: Résolution 136urisdi par le Sénat belge, 15 juin 
2006, available at  https://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/docs/2006/06/15/belgiu13586.htm. 
 348. Bingham, supra note 344, at 86; Høgestøl, supra note 323, at 150. 
 349. The Trial of Hissène Habré: Time is Running Out for the Victims, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, No. 2, January 2007, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/habre0107/. 
 350. Quoted in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 349, at 7. The foreign minister’s 
communiqué was issued in French and here it is: “L’État du Sénégal, sensible aux plaintes 
des victimes qui demandent justice, s’abstiendra de tout acte qui pourrait permettre à M. 
Hissène Habré de ne pas comparaître devant la justice. Il considère, en consequence, qu’il 
appartient au sommet de l’Union africaine d’indiquer la jurisdiction compétente pour juger 
cette affaire.” 
 351. Assembly of the African Union Sixth Ordinary Session, Decision on the Hissène 
Habré Case and the African Union, Doc. Assembly/AU/8(VI) Add.9, https://au.int/ 
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CEAJ was “mandated to consider all aspects and implications of the Hissène 
Habré Case as well as the options available for his trial, taking into account 
the following benchmarks: 
 
(a) Adherence to the principles of total rejection of impunity; 
(b) Adherence to international fair trial standards including the 
independence of the judiciary and impartiality of proceedings; 
(c) Jurisdiction over the alleged crimes for which Mr. Habré should 
be tried; 
(d) Efficiency in terms of cost and time trial 
(e) Accessibility to the trial by alleged victims as well as witnesses; 
(f) Priority of an African mechanism.353 
 
Stating that the Assembly of the African Union Sixth Ordinary Session 
had unanimously rejected impunity, the CEAJ went on to argue that Habré 
could not hide behind “the immunity of a former Head of State to defeat the 
principle of total rejection of impunity that was adopted by the Assembly.”354 
With respect to jurisdiction over the Habré case, the CEAJ recommended 
what it referred to as an “African option.”355 It stated as follows: “The 
Committee within the framework of an African solution considered, in the 
first instance, the two (2) African States, Senegal and Chad, which have the 
necessary link to the Hissène Habré case. Both countries have ratified the 
Convention Against Torture.”356 The CEAJ’s report recommended that 
“Senegal is the country best suited to try Habré as it is bound by International 
law to perform its obligations.”357 In addition, the report also imposed an 
obligation on Chad, arguing that since Chad has the primary responsebility 
“to try and punish Hissène Habré,” it should provide Senegal with all 
necessary cooperation.358 
Subsequently, the African Union Assembly took note of the CEAJ’s 
recommendations and mandated “the Republic of Senegal to prosecute and 
ensure that Hissène Habré is tried, on behalf of Africa, by a competent 
 
sites/default/files/decisions/9554-assembly_en_23_24_january_2006_auc_sixth_ordinary_ 
session_decisions_declarations.pdf (last visited July 31, 2018). 
 352. African Union, Report of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists on the Case of 
Hissène Habré, https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/habreCEJA_Repor0506.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2018). 
 353. Id. ¶ 1. 
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 357. Id. ¶ 29.  
 358. Id. ¶ 30. 
  
138 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
  
Senegalese court with guarantees of fair trial.”359 Despite the fact that he had 
been reluctant to bring Habré to trial, President Wade appeared to be more 
welcoming to the A.U.’s decision, when he proclaimed as follows: “We 
thought Senegal was the country best placed to try [Habré] and I think we 
must not flee from our responsibility.”360 
However, it would take a few months before either the A.U. or Senegal 
could take any decision on the Habré case.  On November 2, 2006, the 
Senegalese government reported that it had decided to establish a 
commission within the Ministry of Justice to procure the necessary 
legislative amendments to allow the trial of Habré to proceed.361 Then, on 
January 31, 2007, Senegal’s National Assembly enacted legislation granting 
the country’s courts, jurisdiction over Habré and his crimes.362 One year 
later, a delegation from the European Union, which was headed by ICC 
Registrar, Bruno Cathala, arrived the Senegalese capital, Dakar, on January 
21, 2008, to provide assistance to the trial.363 
On July 23, 2008, Senegal passed a constitutional amendment 
permitting the retroactive application of certain crimes in the country’s Code 
of Criminal Procedure.  Specifically, the amendment states as follows:  
 
 
 359. Id.  
 360. Quoted in Senegal Trial for ex-Chad Leader, BBC NEWS, July 2, 2006, 
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 361. République du Sénégal, Présidence de la République, Communiqué: Le Sénégal 
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inhumane treatment when it ratified the U.N. Convention Against Torture. See, e.g., Time is 
Running Out, supra note 342. 
 363. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch, EU to Aid Senegal in Preparing 
Hissène Habré’s Trial (Jan. 19, 2008), https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/01/19/eu-aid-
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No one may be condemned if it is not by virtue of law [which] 
entered into force before the committed act. 
 
However, the provisions of the preceding paragraph may not be 
opposed to the prosecution, to the judgment and to the 
condemnation of any individual for reason of acts or omissions 
which, at the moment when they were committed, were held [to be] 
criminal in terms of [après] rules of international law relating to 
acts of genocide, of crimes against humanity and of crimes of 
war.364 
 
Thus, in order to try Habré, Senegal amended its Code of Criminal 
Procedure in order to introduce provisions on genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, as well as to introduce universal jurisdiction for 
“international crimes in certain circumstances.”365 Habré challenged the 
amendments before the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of 
West African States (“ECOWAS Court”).366 The ECOWAS Court held that 
Senegal could not try Habré without violating the nullum crimen sine lege 
principle.367 The ECOWAS Court then ruled further that Habré should only 
be tried by a tribunal with an international character.368 In January 2011, the 
 
 364. Constitution de la République du Sénégal art. 9, Jan. 22, 2001. The original French 
version of the amendment states: “Toute atteinte aux libertés et toute entrave volontaire à 
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crimes contre l’humanité et de crimes de guerre. La défense est un droit absolu dans tous les 
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INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 1139 (2013). See also Mandiaye Niang, The Senegalese Legal 
Framework for the Prosecution of International Crimes, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 1047 
(2009). 
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African Union responded to the ruling issued by the ECOWAS Court and 
proposed a plan to establish such a special chambers within the legal system 
of the Republic of Senegal to prosecute Habré.369 The African Union would 
reserve the right to choose some of the judges who would undertake the 
trial.370 Senegal, however, rejected the A.U.’s plan371 and, in May 2011, the 
country withdrew from the negotiations to create the special tribunal.372 In 
July 2011, the foreign minister of Senegal announced that Habré would not 
be tried in Senegal.373 Subsequently, the government of Chad then 
announced that it would support the extradition of Habré to Belgium to face 
trial there for his alleged criminal activities while he was president in 
Chad.374 
On July 20, 2012, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”),375 in 
response to a case filed by Belgium,376 ruled that Senegal had failed to meet 
its obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  The ICJ then asked 
Senegal to proceed with the prosecution of Habré without further efforts to 
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11 août 2011, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20110710-dakar-suspend-expulsion-ex-president-
tchad ien-hissene-habre (the headline says “Dakar suspends expulsion of former Chadian 
president Hissène Habré”). 
 374. Senegal: Chad asks for the Extradition of Hissène Habré to Belgium, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, July 22, 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/22/senegal-chad-asks-
extradit ion-hissene-habre-belgium. 
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delay the process.377 Macky Sall, who became president of the Republic of 
Senegal on April 2, 2012, unlike his predecessor, Abdoulaye Wade, acted 
positively and quickly to the ICJ decision and expressed regret that Senegal 
had not brought Habré to trial sooner.378  Senegal’s Justice Minister, Aminata 
Touré, expressed the views of the new government when she reminded the 
international community that President Sall, who was elected in March 2012 
and took office in April 2012, had stated publicly that his government would 
proceed with the trial of Habré.  She went on to state that Habré would be 
tried under the law of Senegal and by a panel of Senegalese and African 
judges under an agreement between Senegal and the African Union.379 
Under the new government, led by President Sall, negotiations with the 
African Union resumed and eventually led to an agreement to create the 
Extraordinary African Chambers.380 On December 17, 2012, Senegal’s 
National Assembly enacted legislation establishing the Extraordinary African 
Chambers.381 The inauguration of the special court on February 8, 2013 
brought to a conclusion more than two decades of efforts by Habré’s victims, 
with the assistance of various civil society organizations, including Human 
Rights Watch, to bring Habré to justice for the crimes that he was alleged to 
have committed during his tenure as president of Chad.382  
On July 2, 2013, the Extraordinary African Chambers (“EAC”) indicted 
Habré for (1) crimes against humanity; (2) torture; and (3) war crimes. The 
EAC’s four investigating judges then undertook a 19-month investigation, 
which found sufficient evidence to charge Habré specifically with (1) the 
practice of murder, summary executions, and kidnapping followed by 
enforced disappearance and torture, amounting to crimes against humanity; 
(2) torture; and (3) the war crimes of murder, torture, unlawful transfer and 
unlawful confinement, and violence to life and physical well-being.383  
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The long-awaited trial of Habré started on July 20, 2015. Subsequently, 
the EAC sat for 56 days and heard evidence from 93 witnesses, two-thirds of 
whom were survivors of Habré’s criminal activities and who had fought hard 
to bring him to justice. These victims had an opportunity, not only to face 
their oppressor, but also to tell the world about the atrocities committed 
against them.384 On May 30, 2016, the EAC announced judgment before a 
packed audience. The EAC found Habré guilty of “the commission of crimes 
against humanity, for the underlying crimes of rape, sexual slavery, the 
massive and systematic practice of summary executions, and kidnapping of 
persons followed by their enforced disappearance and of torture.”385 The 
court also found Habré guilty of “war crimes, including murder, torture and 
inhuman treatment, under the principle of command responsibility”386 and 
sentenced him to life imprisonment. 
Two months after the EAC rendered its ruling and after thoroughly 
reviewing written submissions from various parties, the Chambers’ judges 
ordered that each of the survivors of rape and sexual slavery be paid  
€ 30,490; those of torture and arbitrary detention and each mistreated 
prisoner, € 22,865; and each heir of a deceased victim, € 15,243.387 So far, 
however, the EAC has only allocated € 600,000’s worth of assets belonging 
to Habré.388 
Lawyers appointed to represent Habré appealed his conviction, 
“alleging that one of the judges of the trial court should not have been 
appointed because of his background as a prosecutor and that the trial court 
made mistakes in its factual findings.”389 Habré’s victims cross-appealed 
“portions of the compensation order.”390 The EAC, in keeping with its 
statutes,391 named an appeals chamber—the latter was headed by Justice 
Ougadeye Wafi of the Supreme Court of Mali, who was assisted by two 
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Senegalese judges. The appeals chamber heard oral arguments from the 
lawyers representing both sides in January 2017.392 
The appeals chamber delivered its decision on April 27, 2017. It 
rejected all, but one of the arguments advanced by Habré’s lawyers. It 
reversed Habré’s conviction for the rape of Khadidja Hassan Zidane, arguing 
that the charge had not been included in the indictment that framed the 
trial.393 Nevertheless, the appeals chamber explained that while it did not 
doubt or question Zidane’s credibility or truthfulness, it could not allow to 
stand, a charge that had been added after the trial had started. Finally, the 
appeals chamber held that dropping the charge of rape against Habré did not 
change the justification for the life sentence handed out to him by the trial 
chamber.394 
With respect to the compensation order, the appeals chamber “cured the 
deficiencies in the compensation aspects of the trial court’s verdict by fixing 
the total amount of Habré’s liability at 82 billion CFA francs (approximately 
123 million euros) and listing the 7,396 victims eligible for reparations and 
the amount to which each was entitled.”395 Most importantly, the appeals 
chamber provided victims with hope that Habré’s assets would actually be 
recovered and used to provide reparations for his victims.396 
 
 ii. Lessons from the Habré Case 
 
Reed Brody, who worked tirelessly with Human Rights Watch and 
Habré’s victims in order to bring the former Chadian dictator to trial, has 
stated that the most important benefit from the trial is that “justice is 
achievable.”397 Throughout the continent, from South Sudan, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia, to Cameroon, 
victims of human rights violations and other atrocities committed by state- 
and non-state actors, often do not have a voice, either because they are dead 
or live within States in which all avenues for protest, even peacefully, have 
been taken away by the government. For example, in Cameroon, the 
government is using laws against terrorism to suppress all forms of 
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dissent398—in fact, Anglophones who have attempted to peacefully protest 
their marginalization and exploitation by the Francophone-dominated central 
government have been labelled by the government as terrorists and visited 
with brutal treatment from the security forces. In Cameroon, impunity 
remains a major concern as state- and non-state actors who commit 
international crimes are not being brought to justice by the government.399 
Nevertheless, the successful conviction and sentencing of Habré gives 
hope to victims of impunity in other African countries that it is possible that 
they too can be granted the opportunity to testify against those who had 
tortured, demeaned, and committed atrocities against them and in doing so, 
achieve a certain measure of justice. In this section, we briefly examine other 
lessons that Africa and Africans can learn from the Habré trial.  
The Habré trial revealed an important truth about international justice, 
which is that although many victims of international crimes in Africa remain 
voiceless, they are actually the cornerstone of the delivery of international 
justice and the fight against impunity.  In the Habré case, victims took the 
lead and worked relentlessly to force the international community, including 
the African Union, to recognize the need to force Habré to account for his 
crimes.  Hence, the Habré trial shows victims of international crimes, 
particularly those in Africa, that they too, can receive justice. 
When Habré’s trial began on July 20, 2015, it was the first universal 
jurisdiction case to take place in Africa.  It was also the first time that the 
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courts of one State had prosecuted the former head of State of another for 
international crimes. This is an important precedent for the fight against 
impunity in Africa—dictators and others who violate human rights and/or 
commit other atrocities have, by the Habré trial, been put on notice that they 
would no longer be able to hide behind immunities granted to them by their 
countries’ dysfunctional institutions.400  
Already, victims of the atrocities of former Gambian president, Yahya 
Jammeh, have indicated a desire to follow in the footsteps of Habré’s victims 
and organize to bring their torturer to justice. Habré’s trial has given victims 
of international crimes in Africa the hope that with courage and tenacity, they 
too can bring their torturers and oppressors to justice. 
Most lawyers and victims’ advocates are quite aware of the 
“emancipating” and “cathartic” benefits that victims can get from 
participating fully in the prosecution of their oppressors—that is, those who 
have committed atrocities against them. For example, granting victims the 
opportunity to testify in open court against their oppressors can allow them to 
“engage in a form of cathartic denunciation of the political leaders who had 
imprisoned, exploited, and marginalized them.”401 Unfortunately, such 
participation is rarely available to Africa’s victims of international crimes. 
Thus, the fact that Habré’s victims were actually able to participate fully in 
his trial in Senegal augurs well for the fight against impunity in Africa. 
Perhaps, more important is the fact that such participation has returned 
victims to the center of international justice. 
 
 400. Consider, for example, the fact that the constitutions of some African countries 
actually grant some high-ranking government officials immunity from prosecution for any 
crimes that they commit while in office. Such immunity can contribute significantly to 
impunity in these countries. The Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, for example, 
grants the President of the Republic of Cameroon, immunity from prosecution for all crimes 
committed during his tenure in office. Consider Article 53(3): “Acts committed by the 
President of the Republic . . . shall be covered by immunity and he shall not be accountable 
for them after the exercise of his functions.” Here is the French version of Article 53(3): 
“Les acts accomplis par le président de la République . . . sont couverts par l’immunité et ne 
sauraient engager sa responsabilité à l’issue de son mandat.” See Présidence de la 
République (du Cameroun), Loi no 2008/001 du 14 avril 2008 modifiant et complétant 
certaines dispositions de la loi 96/06 du 18 janvier 1996 portant révision de la constitution 
du 02 juin 1972, http://www.minsep.cm/uploads/media/CONSTITUTION_du_Cameroun-
1996_et_2008.pdf. 
 401. As argued by Reed Brody, the team that helped the victims of Habré seek justice 
went to the Gambia in 2017 and described “their long campaign” to seek justice to Yahya 
Jammeh’s victims. Accordingly, “[t]he meeting inspired the Gambians who saw in the 
Chadians’ struggle proof that justice can be achieved, despite the obvious obstacles.” See 
REED BRODY, VICTIMS BRING A DICTATOR TO JUSTICE: THE CASE OF HISSÈNE HABRÉ 20 
(Brot für die Welt/Bread for the World, 2017), https://www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/file 
admin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Analyse/Analysis70-The_Habre_Case. 
pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2018). 
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The pleas of Habré’s victims were especially important in convincing 
policymakers at both the national and international levels to take action to 
make the prosecution of Habré possible. The tenacity and courage of Habré’s 
victims created the enabling political environment within which various 
actors could be brought together to make possible the prosecution of 
Habré.402 
The trial of Habré required working across international borders and 
that necessitated the building of a transnational advocacy coalition that 
included individuals and institutions from Chad, Senegal and other countries.  
The success of this transnational coalition, which was ably assisted and 
advised by several international non-governmental organizations, notably, 
Human Rights Watch, provides a learning opportunity for other African 
victims of international crimes. How this coalition was organized, the 
challenges that it faced, which included language problems, considering the 
fact that many of the Chadian victims were illiterate in French—the official 
languages of Senegal and Chad—provides an important template for other 
victims throughout the continent. 
Reed Brody, the international human rights lawyer, who was 
instrumental in bringing Habré to trial, has argued that “[a] major challenge 
in any universal jurisdiction case is creating the necessary political will in the 
forum state.”403 Unfortunately, getting politicians in the forum state to muster 
the courage to help the international community fight impunity in other 
countries is often quite difficult. For example, in November 1999, Ethiopia’s 
former military dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, who was living in exile in 
Zimbabwe but was wanted in Ethiopia on charges of genocide and crimes 
against humanity, was visiting South Africa for medical treatment.  Local 
and international groups called on South African authorities to arrest him and 
subsequently extradite him to Ethiopia to stand trial for crimes committed 
 
 402. One cannot underestimate the importance of victim participation in the prosecution 
of Habré. Consider, for example, the “[t]he visible leadership of the victims made it 
impossible for Habré to paint himself as a political victim or to tar his prosecution as 
imperialistic.” See Brody, supra note 384, at 20. In fact, after the Extraordinary African 
Chambers arrested Habré in 2013, his wife wrote a letter to Senegal’s President Sall to 
complaint that “his arrest had disrupted their family life and that her children now had to 
pass Ramadan without their father.” Id. Shortly afterward, one of Habré’s victims responded 
to the pleas of Habré’s wife—“Khaltouma Daba, a Chadian widow and vice-president of the 
victims’ association, responded that her family life had been shattered when her husband 
was taken away by Habré’s political police, that her children had now passed 26 Ramadans 
without their father.” Id.  
 403. Brody, supra note 384, at 23. 
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during a dictatorship that lasted from 1977 to 1991.404 Despite South Africa’s 
strong record on human rights, the government of Thabo Mbeki failed to 
arrest Mengistu and instead allowed him to return to his home in 
Zimbabwe.405 In mid-June 2015, when Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir 
was visiting Johannesburg to attend the African Union summit, the 
government failed to arrest al-Bashir, who was wanted by the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) for genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.406 Since then, al-Bashir has traveled to other African countries 
without fear of being arrested. For example, al-Bashir has been to Uganda 
and Djibouti and neither country has made any efforts to arrest him.407 It 
appears many African governments have yet to develop the political will to 
assist in the arrest and prosecution of high-ranking government officials 
engaged in serious human rights abuses. 
In 2001, when political interference led to the dismissal of the case 
against Habré, the transnational advocacy coalition that was fighting to bring 
the ex-Chadian dictator to justice realized that it would not be able to succeed 
unless it convinced political leaders in Senegal and Chad that it was not in 
their best interest to continue to stand against the prosecution of Habré. This 
is an important lesson for other victims in Africa—garnering necessary 
political will, especially in the forum State, is critical to successfully bring 
those who commit serious human rights violations to justice. 
Another lesson that the Habré trial provides for Africans who are 
interested in combatting impunity is that, even if there is not full support 
domestically for bringing the perpetrators of serious international crimes to 
justice, victims can mobilize international pressure and use it to force 
domestic policymakers to cultivate the political will to act to combat 
impunity. Victim advocacy organizations, for example, can seek the 
assistance of various international human rights committees, which can use 
their moral and political (and perhaps, legal) authority to force national 
governments to meet their obligations under international law. For example, 
during the struggle to bring Habré to justice, victims worked closely with the 
 
 404. For more on Mengistu Haile Mariam, see ANDARGACHEW TIRUNEH, THE ETHIOPIAN 
REVOLUTION 1974–1987: A TRANSFORMATION FROM AN ARISTOCRATIC TO A TOTALITARIAN 
AUTOCRACY (1993). 
 405. Brody, supra note 384, at 23. 
 406. Shiraaz Mohamed, South Africa Flouted Law by Failing to Arrest Sudanese 
President al-Bashir: ICC, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (SOUTH AFRICA), July 6, 2017, https:// 
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/south-africa-flouted-law-in-failing-to-arrest-sudan 
ese-president-bashir-icc/article35574102. 
 407. ICC Refers Uganda and Djibouti to U.N. for not Arresting al-Bashir, DW NEWS 
(July 12, 2016), https://www.dw.com/en/icc-refers-uganda-and-djibouti-to-un-for-not-arrest 
ing-al-bashir/a-19396326. 
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U.N. Committee against Torture (CAT) to make certain that the case was not 
derailed. Of great importance is the fact that it was CAT’s preliminary ruling 
in April 2001 that “Habré should stay in Senegal pending an extradition 
request” that “preserved the status quo all the way through to the 2012 ICJ 
ruling.”408 It was the ICJ who demanded that Senegal prosecute Habré 
without further delay.409 
Political will in Belgium played a very important part in making 
possible the trial of Habré. As argued by Brody,410 “[a]fter the victims’ initial 
lobbying saved the pre-trial investigation from the repeal of the universal 
jurisdiction law, the Coalition411 reached out to lawyers, professors and 
especially parliamentarians across Belgium’s notorious linguistic and 
political divides.”412 In addition, victims from Chad visited Belgium and 
interacted with policymakers and ordinary citizens, and others authored op-
eds that educated people on the merits of the case.413 
The African Union (“A.U.”) emerged as a key player in the effort to 
bring Habré to justice. Despite the fact that, at the time the AU was 
“[e]ngaged in a tug of war with the International Criminal Court,”414 
individuals at the A.U. Secretariat, including especially the organization’s 
Legal Counsel—Ben Kioko—were “able to see the benefit of being able to 
prosecute African crimes in Africa.”415 The A.U.’s decision to create the 
Committee of Eminent African Jurists (“CEAJ”) was significant—the CEAJ 
became a major player in mobilizing policymakers to support the prosecution 
of Habré. In fact, in 2007, with lobbying from members of the Coalition, the 
A.U. appointed Robert Dossou, who was head of the CEAJ, as the A.U.’s 
Special Representative to the trial. In that capacity, Mr. Dossou made several 
visits to Senegal and Chad that were critical in keeping “the process on 
track.”416  
Belgium was not the only non-African State to play a key role in the 
prosecution of Habré. The United States, under the presidency of Barrack 
Obama, became quite instrumental in making the trial a reality. In addition to 
 
 408. Brody, supra note 384, at 23, 25. 
 409. Belg. v. Sen., supra note 376. 
 410. Brody, supra note 384, at 25. 
 411. That is, the transnational advocacy coalition, which included victims of Habré’s 
atrocities in Chad, civil society organizations, NGOs, and other volunteers, that worked 
tirelessly to bring Habré to justice. See Brody, supra note 384, at 25–26. 
 412. Id. 
 413. Id. at 25. 
 414. Id. at 26. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. 
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the fact that, while on a State visit to Senegal, President Obama 
congratulated Senegalese President Macky Sall on his leadership, Obama’s 
government also supported the prosecution of Habré in other ways.417 After 
several members of the Coalition, who included Reed Brody, had visited the 
U.S. Congress, the latter, in December 2011, requested then Secretary of 
State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, to report on “steps taken by the Government 
of Senegal to assist in bringing Habré to justice.”418 Stephen J. Rapp, who at 
the time was U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, visited Senegal 
and Chad on several occasions to make sure that the prosecution of Habré 
was on track.419 
The participation of many Africa-based civil society organizations was 
critical—this was necessary, not only because these groups possessed 
information about Habré’s crimes that could not be secured from other 
sources, but also because their participation ensured that no one would argue 
that the trial was an attempt by Western countries to impose their will and 
values on Africans. Given the fact that the ICC has been accused of being a 
tool of Western imperialism for its efforts to prosecute al-Bashir (Sudan) and 
Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya) and William Ruto (Kenya), it was important that 
the effort to bring Habré to justice not be viewed in the same light. Hence, 
the participation of several African NGOs in the Habré trial was quite 
important. 
The Coalition also sought and secured the support of France,420 the 
European Union,421 the European Parliament,422 Special Rapporteur on 
 
 417. It was President Sall, who, unlike his predecessor (President Wade), gave full 
support to the prosecution of Habré for the atrocities that he was alleged to have committed 
in Chad. See Brody, supra note 384, at 26. 
 418. Brody, supra note 384, at 26. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Although France had originally been reluctant to support the prosecution, the 
country changed its policy after its Human Rights Minister, Rama Yade, a woman of 
Senegalese origin, spoke to Reed Brody and another member of the Coalition. She was able 
to convince President Nicolas Sarkozy to announce support of the case by the government 
of France. See Id. at 27. 
 421. The European Union negotiated the trial’s final budget with the government of 
Senegal and continued to put pressure on Senegal to follow through with the trial.  See 
Human Rights Watch, Q&A: The Case of Hissène Habré before the Extraordinary African 
Chambers in Senegal: Questions and Answers (Revised Sept. 25, 2003), ¶ 22, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/03/qa-case-hissene-habre-extraordinary-african-chamb 
ers-senegal (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
 422. The European Parliament passed two resolutions on the Habré case. Motion for a 
Resolution, EUR PARL. DOC. B6-0176 (2006), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ 
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+MOTION+B6-2006-0176+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2018); Senegal: EU Parliament Calls for Support of Hissène Habré 
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Torture,423 and the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights.424 All these 
actors were quite instrumental in helping the victims of Habré’s atrocities 
bring him to justice. Of course, the most important lesson that can be learned 
from Habré’s trial, besides putting victims in the center of such proceedings, 
is that persistence and tenacity on the part of victims and their supporters is 
critical for success. This is evidenced by the type and nature of the 
persistence and tenacity exhibited by the victims of Habré.  
 




During the last several years, there have been many developments in 
international law that have significantly improved the ability of the 
international community to deal with impunity. Shortly after World War II, 
the world was confronted with what to do to prevent a repeat of the atrocities 
that occurred prior to and during the war, particularly, the extermination of 
millions of the Jewish citizens of Europe. The international community made 
concerted efforts to create laws and institutions that would put an end to such 
serious crimes. In addition to other actions, the international community 
created the United Nations425 and adopted several conventions and treaties 
directed at fighting international crimes and maintaining international peace 
and security. 
 
Trial, Apr. 26, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/04/26/senegal-eu-parliament-calls-
support-hissene-habre-trial. 
 423. The Special Rapporteur for Torture criticized the decision by Senegal to dismiss the 
case against Habré and kept pressure on the country to proceed with the trial.  See 
International Justice Resource Center, Extraordinary African Chambers: Hybrid Court to 
Try Former Chad Dictator Hissène Habré, Feb. 13, 2013, https://ijrcenter.org/2013/02/13/ 
extraordinary-african-chambers-hybrid-court-to-try-former-chad-dictator-hissene-habre/. 
 424. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights intervened several times to make 
sure that the trial was not derailed or stopped. See BRODY, supra note 384, at 27. 
 425. The United Nations was established as an intergovernmental organization on 
October 24, 1945, and empowered to promote international cooperation and peace and 
security. The U.N. has several organs (e.g., the Security Council) that deal with various 
aspects of international peace and security. For more on the United Nations and its various 
agencies and organs, see U.N. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, BASIC FACTS ABOUT 
THE UNITED NATIONS (2000); STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS—A STORY OF SUPERPOWERS, SECRET AGENTS, WARTIME ALLIES 
AND ENEMIES, AND THEIR QUEST FOR A PEACEFUL WORLD (2003). For more on the U.N. 
Security Council, see STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH THE U.N. SECURITY 
COUNCIL (Jeremy Farall & Hilary Charlesworth eds., 2016). 
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Of special note are the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”), which was adopted by the 
U.N. General Assembly on December 9, 1948, and entered into force on 
January 12, 1951.426 Article I of the Genocide Convention speaks directly to 
threats to international peace and security: “The Contracting Parties confirm 
that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a 
crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and 
punish.”427 Article III provides a list of international crimes that shall be 
punished under the Convention: (a) genocide; (b) conspiracy to commit 
genocide; (c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) attempt to 
commit genocide; and (e) complicity in genocide.428 
The Genocide Convention429 directed all Contracting Parties to 
“undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the 
necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present 
Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons 
guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.”430 Then, 
there are the Geneva Conventions, which comprise four treaties and three 
protocols—these provide or establish the foundation for international 
humanitarian law in the aftermath of World War II. The four conventions 
were designed to regulate armed conflict and provide protection for people 
who are no longer taking part in hostilities—the sick and wounded members 
of armed forces fighting on land, as well as those fighting at sea (including 
those who are shipwrecked), prisoners of war, and civilians.431 Specifically, 
 
 426. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx. 
 427. Id. art. I. 
 428. Id. art. III. 
 429. The word “convention,” as used here means “treaty” or “international agreement.” 
States that “[a] treaty thus embraces all instruments formed between two or more 
international judicial persons; conventions, agreements, protocols, and exchanges of letters 
or notes may all constitute treaties.” Bryan H. Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private 
Order: Public International Law as a Form of Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423, 
452–53 (2014). 
 430. Genocide Convention, supra note 426, art. V. 
 431. The four Geneva Conventions are (1) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; 
and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
These four treaties significantly extended and expanded the scope of international 
humanitarian law. Note that Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions extends the 
principles of the Geneva Conventions to non-international armed conflicts and eliminated 
certain problems of national sovereignty regarding the ability of the international 
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the first Geneva Convention protects wounded and sick soldiers on land 
during war or hostilities.432 The second Geneva Convention protects 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war.433 The 
third Geneva Convention applies to the treatment of prisoners of war and 
replaced the Prisoners of War Convention of 1929.434 The fourth Geneva 
Convention protects civilians, including those in occupied territory.435 
Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions covered, for the first 
time, situations that involved non-international armed conflicts. These 
include “traditional civil wars, internal armed conflicts that spill over into 
other States or internal conflicts in which third States or a multinational force 
intervenes alongside the government.”436 Article 3, common to the four 
Geneva Conventions “establishes fundamental rules from which no 
derogation is permitted.”437 The four Geneva Conventions have been ratified 
by all States and are universally applicable.438 
Nevertheless, in the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms, 
“violations of international humanitarian law [have] continued with glaring 
 
community to confront impunity. See The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their 
Additional Protocols, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), https://www. 
icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additional-protocols (last visited Aug. 3, 
2018). According to the ICRC, “[t]he Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
are international treaties that contain the most important rules limiting the barbarity of war. 
They protect people who do not take part in the fighting (civilians, medics, aid workers) and 
those who can no longer fight (wounded, sick and shipwrecked troops, prisoners of war). 
See, id.  
 432. See ICRC, Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12, 1949, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ 
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/365?OpenDocument. 
 433. See ICRC, Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
85, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/370?OpenDocument. 
 434. See ICRC, Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/ 
375?OpenDocument. 
 435. See ICRC, Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 287, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ 
ihl.nsf/INTRO/380?OpenDocument. 
 436. ICRC, supra note 432. 
 437. Id. 
 438. Id. For a list of States Parities to the Four Geneva Conventions, see ICRC, Treaties, 
States Parties and Commentaries, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States. 
xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=365 (last visited Aug. 
3, 2018). 
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impunity.”439 Faced with this conundrum, the international community 
decided to create an international legal mechanism to more effectively 
confront the problem of impunity. This international legal tool for fighting 
impunity by prosecuting those committing international crimes came in the 
form of the permanent international criminal court. Such a court was created 
by the multilateral treaty called the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. The ICC has already been fully examined, especially as it 
applies to impunity in Africa. In the following sections, we provide an 
overview of other ways in which international law can help the fight against 
impunity in Africa.  
 
B. International Law and Impunity in Africa: The Problem of Immunity 
for Diplomats and State Officials in Missions in Other States 
 
Since the end of World War II, there have been significant 
developments in “substantive norms of international human rights and 
international criminal law.”440 Unfortunately, these developments have not 
been accompanied or matched by the provision of mechanisms or procedures 
for enforcing these norms. Historically, “the primary methods of judicial 
enforcement envisaged by international law are the domestic courts of the 
state where the human rights violation or international crime occurred and 
the courts of the state responsible for that violation.”441 International law, 
thus, imposes obligations on States to fully bring to justice those individuals 
who commit international crimes within their territories. Where a state has 
violated a substantive human right, international human rights law provides 
“a right to a remedy or to reparation”442—the latter are to be paid by the State 
that has committed the human right violation. Unfortunately, these 
approaches to the enforcement of human rights violations and international 
criminal law have usually failed to accomplish the task of minimizing 
impunity and enhancing international peace and security. First, States may 
not incorporate provisions of international human rights laws in their national 
constitutions or legislation. That is, States may not make the rights contained 
in the various international human rights instruments justiciable in national 
 
 439. Sang-Hyun Song, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Ending Impunity 
and Establishing the Rule of Law, U.N. CHRONICLE, vol. 49, No. 4 (2012), https://unchron 
icle.un.org/article/role-international-criminal-court-ending-impunity-and-establishing-rule-
law. 
 440. Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International 
Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts, 21 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 815 (2010). 
 441. Id. at 816. 
 442. Id. 
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courts. Second, in many situations,443 the perpetrators of the atrocities are 
actually state actors and the crimes may be committed as part of official 
government policy.444 Of course, in these countries, governments do not 
prosecute their own officials.445 
Over the years, what has evolved, especially in Africa, is a culture of 
impunity in which human rights are regularly violated without any effort by 
national governments to bring violators or perpetrators to account for their 
crimes. Given the fact that national governments are either unwilling or 
unable to bring these perpetrators to justice, it has been suggested that the 
prosecution of these criminals can take “place in international (including 
regional) courts: such as the human rights tribunals or quasi-judicial bodies 
dealing with state responsibility or international criminal tribunals dealing 
with the penal responsibility of individuals.”446 A major problem to this latter 
approach to the prosecution of perpetrators of international crimes is the fact 
that there may not exist an international court with the necessary jurisdiction 
to try the crimes in question. As a consequence, it has been suggested that 
prosecution should be undertaken by the domestic courts of other States.447 
 
 443. For example, the Rwandan Genocide, which was perpetuated by the government of 
Rwanda and its supporters. See, e.g., LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE 
RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2004) (providing a comprehensive overview of the genocide that took 
place in Rwanda in early summer 1994). Consider also the Darfur Genocide, which was 
organized and carried out by the government in Khartoum and militias either directly hired 
and paid by the State or those whose interests are congruent with those of the State. See 
GENOCIDE IN DARFUR: INVESTIGATING THE ATROCITIES IN THE SUDAN (Samuel Totten & Eric 
Markusen eds., 2009) (providing a series of essays that examines the evolution of the Darfur 
Genocide and its impact on the peoples of the Darfur region of the Republic of Sudan). 
 444. Both the Genocide in Rwanda and that in Darfur, Sudan, are good examples. In 
both cases, the atrocities that constituted the genocides were carried out by the governments 
of these countries and their agents. See, e.g., DENISE BENTROVATO, NARRATING AND 
TEACHING THE NATION: THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION IN PRE- AND POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 
(2015) (stating that the Rwandan Genocide was carried out by the extremist government-
backed Hutu militia called Interahamwe); MODERN GENOCIDE: THE DEFINITIVE RESOURCE 
AND DOCUMENT COLLECTION 641 (Paul R. Bartrop & Leonard Jacobs eds., 2014) (stating 
that the genocide in Darfur, Sudan, was carried out by “Sudan’s regular armed forces” and 
“government-backed militias, namely the Janjaweed”). 
 445. It is important to note, however, that a change in government, as occurred in Chad, 
could bring about a change in policy, leading to the prosecution of officials of the ancien 
régime for international crimes. In Africa, the prosecution of Hissène Habré is a good 
example. See CELESTE HICKS, THE TRIAL OF HISSÈNE HABRÉ: HOW THE PEOPLE OF CHAD 
BROUGHT A TYRANT TO JUSTICE (2018) (detailing the trial and conviction of former Chadian 
dictator, Hissène Habré). 
 446. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 816. 
 447. These are States other than the ones in which the crimes were actually committed. 
This approach, of course, implicates the concept of universal jurisdiction, which made it 
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This approach has been criticized for several reasons, including: (1) it would 
be quite difficult to obtain the evidence on crimes that took place abroad; (2) 
the political will needed to facilitate the trial may be lacking in the State 
being called upon to carry out the trial; (3) there may be a lack of motivation 
among prosecutors in the State that is being called upon to prosecute cases 
that have no connection to their country; (4) it would still have to be 
established that the foreign State has jurisdiction, as a matter of international 
law, to prescribe rules to govern the trial and to subject the alleged crimes to 
its domestic courts for adjudication; and (5) it has to be established that the 
individuals to be tried do not enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of the 
forum.448 
It is generally accepted that the officials of a State are immune, under 
certain circumstances, from the jurisdiction of foreign States.449 One type of 
immunity is that which is conferred by international law on “certain state 
officials” and it attaches to “the office or status of the official.”450 Immunities 
of this type remain valid only as long as the official remains in office and are 
described as “personal immunity” (or immunity ratione personae).451 Under 
customary international law, the Head of State and all diplomats that are duly 
accredited to a foreign state “possess such immunity from the jurisdiction of 
foreign states.”452 Of course, treaties also confer “similar immunities on 
diplomats, representatives of states to international organizations, and other 
officials on special mission in foreign states.”453 
 
possible for Hissène Habré to be prosecuted in Senegal for crimes committed in Chad. 
According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, “universal jurisdiction purports to remove the need for 
a particular connection to any one” and hence, allows courts in countries other than those in 
which the crimes were committed to prosecute the accused persons. Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts, in UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 168, 168 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004). 
 448. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 816. 
 449. See, e.g., UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 2, 2004, 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/4_1_2004.pdf. However, this 
Convention is not yet in force. 
 450. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 816. 
 451. Id. at 818.  
 452. Id. See also Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of 
States, Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers, 247 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE 
HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT’L L. 13 (1994). 
 453. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 818. According to Article 29 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, “The person of a diplomatic agent shall be 
inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall 
treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his 
person, freedom or dignity.” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 2, 1961, 500 
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But, what is the justification for these immunities? The usual thinking is 
that such immunities are needed and critical for the effective undertaking of 
international relations. In negotiations between States, for example, it is 
argued that the diplomats who undertake these negotiations would not be 
able to negotiate freely and perform their jobs effectively if they are 
subjected to harassment by other States.454 In its decision in the case of U.S. 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), 
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has held that there is “no more 
fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States than the 
inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies.”455 These immunities, it is 
argued, are necessary, not only for the peaceful coexistence of the world’s 
States, but also for the conduct of international affairs. 
 
i. Immunity Ratione Personae and Impunity of Officials 
 
Senior government officials who are granted immunity ratione 
personae will not be able to perform their functions effectively and fully if 
they are subjected to arrest and detention during their tenure in a foreign 
State.456 Thus, in the case where this type of immunity is applicable, it is 
generally understood that there is an absolute prohibition on the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction by the host State—under this international law doctrine, 
the host State is prohibited from exercising criminal jurisdiction, not only in 
situations or “cases involving the acts of these individuals457 in their official 
capacity but also in cases involving private acts.”458 
But, what if the act in question was committed before the individual 
actually took office or commenced his or her official duties?  Does immunity 
 
UNTS 95 (entered into force on Apr. 24, 1964), http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments 
/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf. This provision is supplemented by that in Article 31: 
“A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving 
State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction.” Id. 
 454. Michael A. Tunks, Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-of-State 
Immunity, 52 DUKE L.J. 651, 656 (2002). 
 455. U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), 
1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 91 (May 24) (quoting United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran, Provisional Measures, Order, 1979 I.C.J. (Dec. 15)). 
 456. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 819. 
 457. These individuals, according to the U.N. Convention on Special Missions, include 
heads of state and government, ministers of foreign affairs, and other persons of high rank, 
“when they take part in a special mission of the sending State,” as well as members of the 
sending country’s diplomatic staff residing in the host receiving State. See U.N. Convention 
on Special Missions, art. 21, 31, 39, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231 (Dec. 8, 1969). 
 458. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 819. 
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ratione personae still attach? As was made clear by the International Court 
of Justice (“ICJ”) in the Arrest Warrant Case,459 immunity applies, regardless 
of the nature of the activity and when it was carried out. In 2000, the 
Government of Belgium issued an arrest warrant against Abdoulaye Yerodia 
Ndombasi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
under Belgium’s law of universal jurisdiction.460 The warrant was challenged 
before the International Court of Justice in the case generally referred to as 
the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v. Belgium).461 The pertinent parts of the ICJ’s judgment 
are presented in para. 54, which states as follows: 
 
The Court accordingly concludes that the functions of a Minister 
for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his or 
her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from 
criminal jurisdiction and inviolability.  That immunity and that 
inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of 
authority of another State[,] which would hinder him or her in the 
performance of his or her duties.462  
 
The critical issue here is that the individual be allowed to enjoy such 
immunity as is necessary to allow him or her to perform his or her duties.  As 
such, any legal process invoked by the host or receiving State must not 
subject the official to “a constraining act of authority at the time when the 
official was entitled to the immunity.”463 
In this respect, no distinction can be drawn between acts performed by a 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in an “official” capacity, and those claimed to 
have been performed in a “private capacity”, or, for that matter, between acts 
 
 459. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of 
Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14). 
 460. Belgium’s law of universal jurisdiction was enacted in 1993 to allow the country’s 
domestic courts to judge people accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity or 
genocide. See, e.g., MITSUE INAZUMI, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: EXPANSION OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION FOR PROSECUTING SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (2005) (describing, inter alia, Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law 
of 1993).  
 461. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 459. 
 462. Id. ¶ 54. 
 463. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 819. It is important to note that while any 
attempts to arrest and prosecute, for example, high ranking officials or those on a diplomatic 
mission would constitute a violation of the immunity granted them under international law, 
an invitation by the host or receiving State’s government for the officials clothed by such 
immunity to testify voluntarily would not be a violation. See Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 459, ¶¶ 55, 70–71 .  
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performed before the person concerned assumed office as Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and acts committed during the period of office. Thus, if a 
Minister for Foreign Affairs is arrested in another State on a criminal charge, 
he or she is clearly thereby prevented from exercising the functions of his or 
her office. The consequences of such impediment to the exercise of those 
official functions are equally serious, regardless of whether the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs was, at the time of arrest, present in the territory of the 
arresting State on an “official” visit or a “private” visit, regardless of whether 
the arrest relates to acts allegedly performed before the person became the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs or to acts performed while in office, and 
regardless of whether the arrest relates to alleged acts performed in an 
“official” capacity or a “private” capacity. Furthermore, even the mere risk 
that, by travelling to or transiting another State a Minister for Foreign Affairs 
might be exposing himself or herself to legal proceedings could deter the 
Minister from travelling internationally when required to do so for the 
purposes of the performance of his or her official functions.464 
The nature of the alleged activity or when it was committed are not 
important to this doctrine of immunity. With respect to the Arrest Warrant 
case, the ICJ held that a Foreign Minister is entitled to immunity ratione 
personae and that that immunity remains valid even when and if it is alleged 
that the said minister had committed an international criminal offense. On 
this point, the ICJ held as follows: 
 
The Court has carefully examined State practice, including national 
legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts, such 
as the House of Lords465 or the French Court of Cassation.466  It has 
 
 464. Id. ¶ 55. 
 465. The House of Lords is the Upper House of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. 
Until the U.K. established a Supreme Court in 1999, the House of Lords, through the Law 
Lords, served as the final court of appeal in the U.K. judicial system. The Law Lords or 
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were judges that were appointed under the Appellate 
Jurisdiction Act 1876 to the British House of Lords to perform certain judiciary functions, 
which included acting as the highest court of appeal for most domestic cases. The House of 
Lords lost its judicial functions after the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom was 
established in 2009. For more on Britain’s Law Lords, see MAXWELL BARRETT, THE LAW 
LORDS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE WORKINGS OF BRITAIN’S HIGHEST JUDICIAL BODY AND THE 
MEN WHO PRESIDENT OVER IT (2000) and for the House of Lords, see MEG RUSSELL, THE 
CONTEMPORARY HOUSE OF LORDS: WESTMINSTER BICAMERALISM REVIVED (2013). 
 466. The French Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation), founded in 1804, is the court of 
final appeal for civil and criminal matters. For more on the French Court of Cassation, see 
EVA STEINER, FRENCH LEGAL METHOD (2002); MARTIN WESTON, AN ENGLISH READER’S 
GUIDE TO THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM (1991); NICOLAS MOLFESSIS, LA COUR DE CASSATION 
  
2019]         International Law and the Struggle Against Government Impunity in Africa 159 
 
been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists under 
customary international law any form of exception to the rule 
according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to 
incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected 
of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.467 
 
In addition, the immunity applies even when the minister is traveling 
abroad on a private visit.468 Given the fact that this type of immunity is 
designed primarily to enhance the ability of the official to effectively perform 
his or her international functions, the immunity is valid only as long as the 
individual concerned is in office or on assignment in another State.469 The 
immunity ratione personae is generally accepted, recognized and applied in 
national courts in many countries and has become part of state practice 
throughout the world.470 
While the doctrine of immunity ratione personae is well-established in 
international law and international relations, the question of how this doctrine 
impacts government impunity still remains unanswered. What happens if 
diplomats and other State officials on service abroad use their offices (e.g., 
an embassy or a diplomatic pouch) to commit international crimes?  Such 
crimes could include, for example, transporting children in diplomatic planes 
for sex trafficking purposes or using diplomatic pouches to traffic illegal 
 
ET L’ÉLABORATION DU DROIT (2004); JEAN-BAPTISTE SIREY, JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR DE 
CASSATION DE 1791 À 1813 (1822).  
 467. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 459, ¶ 58. 
 468. Id. ¶ 55. 
 469. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 819. 
 470. Note, however, that there is one case in which a Head of State was denied 
immunity from prosecution for international crimes. On February 14, 1988, a federal grand 
jury, sitting in Miami (USA), returned a 12-count indictment against General Manuel 
Antonio Noriega, then de facto ruler of Panama (1983–1989), with taking part in an 
international conspiracy to import cocaine, as well as materials used in the production of 
cocaine, into and out of the United States. Noriega’s lawyer moved to dismiss the 
indictment, arguing that the alleged illegal activities were committed outside “the territorial 
bounds of the United States” and that “Noriega was immune from prosecution as a head of 
state and diplomat, and that his alleged narcotics offenses constituted acts of state not 
properly reviewable by this Court” [i.e., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida]. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 117 F.3d 
1206 (11th Cir. 1997). 
Noriega’s lawyer argued that the Panamanian leader was immune from prosecution 
based on head of state immunity, the act of state doctrine, and diplomatic immunity. Id. 
Noriega’s claim of immunity from prosecution was denied based on the ground that Noriega 
had never served as the constitutional leader of Panama, that Panama had not sought 
immunity for Noriega, and that the acts charged relate to Noriega’s private pursuits of 
“personal enrichment.” See id. at 1212. 
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substances. If these individuals are covered by immunity, as stated in various 
international legal instruments,471 decisions of international judicial bodies,472 
and the writings of international legal scholars,473 would not they be able to 
commit international crimes with impunity? Despite the loophole474 used by 
U.S. courts to deny former Panamanian ruler General Manuel Antonio 
Noriega immunity for his alleged crimes, the doctrine of immunity ratione 
personae remains an important principle of international law and 
international relations.  
 
 ii.   Who is Entitled to Immunity Ratione Personae? 
 
Over the years, it has become clear that sitting Heads of State,475 Heads 
of Government,476 and diplomats477 are usually granted or possess immunity 
 
 471. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 453; UN 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 
http://www.un.org/en/ethics/pdf/convention.pdf; U.N. Convention on Special Missions, 
supra note 457. 
 472. Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 376. 
 473. See, e.g., HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY (2013) 
(providing a detailed guide to the operation of the international rule of State immunity, 
which bars the domestic courts of States from exercising criminal or civil jurisdiction over 
claims made against another State). 
 474. Although Noriega was, at the time of his indictment, the de facto ruler of Panama, 
U.S. prosecutors were able to argue that he could not be granted immunity on the ground 
that he had never been recognized by the U.S. Government as the constitutional leader of 
Panama. Implied in this reasoning is that had he been recognized as the legitimate head of 
state of Panama, he would have been granted immunity regardless of his alleged criminal 
activities. See, e.g., EDWARD CHUKWUEMEKE OKEKE, JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF 
STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2018) (stating, inter alia, that Noriega’s claim 
of head of State immunity was denied by courts in the United States because the U.S. 
government had never recognized him as the legitimate constitutional ruler of Panama). 
 475. Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
(Djibouti v. France), 2008 I.C.J. 177 (June 4). In paragraph 170, the ICJ held as follows: 
“The Court has already recalled in the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) case ‘that in international law it is firmly established 
that . . . certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State . . . enjoy 
immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal’ (Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2002, ¶ 51). A Head of State enjoys in particular ‘full immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction and inviolability’ which protects him or her ‘against any act of authority of 
another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties’ (Ibid., 
p. 22, para. 54). Thus the determining factor in assessing whether or not there has been an 
attack on the immunity of the Head of State lies in the subjection of the latter to a 
constraining act of authority.”  
 476. In Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 459, ¶ 51, the 
ICJ ruled as follows: “The Court would observe at the outset that in international law it is 
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ratione personae to enhance their ability to perform their duties. In the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium case,478 the ICJ was called 
upon to decide on the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the 
inviolability of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. The ICJ held that 
“the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the 
duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and that 
inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of authority of 
another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her 
duties.”479 
But, does immunity ratione personae apply to other senior members of 
the government? It has been argued that in the Arrest Warrant case, when the 
ICJ held that “diplomatic and consular agents [and] certain holders of high-
ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other 
States, both civil and criminal,”480 the Court’s use of the expression “such 
as” indicates or suggests that the list of senior government officials entitled to 
immunity ratione personae is not exhaustive. 
In the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ held that Foreign Ministers are 
entitled to immunity ratione personae due to the nature of their jobs or public 
functions—these individuals are responsible for the international relations of 
their countries. Other government officials besides Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs also perform functions for their governments at the international 
level. Such functions may include, for example, negotiating on behalf of their 
governments with multilateral organizations, and other foreign-based 
entities. As stated in Article IV of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations,481 “[r]epresentatives of Members to the 
principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and to conferences 
convened by the United Nations, shall, while exercising their functions and 
during the journey to and from the place of meeting, enjoy the following 
privileges and immunities: (a) Immunity from personal arrest or detention 
and from seizure of their personal baggage, and, in respect of words spoken 
or written and all acts done by them in their capacity as representatives, 
 
firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain holders of high-
ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal.”  
 477. Id.  
 478. Id. 
 479. Id. ¶ 54. 
 480. Id. ¶ 51. 
 481. U.N. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities, 1946, supra note 471, art. IV, § 
11. 
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immunity from legal process of every kind.”482 In addition, under the U.N. 
Convention on Special Missions, 1969,483 “persons of the representatives of 
the sending State in the special mission and of the members of its diplomatic 
staff shall be inviolable. They shall not be liable to any form of arrest or 
detention. The receiving State shall treat them with due respect and shall take 
all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their persons, freedom or 
dignity.”484 Also, “[t]he representatives of the sending State in the special 
mission and the members of its diplomatic staff shall enjoy immunity from 
the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.”485 
These treaty-based conferrals of immunity, as well as those enunciated 
by the ICJ, are designed or intended to enhance the conduct of international 
relations.486 But, have the immunity provisions in these treaties evolved into 
customary international law?  If yes, then immunity ratione personae may be 
available to a much larger group of individuals than mentioned in the ICJ’s 
decision in the Arrest Warrant case.487 The International Law Commission is 
of the opinion that the immunity of special missions has been established as a 
matter of international law.488 However, in the case, United States v. 
Sissoko,489 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida held 
that it “did not find that the U.N. Convention on Special Missions is 
‘customary international law’ that binds this Court.”490 The Executive 
Branch of the U.S. Government has asserted that foreign officials who are in 
the United States temporarily and on a “special diplomatic mission” are 
entitled to immunity from the criminal and civil jurisdictions of the courts of 
the United States.491 
In the Weixum v. Xilai case, the foreign official involved was not a Head 
of State or Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was 
 
 482. Id. art. 11(a). 
 483. U.N. Convention on Special Missions, supra note 457. 
 484. Id. art. 29. 
 485. Id. art. 31. 
 486. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 821. 
 487. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 459. 
 488. Documents of the Nineteenth Session Including the Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly, 1967 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Vol. II, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 
1967/Add.1. The relevant section is: “It is now generally recognized that States are under an 
obligation to accord the facilities, privileges and immunities in question to special missions 
and their members. Such is also the opinion expressed by the Commission on several 
occasions between 1958 and 1965 51 and confirmed by it in 1967.” Id. at 358. 
 489. United States v. Sissoko, 995 F. Supp. 1469 (S.D. Fla 1997). 
 490. Id. at 1471. 
 491. Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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China’s Minister of Commerce and International Trade, Bo Xilai.492 The 
governments of many countries and their courts have also been “willing to 
accept the customary law status of the rule granting immunity to members of 
Special Missions.”493 For example, in Re Bo Xilai,494 a court in the UK 
showed willingness to grant immunity to the same Chinese Minister of 
Commerce and International Trade on the ground that such action was 
required by international customary law.495 Also, when, in April 2008, 
Rwanda’s Chief of State Protocol, Lt. Col. Rose Kabuye,496 was on an 
official visit to Germany, the government of the latter refused to arrest her on 
a warrant from France on charges of terrorism and stated that it had made the 
decision based on the belief that she was immune. Nevertheless, in a 
subsequent visit to Germany in November 2008, Ms. Kabuye was arrested 
by German authorities and extradited to France—German authorities argued 
that she was on a private visit this time and hence, did not qualify for 
immunity.497 The arrest warrant was later lifted by French judges and she 
returned to Rwanda.498 
It appears that “special mission immunity” does not apply to state 
officials who are on a private visit abroad and can be distinguished from the 
immunity ratione personae examined by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case.  
In the latter case, the ICJ ruled that the Foreign Minister, as well as the Head 
of State and the Head of Government, would be granted immunity even if 
they are traveling abroad on a private visit. While international law had 
granted Heads of State absolute immunity ratione personae from the 
criminal jurisdiction of foreign courts, even when traveling abroad for a 
private purpose, it was not until the ICJ’s decision in the Arrest Warrant case 
 
 492. Id. 
 493. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 822. 
 494. Re Bo Xilai, 128 I.L.R. 713 (Bow St. Magistrate Ct. 2005). 
 495. Id. 
 496. Lt. Col. Rose Kabuye is a retired officer in the Rwandan Army and remains the 
highest-ranking woman to ever serve in the country’s armed forces. See, e.g., JENNIE E. 
BURNET, GENOLCIDE LIVES IN US: WOMEN, MEMORY, AND SILENCE IN RWANDA 12 (2012) 
(identifying Rose Kabuye as the “highest-ranking woman in the armed wing of the 
[Rwandan Patrotic Front]” who went on to serve in “several important administrative 
positions after the genocide.” 
 497. Rwandan authorities disputed this claim and stated that Kabuye traveled to 
Germany on a diplomatic mission. See Germany Arrests Woman in Rwanda Genocide: 
Rwandan President Says Holding of Aide Violates Country’s Sovereignty, AFRICA ON NBC 
NEWS.COM (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27665617/ns/world_news-africa/ 
t/germ any-arrests-woman-rwanda-genocide/#.W2iJithKhBw. 
 498. Hereward Holland, Rwanda Says France Drops Kabuye Arrest Warrant, REUTERS, 
(Mar. 31, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-rwanda-france-kabuye-idAFJOE53 
001S20090401. 
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that immunity was conferred on a serving Foreign Minister (whether the 
Minister was traveling abroad on private or official business). The decision 
was justified on the basis that such immunity was necessary to enhance the 
ability of the minister to perform his or her obligations at the international 
level.499 
Besides the functional basis, there are other justifications for conferring 
immunity ratione personae on state officials. It has been argued that “[t]he 
person and position of the Head of State reflects the sovereign equality of the 
state and the immunity accorded to him or her is in part due to the respect for 
the dignity of the office and of the state which that office represents.”500 In 
addition, another justification for the absolute immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction that is accorded Heads of State can be found in the principle of 
non-intervention, whose corollary is the principle of sovereign equality of 
states. This, it is argued, “is the basis for the immunity of states from the 
jurisdiction of other states (par in parem non habet imperium).”501 
Similarly, arresting and detaining the Head of Government of a State 
would produce similar results, especially considering the fact that in many 
countries, Heads of State are also Heads of Government.  In many countries, 
the Head of Government is the effective leader of the country and his or her 
arrest and detention could have the same political implications for the 
country as the arrest and detention of the Head of State. Other state officials, 
including ministers, however, “do not embody the supreme authority of the 
state, and their removal does not signify a change in government of the 
state.”502 Thus, removing immunity for other senior state officials503 who 
travel abroad on a private visit should not have the same effect as if such 
immunity were withdrawn from the Head of State and the Head of 
Government. Akande and Shah504 have argued that “by restricting the 
allocation of broad immunity ratione personae to Heads of State and Heads 
of Government, a balance is struck between sovereign equality and respect 
 
 499. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 823–24. 
 500. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 824. 
 501. Arresting and detaining the Head of State of a country, it is argued, is tantamount to 
a form of regime change, even if temporary, and hence, represents interference with the 
independence and autonomy of a State. See id.  
 502. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 825. 
 503. That is, senior government officials besides the Head of State and the Head of 
Government. See, e.g., JOANNE FOAKES, THE POSITION OF HEADS OF STATE AND SENIOR 
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2014) (identifying senior government officials (other 
than the head of state) as including “Foreign Ministers” and “a very narrow category of 
other high-ranking State representatives by virtue of their office”). 
 504. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 825. 
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for the rule of (international and domestic) law”505 and that “extending such 
broad immunity ratione personae to other ministers, as the ICJ did in the 
Arrest Warrant case, is erroneous and unjustified.”506 
 
3. What About Immunity Ratione Materiae? 
 
Immunity ratione materiae or functional immunity is that which 
attaches to the official act (performed or to be performed by the state official) 
instead of to the status of the state official.507 This type of immunity, hence, 
may be relied on by any individual who is (1) acting on behalf of the state; 
and (2) is performing an official act. Since this type of immunity is conduct-
based, it can “be relied on by former [state] officials in respect of official acts 
performed while in office as well as by serving state officials.”508 Of course, 
individuals who are not in the service of the State but who, at some time in 
the past, had served the State, can rely on immunity ratione materiae to 
cover those acts that they had performed while they were in the service of the 
State.509 
The conferment of immunity ratione materiae implicates two important 
policies.  In the first one, the state official in question can argue that he is not 
legally responsible for acts, which are effectively those of the State. These 
acts, which were, in effect, undertaken on behalf of the State by the state 
official, must be imputed only to the State.510 The principle if immunity 
ratione materiae can be used to place responsibility for certain acts511 where 
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COMP. L.Q. 1193 (1964). 
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it belongs—on the State. Consider, for example, what the Appeals Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia said in the 
case of Prosecutor v. Blaškić:  
 
The acts of state officials acting in that capacity are not attributable 
to them personally but only to the state: ‘Such [State]512 officials 
are mere instruments of a state and their official action can only be 
attributed to the state. They cannot be the subject of sanctions or 
penalties for conduct that is not private but undertaken on behalf of 
a state. In other words, state officials cannot suffer the 
consequences of wrongful acts which are not attributable to them 
personally but to the state on whose behalf they act: they enjoy so-
called ‘functional immunity’. This is a well-established rule of 
customary international law going back to the 18th and 19th 
centuries, restated many times since.513 
 
But, is immunity of state officials co-extensive with that of the State? 
International legal scholars argue that “[o]ne consequence of this function of 
immunity ratione personae is that the immunity of state officials is not co-
extensive with, but broader than, the immunity of the state itself.”514 That is, 
the state official is immune with respect to the “sovereign acts for which the 
state is immune,”515 as well as other acts, which are official but non-
sovereign. 
Secondly, without immunity granted to state officials in foreign courts, 
the latter can circumvent the immunity of the State by bringing proceedings 
against those who represent or act on behalf of the State. Hence, immunity 
ratione materiae provides a mechanism through which the circumvention of 
the immunity of sovereign states can be prevented.  As was held by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Chuidian v. Philippine National 
Bank,516 “[i]t is generally recognized that a suit against an individual acting 
in his official capacity is the practical equivalent of a suit against the 
 
for which it is responsible.” JOANNE FOAKES, THE POSITION OF HEADS OF STATE AND SENIOR 
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2014). 
 512. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Objection to the Issue of Subpoena duces Tecum, ¶ 38 (Oct. 
29, 1997). 
 513. Id.  
 514. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 827. 
 515. Id. See also Zachary Douglas, State Immunity for the Acts of State Officials, 82 
BRIT. YEARBOOK OF INT’L L. 281 (2012). 
 516. Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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sovereign directly.”517 This means, essentially, that this type of immunity 
“operates as a jurisdictional, or procedural, bar and prevents courts from 
indirectly exercising control over the acts of the foreign state through 
proceedings against the official who carried out the act.”518 
But, can a state official who is on official duty abroad rely on immunity 
ratione materiae if he is charged with an international crime? There are three 
reasons why the state official cannot rely on immunity ratione materiae in 
order to evade liability for his or her international crimes. First, one can 
argue that given the fact that “immunity is accorded only to sovereign 
acts,”519 officials and the states that they represent, “can never be immune 
from the jurisdiction of other states in respect of international crimes because 
these crimes, for the most part, constitute violations of jus cogens norms520 
and thus cannot be sovereign acts.”521 Second, immunity ratione materiae 
can only be invoked by a state official to prevent being scrutinized for acts 
that are sanctioned by the state (i.e., official acts). However, acts that 
constitute international crimes cannot be considered official acts. Finally, 
since jus cogens norms “supersede all other norms they overcome all 
inconsistent rules of international law providing for immunity.”522 Below, we 
take a closer look at these three arguments and see how they relate to the 
struggle against impunity in Africa.523 
State immunity, it has been argued, applies only in cases involving 
“sovereign acts” and that “international crimes,” especially those which are 
contrary to jus cogens norms cannot be considered “sovereign acts.” 
Additionally, it has been argued, acts that constitute or amount to 
international crimes, can never be considered sovereign acts. Thus, if a state 
engages in or is responsible for acts that are contrary to jus cogens norms, 
that state is said to have impliedly waived “any rights to immunity as the 
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peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) is “a norm accepted and 
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state has stepped out of the sphere of sovereignty.”524 In line with this 
argument, since the state does not have the authority to violate jus cogens 
norms, any acts of the state that are contrary to jus cogens norms cannot be 
considered sovereign acts. The Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of 
Germany525 case can shed some light on this point. The facts of the case are 
that in June 1944, military units belonging to the German occupation 
government in Greece massacred more than 300 citizens of the village of 
Distomo and burnt down the village. A case was brought against Germany 
for those atrocities in 1995 before Greek courts by relatives of the victims. 
The Court of Livadia held that Germany was liable and ordered it to pay 
compensation to the claimants.  Germany then appealed the court’s decision 
and the appeal was heard by the Hellenic Supreme Court, the Areios 
Pagos.526 The Areios Pagos upheld the judgment of the Court of Livadia 
based on the argument that acts which violate jus cogens norms527 do not and 
cannot qualify as sovereign acts (acts jure imperii) and that by committing 
such atrocities, Germany had impliedly waved its immunity.528 Although the 
majority of the Areios Pagos affirmed the lower court’s ruling and ordered 
Germany to pay the amount of money fixed by the Lividia court, “a strong 
dissenting opinion asserted that no such customary rule restricting sovereign 
immunity existed.”529 Germany, nevertheless, declined to honor the ruling of 
the Areios Pagos.  
 
 524. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 829. See also Adam C. Belsky, Mark Merva & 
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Implied Waiver under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity 
for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 365 (1989). 
 525. Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany (Distomo Massacre Case), 
129 I.L.R. 514 (Court of Cassation 2000) (Greece). 
 526. Id.  
 527. The massacre of more than 300 civilians by German forces in the village of 
Distomo definitely qualifies as an act that violates jus cogens norms. See, e.g., CHRIS 
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The matter eventually reached the Greek Special Highest Court and by 
six votes to five, the Court held that Germany enjoyed unrestricted immunity 
and hence, could not be brought before any Greek courts for torts committed 
by its soldiers.530 In its ruling, the Special Highest Court “asserted a general 
norm of customary international law that rendered inadmissible any claim 
against a foreign state for torts committed by its armed forces.”531 The Court 
then went on to state that there does not yet exist a norm of customary 
international law that excludes certain acts from the international law of state 
immunity.  Nevertheless, a minority of five judges on the Special Highest 
Court held that such an exception “did exist under customary law.”532 
Finally, the Court held that there was no exception from jurisdiction under 
customary law. Within the Greek legal system, this decision of the Greek 
Special Highest Court was final and binding.533 
On December 12, 2002, the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) decided on several claims emanating from the Prefecture of 
Voiotia case. One of the rulings by the ECtHR concerned Germany’s 
immunity—the ECtHR declared, after referring to its ruling in Al-Adsani, 
that it “does not find established, however, that there is yet acceptance in 
international law of the proposition that States are not entitled to immunity in 
respect of civil claims for damages brought against them in another State for 
crimes against humanity. The Greek Government cannot therefore be 
required to override the rule of State immunity against their will.”534 
The most important legal question in the Prefecture of Voiotia case 
concerned the immunity of States, on the one hand, and jus cogens norms, on 
the other. In 2001, the ECtHR in the Al-Adsani case,535 had already decided 
in favor of state immunity. The decision, however, was split, although legal 
scholars, through commentary and other writings, appeared to unanimously 
support the ruling of the ECtHR.536 
 
 530. Id. at 481. See also Federal Republic of Germany v. Miltiadis Margellos, Case 
6/17–9–2002, Decision of September 17, 2002. 
 531. Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 528. 
 532. Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 528, at 482. 
 533. Id. See also Federal Republic of Germany v. Miltiadis Margellos, supra note 530. 
 534. ECtHR, Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany, Admissibility 
Decision, § D1(b) (Dec. 12, 2002), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%2 
2001-23539%22]}. See also ECtHR, Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, Judgment (Nov. 21, 
2001), https://www.dipublico.org/1571/case-of-al-adsani-v-the-united-kingdom-european-
court-of-human-rights/. 
 535. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, supra note 534. 
 536. See, e.g., Markus Rau, After Pinochet: Sovereign Immunity in Respect of Serious 
Human Rights Violations–The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Ad-
Adsani Case, 3 GERMAN L.J. 6 (2002); Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 528. 
  
170 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:1 
  
Recall that jus cogens can be defined as international law norms from 
which no derogation is permitted and in the case of conflict of rules, a jus 
cogens norm would trump every other rule of international law that is not of 
the same superior status.537 The prohibition of certain war crimes, it is 
argued, forms part of jus cogens. Since state immunity is not absolute but is 
“limited to certain acts of the state and that it may be derogated from in a 
variety of circumstances,”538 one can conclude that “state immunity may not 
serve to bar the judicial enforcement of the jus cogens norm prohibiting 
certain war crimes.”539 Those who support the Al-Adsani decision have put 
forth two arguments to support their claim that state immunity is not barred 
in cases that violate jus cogens, such as war crimes.  
First, it is argued that there does not exist any actual conflict of rules 
between the jus cogens norm that is being violated and states’ reliance on 
state immunity before the courts.540 International law does not have an 
authority that makes and executes the laws. It is argued that in this system, 
“one must always distinguish between material rules and the ways in which 
these rules are enforced.”541 If a jus cogens norm prohibits, for example, war 
crimes or crimes against humanity, the same norm “still does not bar states 
from relying on state immunity before national courts in cases concerning 
war crimes, since state immunity only concerns the enforcement, not the 
material content of the jus cogens rule.”542 As argued by Zimmermann, “it 
seems to be more appropriate to consider both issues as involving two 
different sets of rules which do not interact with each other.”543 
Another argument was also mentioned in the Al-Adsani544 decision by 
one of the majority judges and is of a largely political rather than a legal 
character.  Some legal scholars have argued that any attempt to deny state 
immunity could create judicial chaos: States, whose agents (e.g., their 
militaries) had committed atrocities, even a very long time ago, can suddenly 
be inundated with a significantly large number of civil claims.545 For 
example, it is feared that courts in countries that were colonized or subjected 
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to various forms of exploitation by the Europeans may not adjudicate cases 
involving long-ago atrocities fairly if the defendant is a European State.  For 
example, as argued by Christian Maiehöfer,546 “[a]n international order in 
which the judges of developing states sit in judgment over industrialized 
states or Arab judges over Israel—and vice versa-, enforcing their notion on 
the observance of international law—or at least or jus cogens, hardly seems 
desirable.”547 
But, how convincing are these arguments? Some scholars have argued 
that “the material jus cogens rule also contains a procedural jus cogens rule 
prohibiting certain limits to enforcement.”548 In other words, the “jus cogens 
character of a norm presupposes superior means of enforcement.”549 Hence, a 
state may not rely on state immunity in any case that concerns or involves the 
violations of jus cogens norms.550 Also, as made evident in the work of the 
International Law Commission with respect to the law of state responsibility, 
jus cogens norms “are afforded superior means of enforcement.”551 
But, what about the fear that the courts of some States would be used in 
an opportunistic manner to produce rulings that are unfair to other States?  
This does not seem to be a very convincing argument against any proposal to 
restrict the immunity of states. Jus cogens, as a concept in international law, 
presupposes wide agreement among States that there may not be any 
derogation from the rule concerned.552 Hence, no State may, on its own 
accord or unilaterally, “declare that a certain rule forms part of jus 
cogens.”553 Bartsch and Elberling554 argue that “this concept alone makes 
frivolous court cases hard to imagine.”555 More important is the fact that if 
the courts of a State adjudicate a case and make their judgments based on “a 
subjective and false understanding of jus cogens,”556 such decisions or 
rulings would not be enforceable or enforced by other States. 
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It is not necessary to deal with the past atrocities of States by simply 
using the principle of state immunity. States can enter into reparation treaties 
that impose a duty on the offending State to pay compensation for damages 
done. Such treaties can contain provisions designed to deal with claims that 
were not covered by the treaties concluded. In addition to the fact that these 
treaties would serve as a statement of responsibility for the atrocities 
committed, they would also provide compensation for the victims or their 
surviving relatives of violations of jus cogens. It has been argued that 
reparation treaties would form a much more effective tool to deal with past 
atrocities committed by States or their agents than the blocking, through state 
immunity, of the efforts of victims and/or their surviving relatives to seek 
compensation for the atrocities committed against them.557 
The prevailing opinion in the legal literature is that legal or political 
reasons can be advanced to allow state immunity to be used to bar States 
from being held accountable for violations of jus cogens norms. 
Nevertheless, some legal scholars have argued that “legal or political reasons 
do not call for allowing state immunity to bar claims concerning the violation 
of jus cogens norms.”558 But, what is the view of the courts? The courts are 
divided: the Special Highest Court of Greece decided in favor of state 
immunity for crimes that violate jus cogens norms. Nevertheless, it did so, 
not unanimously, but only by a plurality of six to five votes. The European 
Court of Human Rights affirmed the decision in Al-Adsani, which itself was 
a sharply divided decision, but only through a majority opinion. 
It appears that both the courts and the legal literature are divided on how 
to deal with violations of jus cogens norms. In fact, there remains a lot of 
uncertainty regarding whether heads of state and heads of government should 
be prosecuted by national courts or by the courts of other States under the 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction. In the following section, we look at the 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to see if we can get some 
answers to this legal quagmire. We will also return to the discussion of the 
trial of Hissène Habré by the Extraordinary African Chambers to see if they 
provide a way to deal with impunity in Africa, especially that which is 
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C. Recent Developments in the Fight Against Impunity in Africa 
 
According to Article 6(2) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone,559 “[t]he official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of 
State or Government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve 
such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”560 This rule, 
it is argued by some scholars, is now “so entrenched in state practice and 
international jurisprudence that it reflects a rule applicable before 
international courts.”561 Many scholars now believe that the uncertainty 
surrounding the rules about immunity are no longer unsettled but that the 
rules have “crystallized precisely in the form stated in Article 6(2) in respect 
of the power of international courts to exercise international jurisdiction over 
heads of state and other political and military leaders.”562 
It is argued that this power to prosecute heads of state and other high-
ranking officials for international crimes or violations of jus cogens is 
“unvarnished and unrestricted in the sense that it has no place for distinctions 
which have been made in the municipal laws governing immunities, e.g., 
distinctions between absolute immunity (ratione personae) which exists for 
all acts committed during a head of state or ambassador’s tenure of office, 
and the more limited immunity (ratione materiae) which applies to ex-heads 
and lesser officials, protecting them from acts performed as part of their 
official functions but not for acts done for private gratification.”563 
When the accused asserts immunity in national law, these distinctions 
might be meaningful because motivation is relevant. However, such 
distinctions do not have a place in international criminal law, whose main 
objective is to prosecute and bring to justice those who are engaged in 
planning, designing, inciting, and providing the leadership for the 
commission of international crimes. With respect to crimes such as war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, the motivation for those who 
plan and incite these acts is not necessary or required in order for the 
international community to hold the culprits accountable. As argued by 
Robertson, “[t]hese are people of power or wealth or both and their 
motivation for widespread and systematic abuse of power, whether private 
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greed or public aggrandizement, is irrelevant.”564 This is evident in the trials 
of former Liberian President Charles Taylor and former Chadian dictator 
Hissène Habré for international crimes—motivation was not a relevant 
variable in the decision to bring these men who had abused their power to 
justice. 
It has been argued that the “State immunity of rulers or officials or 
ambassadors derives from [the] seventeenth century when states ruled by 
divine right or feudal inheritance, and lacked the facilities for instantaneous 
communication.”565 In today’s relatively more enlightened world, especially 
one in which there is greater recognition of and respect for human rights, 
justifications such as the argument that it is undignified to put a sovereign or 
head of state on trial, no longer garner much respect among many 
communities. In addition, significant advancements in information and 
communication technologies (e.g., Internet, e-mail, video conferencing, etc.) 
have lessened the need for Heads of State and foreign ministers to travel 
abroad in order to engage in international transactions. As a consequence, the 
so-called “functional rationale of immunity . . . is less crucial in the age of e-
mail and video conferencing.”566 Perhaps, more important is the fact that 
“[i]nternational law now acknowledges the imperative need to end impunity 
for crimes against humanity, and the logical consequence of this imperative 
is to end all immunity of state officials, past and present, who are credibly 
arraigned on such charges by international courts.”567 The impetus to this 
significantly changed attitude towards international crimes include the 
atrocities of World War II (1939-1945), ethnic cleansing in the Balkans 
(1991-1999), crimes of the apartheid regime in South Africa (1948-1994), 
the Rwandan Genocide (1994), the Khmer Rouge Killing Fields in 
Cambodia (1970-1975), the atrocities committed by the Revolutionary 
United Front during the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002), and many 
others. 
These atrocities, many of them committed by or at the direction of 
governments, have forced the international community to become more 
determined to fight impunity and in doing so, emphasis has been placed on 
ending immunity for all state officials. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of 
uncertainty regarding the ability or capacity of municipal law to prosecute 
heads of state where the international crimes were committed or in other 
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States through the exercise of universal jurisdiction.568 As was seen in the 
trials of Charles Taylor and Hissène Habré, a duly constituted hybrid court, 
which is properly vested with international criminal jurisdiction, can 
prosecute any individual, including a head of state, who is alleged to have 
committed international crimes. 
It is clear that international law prohibits certain crimes (e.g., genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture) regardless of the motivation for 
committing these atrocities. Also, if international law is to contribute 
significantly to the fight against impunity, the traditional approach to State 
immunity in civil actions must be reexamined.569 Courts, such as the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(“SCSL”), and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), are 
considered “purpose-built” international courts that are designed to prosecute 
crimes, which by their very nature, are “often committed by state officials in 
pursuance of state policy.”570 International law has, during the last several 
years, set aside the immunities to which these state officials are entitled 
through the statutes that establish the international courts. The elimination of 
these immunities is to allow the prosecution of state officials who engage in 
activities that violate jus cogens norms (e.g., international crimes) without 
such constraints as state immunity.571 What remains unclear is the place of 
immunity for state officials before national courts. 
It appears that there is a general consensus among legal scholars and 
human rights activists, especially in the West, “that there is an exception 
from immunity when former leaders are prosecuted in foreign courts for 
international crimes.”572 In addition, significant developments in 
international law, particularly in international treaties, which provide “for the 
exercise by states parties of extra-territorial jurisdiction over crimes that are 
themselves defined as official acts, or that are linked closely with such acts, 
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suggests that international law now contemplates the prosecution in national 
courts of foreign officials accused of such crimes.”573 
It has been argued that with respect to the commission of international 
crimes, international law rules that deal with State immunity must strike a 
fair balance between “the need to ensure that undue interference with the 
functioning of foreign states is avoided and the need to ensure that those who 
perpetrate international crimes are punished.”574 Senior state officials, 
diplomats serving their country abroad, and other officials who are abroad on 
special missions, “are entitled to immunity and may not be arrested or 
subjected to prosecution while in office or working as part of the mission.”575 
However, the situation is not clear for two categories of individuals: (1) other 
state officials; and (2) former state officials, regardless of the rank that they 
held during their tenure of service. The recent development of the rule of 
universal jurisdiction has provided States with the wherewithal to prosecute 
any individual within their territory who commits certain international 
crimes, regardless of the nationality of the individual in question and also 
irrespective of where the crime was committed. 
The States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court went beyond developments in international customary law and 
subjected all state officials to the jurisdiction of the ICC and expressly 
removed the international law immunities of senior state officials, including 
heads of state. Article 27 of the Rome Statute states as follows: 
 
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official 
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a 
government official shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of 
itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.  
 
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the 
official capacity of a person, whether under national or 
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over such a person.576 
 
 573. Id.  
 574. Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court, 
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 432 (2004). 
 575. Id. 
 576. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 116. 
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The Rome Statute provided, not only for prosecution by the ICC, but 
also for “the possibility that senior officials may be arrested and surrendered 
to the ICC by other states.”577 Of course, there is Article 98 of the Rome 
Statute, which states as follows:  
 
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or 
assistance which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with 
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property 
of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of 
that third State for the waiver of the immunity.  
 
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which 
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the 
consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that 
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation 
of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.578  
 
The interpretation of the provisions of Article 98, as preserving the 
international law immunities of officials of States Parties to the Rome Statute 
when those individuals are in a third State, must ultimately be rejected 
because it would invalidate or render ineffective certain parts of Article 27. 
Article 27 subjects all persons, regardless of official capacity, to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.  
Many international legal scholars have argued that the “conferral of a 
power on states to arrest a visiting serving head of state or a serving 
ambassador is very far-reaching but is probably the only way in practice that 
such persons will be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Court” (i.e., the 
ICC).579 Although the ICC can issue arrest warrants, it does not have the 
wherewithal to arrest those individuals listed in its warrants—it must rely on 
States Parties to do so. Hence, the cooperation of States Parties is very 
important and critical to the international community’s efforts to combat 
impunity. The determination of the international community to fight 
impunity and bring all perpetrators of international crimes to justice is fully 
reflected in the Rome Statute’s Preamble:580  
 
 577. Akande, supra note 574. 
 578. Rome Statute, supra note 116, art. 98. 
 579. Akande, supra note 574, at 433. 
 580. Rome Statute, supra note 116, preamble. 
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The States Parties to this Statute, [a]ffirming that the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must 
not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be by 
enhancing international cooperation, [d]etermined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to 
the prevention of such crimes, [r]ecalling that it is the duty of every 
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes, [r]esolved to guarantee lasting respect for and 
the enforcement of international justice.581 
 
Given this determination by the international community to fully 
confront impunity and significantly enhance respect for human rights, the 
Rome Statute must necessarily be construed only in a way that enhances the 
ability of the international community to bring perpetrators of international 
crimes to justice. That applies, as stated in Article 27(1), “official capacity,” 
even as “Head of State or Government,” cannot be used to “exempt a person 
from criminal responsibility” under the Rome Statute.582 
State immunity, it has been argued, is based on the independence and 
sovereign equality of States.583 Nevertheless, “where a state is acting in 
support of an international tribunal,” such as the ICC, “it is appropriate to set 
this principle aside.”584 One cannot apply the maxim par in parem non habet 
imperium585 given the fact that the issue is not one of a conflict between two 
sovereign States586 over who should exercise jurisdiction over the individual 
being accused of international crimes. Here, the entity seeking the arrest and 
extradition is not a State with sovereign equality to the arresting State but the 
ICC. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize the fact that “this waiver of 
 
 581. Id. 
 582. Id. art. 27(1). 
 583. See HAZEL FOX AND PHILLIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 30 (2013). 
 584. Akande, supra note 574, at 433. 
 585. This is the principle in public international law that one sovereign power cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign power. This is the basis of the act of state 
doctrine and sovereign immunity. See, e.g., XIAONDONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 52–55 (2012). 
 586. The State that is arresting the individual that is alleged to have committed 
international crimes and the one that seeks extradition and subsequent prosecution. 
Specifically, the maxim par in parem non habet imperium means that “equals cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over one another”—that is, “no State can claim jurisdiction over 
another Sovereign State.” ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR 
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 50 
(2008). 
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immunity vis-à-vis other states applies only when the ICC requests an arrest 
and surrender and not in relation to domestic prosecutions.”587 
Of course, it is important to note that although the ICC may exercise 
jurisdiction over the nationals and officials of States that are not parties to the 
Rome Statute, they are no provisions in the Rome Statute that affect the 
immunities that States that are not parties to the Rome Statute would 
otherwise enjoy.588 Hence, Article 98 of the Rome Statute is quite 
instructive—it instructs the ICC and States Parties that  
 
State officials of nonparties are not to “interfere with those officials 
of nonparties who ordinarily possess immunity in international 
law.”589 
 




The main issue in this paper is how Africans can fight impunity and 
improve respect for human rights.  Immunity, especially for Heads of State 
and Government, as well as other senior State officials, is a major problem 
for the struggle against impunity in many countries around the world, 
including those in Africa. Nevertheless, during the last several years, it has 
become evident that the international community is no longer willing to 
allow individuals, regardless of their public positions, to assert immunity in 
an international court in order to bar their indictment, arrest or trial for war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.590 It should not matter if the person being 
indicted is a serving or former head of state or official; what is critical in the 
fight against impunity is that there exists a competent international criminal 
court that is vested with the power to override sovereign immunities.591 
 
 587. Akande, supra note 574, at 433. 
 588. Id. 
 589. Id. 
 590. Robertson, supra note 561, at 667. 
 591. Id. The international community now has such a court in the Rome Statute’s 
International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC withdrew its case against Uhuru Kenyatta in 
December 2014, after the court was unable to show that it had sufficient evidence to 
proceed. See Marlise Simons and Jeffrey Gettleman, International Court Ends Case Against 
Kenyan President in Election Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes. 
com/2014/12/06/world/africa/uhuru-kenyatta-kenya-international-criminal-court-withdraws-
charges-of-crimes-against-humanity.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2018). On April 5, 2016, the 
ICC withdrew charges of crimes humanity against Deputy President William Ruto due to a 
lack of evidence. See Marlise Simons and Jeffrey Gettleman, International Criminal Court 
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In the courts of the various States, immunity may be asserted “under 
municipal law to bar civil claims against incumbent or retired officials which 
are based on the commission of criminal offenses.”592 Nevertheless, in 
“international civil courts or arbitral tribunals” that apply international law, 
“there is no reason in principle why immunity claims should not be 
overridden when the claim is based on commission of crimes against 
humanity.”593 The international community has already applied this principle 
in, for example, the trials of former heads of state Charles Taylor and 
Hissène Habré,594 as well as the failed prosecutions of Uhuru Kenyatta and 
William Ruto.595 
The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone has what has been 
referred to as “an immunity-busting clause.”596 Nevertheless, that provision 
alone is not enough to provide the court with the wherewithal to bring 
national leaders who commit international crimes to justice. In addition to the 
fact that the international court’s competence to override state immunity 
must bear what has been referred to as the “imprimatur of . . . international 
consensus,”597 the international community must support such an effort.  The 
court must not just be one that can apply international law or one that has 
been set up through the concluding of an international treaty.  Take the ICC, 
for example. Granted, it is an international tribunal created by an 
 
Drops Case Against Kenya’s William Ruto, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2016, https://www.nytimes. 
com/2016/04/06/world/ africa/william-ruto-kenya-icc.html.  
 592. Robertson, supra note 561, at 667. 
 593. Id. 
 594. Taylor, former president of Liberia, was prosecuted by the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and Habré, former president of Chad, was tried by the Extraordinary African 
Chambers. 
 595. Kenyatta and Ruto were, at the time of their indictment by the International 
Criminal Court, president and vice president of Kenya respectively. The pair won the 2017 
presidential election in Kenya and are now, respectively, president and vice president of the 
country. See, e.g., Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, President Uhuru Kenyatta is Declared Victor 
of Kenyan Election, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/ 
world/africa/kenya-uhuru-kenyatta-president-election.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2018); 
Lauren Said-Moorhouse, Susannah Cullinane & Briana Duggan, Uhuru Kenyatta Wins 
Disputed Kenya Presidential Rerun, CNN INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 31, 2017, https://www. 
cnn.com/2017/10/30/africa/kenya-election-rerun-results/index.html. 
 596. Robertson, supra note 561, at 667. 
 597. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 n.78 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). If, for example, 
such a court is created by or with the full support of the U.N. Security Council, or other 
important U.N. organ, it would bear this imprimatur of international consensus. The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, for example, was a creation of the United Nations and the 
Government of Sierra Leone and hence, was clothed with the imprimatur of international 
consensus. 
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international treaty. Nevertheless, it is clothed with other important elements 
that make it a true international court, capable of overriding immunity claims 
when they are based on the commission of crimes against humanity. First, it 
was established by an international treaty—the Rome Statute.598 Second, it 
entered into force on July 1, 2002 and only after at least sixty States had 
ratified the treaty. Finally, eighteen international judges were elected to serve 
on the court. 
But what about the Special Court for Sierra Leone, does it fall into this 
category? It was established by treaty to which the U.N. Security Council 
(“UNSC”) is party; it was expressly clothed with “immunity-busting 
jurisdiction”;599 it is made up of a “majority of international judges and an 
international prosecutor,”600 and its establishment was initiated and supported 
by the U.N. Security Council, which was acting on behalf of all members of 
the United Nations. As argued by many scholars, when the UNSC issued 
Resolution 1315, in which it directed the Secretary-General to “negotiate an 
agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent 
and special court consistent with this Resolution,”601 it was acting on behalf 
of all the members of the United Nations.  In Resolution 1315, the UNSC 
recommended that the Special Court for Sierra Leone “should have personal 
jurisdiction over persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the 
commission of [crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant 
Sierra Leonean law committed within the territory of Sierra Leone], 
including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the 
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra 
Leone.”602 
An international court, such as the ICC, which is empowered with the 
jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for international crimes, would, unlike a 
domestic court, be able to confront the sovereign immunity issue from an 
international law perspective without being bound by amnesty clauses in 
national constitutions.603 As has been made clear by many international legal 
 
 598. Rome Statute, supra note 116.  
 599. Robertson, supra note 561, at 668. 
 600. Id. 
 601. U.N. Security Council, Res. 1315 (2000) ¶ 1, adopted by the Security Council at its 
4186th meeting, on Aug. 14, 2000, http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Establishment/S-Res-
1315-2000.pdf. 
 602. Robertson, supra note 561, at 668. 
 603. For example, in the case of Cameroon’s head of state, a domestic court would be 
bound by Article 53(3) of the Constitution, which grants the President of the Republic 
immunity for any crimes committed while in office. See Law No. 2008–1 of 14 April 2008 
to amend and Supplement Some Provisions of Law No. 96–6 of 18 January 1996 to amend 
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scholars, international law, unlike domestic or national law, “operates in a 
different dimension to local law and overrides pardons, amnesties and 
immunities when the charge is genocide or the commission of crimes against 
humanity.”604 Reference is usually made to fromer Chilean dictator, Gen. 
Augusto Pinochet, who, during his many years in power, granted himself and 
his close associates, constitutional immunities. Nevertheless, these 
immunities, although legal in Chile, could not override the provisions of the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.605 In the case of impunity in Africa, then, an 
international court (such as the ICC) or a continental court established under 
the auspices of the African Union, supported by the international community, 
and clothed with impunity-busting jurisdiction, should provide the continent 
with the wherewithal to fight impunity and improve recognition and respect 
for human rights. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the most 
effective way to deal with impunity in the continent is for each country to 
provide itself with institutional arrangements that adequately constrain the 
State and minimize the chances that any government official, regardless of 
his or her position, can escape prosecution and punishment for their 
engagement in international crimes. An international court, such as the ICC, 
should be a court of last resort.  
 
B.  International Criminal Justice is Here to Stay 
 
The trial of Charles Taylor, a former head of state, was authorized by 
the U.N. Security Council.606 It was the U.N. Security Council, which 
granted the ICC the authorization to investigate and prosecute incumbent 
Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir. In its Resolution 1593 (2005), adopted 
at its 1593th meeting on March 31, 2005, the UNSC referred the situation in 
 
the Constitution of 2 June 1972, art. 53(3), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/fr/cm/ 
cm013fr.pdf. 
 604. Robertson, supra note 561, at 669. 
 605. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General 
Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984 and entered into force on June 26, 1987, in 
accordance with Article 27(1), https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/CAT. 
aspx. For example, Article 2(2) states that “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, 
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public 
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” 
 606. The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which established the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, was established through an agreement between the United Nations 
and the Government of Sierra Leone, pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 
1315 of 2000. 
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Sudan’s Darfur region to the Prosecutor of the ICC.  After investigation, al-
Bashir was later charged by the ICC on ten counts of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. There were two warrants issued by the 
ICC against al-Bashir, one on March 4, 2009 and the other on July 12, 
2010.607 Chad’s former president, Hissène Habré, was tried and convicted by 
the Extraordinary African Chambers within the courts of the Republic of 
Senegal (“EAC”), which was set up under an agreement between the African 
Union and Senegal. The EAC was empowered to prosecute international 
crimes committed on the territory of the Republic of Chad during the period 
June 7, 1982 to December 1, 1990. The EAC was expressly provided with an 
impunity-busting provision, when it stated in Article 20 that “[a]n amnesty 
granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary 
African Chambers with respect to the crimes referred to in Articles 5 to 8 of 
this Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.”608 
In addition to supporting the establishment of an international court and 
its support for special courts such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and 
the Extraordinary African Chambers, the international community, which 
includes countries in Africa, has shown its interest and determination to fight 
impunity in other ways. For example, at the 2005 World Summit, the global 
community endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”), as a global 
political commitment to fight the crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The R2P is designed to complement 
existing programs, such as economic sanctions, mediation, etc., to fight 
impunity and prevent subjection of citizens to gross human rights abuses.  
The R2P was endorsed by all Member States of the United Nations—the 
African countries not only endorsed the global R2P, but have developed a 
regional approach called “non-indifference.”609 Article 4(h) of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union grants the African Union the “right to 
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity.”610 The R2P can be considered part of the overall global 
architecture to fight impunity and promote respect for human rights. 
 
 607. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC–02/05–01/09. 
 608. Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers, http://www.forumchambre 
safricaines.org/docs/Statute_of_the_Extraordinary_African_Chambers.pdf (last visited Aug. 
13, 2018). 
 609. For more on Africa’s policy of non-indifference, see Ndubuisi Christian Ani, The 
African Union Non-Indifference Stance: Lessons from Sudan and Libya, 6 AFRICAN 
CONFLICT & PEACEBLDG. REV. 1 (2016). 
 610. Constitution Act of the African Union, https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32020-
file-constitutiveact_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2018). 
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Another way that the global community has shown its determination to 
fight impunity can be found in the work of the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights (“UNHR”). Beginning in 1998, with the issuance of its Resolution 
1998/53, in which it indicated its interest to combat impunity and prevent the 
violation of international human rights and humanitarian law, the UNHR has 
developed the Principles for the Protection of Human Rights through Action 
to Combat Impunity.611 Not only have these Principles underscored the 
global community’s desire to fully confront impunity, but they have emerged 
as an important foundation for the development of national anti-impunity 
programs and institutions. In addition to the fact that they provide an official 
definition for “impunity,” as well as for “serious crimes under international 
law,” they impose several obligations on Member States of the United 
Nations that can significantly enhance the fight against impunity. While 
States must take effective action to combat impunity, they must also 
guarantee victims of international crimes and their relatives, the right to 
know and the right to justice.612 
Whether one is reviewing the legal literature, especially that dealing 
with international human rights and humanitarian law, documents produced 
by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, as well as those issued by 
regional organizations, such as the African Union, the evidence points to a 
determination by the global community to fight impunity and improve the 
environment for the protection of human rights through the minimization of 
engagement in crimes that violate jus cogens norms. It appears that the 
global fight against impunity is here to stay. 
 
C. Fighting Impunity in Africa: Is There a Role for the Rule of Law? 
 
Impunity in any country, including those in Africa, is directly related to 
the nature of each country’s laws and institutions and specifically to whether 
the country’s governing process is undergirded by the rule of law. For 
example, according to the Principles for the Protection and Promotion of 
 
 611. See U.N., Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, Feb. 8, 2005, https:// 
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/TruthJusticeReparation/Pages/InternationalInstruments.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2018). 
 612. Comm’n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Impunity, 
Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Diane 
Orentlicher, Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection of Human Rights 
Through Action to Combat Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, Feb. 8, 2005, 
https://undocs.org/E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1. 
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Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity,613 “[i]mpunity arises 
from a failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to 
take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the 
area of justice, by ensuring that those suspected of criminal responsibility are 
prosecuted, tried and dully punished.”614 
Impunity regularly occurs in States with dysfunctional institutional 
arrangements, that is, those in which the laws do not adequately constrain the 
State and hence, some individuals, primarily senior members of the 
government, consider themselves above the law and act accordingly.  In 
many of these States, the law is not supreme and many civil servants and 
political elites usually do not accept and respect the law. It is often the case 
that in such States, the governing process is not undergirded by the rule of 
law and civil servants and politicians (i.e., state custodians) routinely engage 
in various forms of opportunism (e.g., corruption and rent seeking) to 
maximize their private interests at the expense of those of the general public.  
The dysfunctional nature of the governing process means that many of 
the state custodians who engage in corrupt and other illegal activities are 
hardly ever held accountable for their opportunism. For example, under the 
laws and institutions that currently exist in the Republic of Cameroon, it is 
virtually impossible for the judiciary to prosecute a member of President 
Biya’s inner-circle who has been alleged to have engaged in corruption and 
other criminal activities. In fact, since November 2016, many of the 
country’s security forces have attacked and killed many peaceful 
demonstrators in the country’s Anglophone Regions, as well as burned down 
many Anglophone villages. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the 
government has launched an investigation into these atrocities and other 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.615 
As determined by several scholarly studies, many of those individuals 
who are members of the President’s inner-circle are usually referred to as 
“untouchables.”616 These individuals usually “benefit from special protection 
 
 613. See Updated Set of Principles, supra note 199. 
 614. Id. at Principle 1. 
 615. See, e.g., Isaac Mugabi, Cameroonian Army Kills Scores in Anglophone Region, 
DW NEWS, May 27, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/cameroonian-army-kills-scores-in-anglo 
phone-region/a-43950288; Peter Zongo, “This is Genocide”: Villages Burn as War Rages 
in Blood-soaked Cameroon, THE GUARDIAN (UK), May 30, 2018, https://www.the 
guardian.com/global-development/2018/may/30/cameroon-killings-escalate-anglophone-
crisis. 
 616. See, e.g., Charles Manga Fombad, Endemic Corruption in Cameroon: Insights on 
Consequences and Control, CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM 
COUNTRY-CASE STUDIES 234 (Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. & Bornwell C. Chikulo eds., 2000). 
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in the form of immunities which defy exact legal rationalization.”617 
Professor Charles Manga Fombad, an expert on the judiciary system and 
constitutional law in Cameroon, states that within Cameroon’s legal system, 
there exist two types of protections for untouchables: “One is the right of the 
Minister of Justice to intervene at any stage and stop [court] proceedings. 
The other is the rule that some specified categories of civil servants, as well 
as those of senior ranks, can only be prosecuted with the fiat of their 
ministers. Thus, complaints of corruption against the police, gendarmes, or 
the military forces, for example, must be made to their superior officers who 
have an absolute discretion on whether to allow the culprit to be 
prosecuted.”618 It is no wonder that many people in Cameroon, especially 
those who are not politically connected, do not trust their legal and judicial 
systems. It is also not surprising that impunity has become quite endemic in 
the country. 
Today, in Cameroon and many other countries in Africa,619 the 
government has actually emerged as the source of most of the violence 
directed at citizens. In these countries, many state- and non-state actors 
routinely engage in the violation of the fundamental rights of citizens without 
any fear of being held accountable. In many of these countries, perpetrators 
of heinous crimes continue to enjoy immunity from prosecution, either 
because the government does not have the capacity to hold these individuals 
accountable or is unwilling to do so. It is no wonder that during the last few 
decades Africa has emerged as the region of the world that has suffered the 
most from or has experienced a significantly large amount of the atrocities 
committed in the world.620 
Studies of impunity in Africa point to weak and dysfunctional legal and 
judicial systems as a major reason why perpetrators of heinous crimes are 
 
 617. Id. at 252. 
 618. Id. 
 619. Examples include South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Sudan (Republic of), and Zimbabwe. 
 620. These atrocities include war crimes, genocide, extra-judicial killings, and other 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. See, e.g., Sasha van Katwyk, 
The Fight over Impunity: How Political Forces are Misdirecting the Efforts to Establish 




0sense%20of%20global%20politics&f=false (last visited Aug. 14, 2018). See also 
GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 
(2013) (putting forth a case for holding political and military leaders accountable in 
international courts for genocide, torture, and mass murder). 
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rarely ever brought to justice. Thus, although the international community—
through international tribunals, such as the International Criminal Court—is 
very important to the struggle to combat impunity in Africa, an effective 
approach is one that begins with efforts to improve and strengthen national 
legal and judicial systems, since the latter are the first line of defense against 
impunity. Impunity is likely to be minimized in States that have governance 
processes that are undergirded by the rule of law. For example, fidelity to the 
rule of law in a State implies that the law is supreme and all citizens, 
regardless of their public positions, are subject to the law. Hence, under such 
a system, no one is above the law; even heads of state and government, as 
well as Ministers of Foreign Affairs, must subject themselves to the law. 
Thus, if any of these people commit international crimes, the municipal legal 
system can bring them to justice. In the following sections, we examine the 
rule of law and show why the most effective anti-impunity program must 
begin with making sure that each African country provides itself with a 
governing process undergirded by the rule of law. 
 
 i. Introduction to the Rule of Law 
 
For more than a hundred years, legal and other scholars have struggled 
to define the concept referred to as the “rule of law.”621 It is generally 
believed that the foundation for the modern definition of the rule of law was 
provided by British jurist and constitutional theorist, Albert Venn Dicey,622 
who argued that the rule of law must embody three important concepts: (1) 
the law is supreme; (2) all citizens are equal before the law; and (3) the rights 
of individuals must be established through court decisions—this is a 
principle that must be accepted and respected.623 
In recent years, notable contributors to the definition of the rule of law 
have included the late Rt. Hon. Lord Bingham of Cornhill KG,624 a very 
distinguished British jurist and legal philosopher, who, before he passed 
 
 621. See CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE RULE OF LAW: THE COMMON SENSE OF GLOBAL 
POLITICS (2014) (examining, inter alia, the role played by the rule of law in political 
economy). 
 622. A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1915) (providing a definition for the rule of law). 
 623. Id. at 179. 
 624. See TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW (2011) (examining, inter alia, the rule of 
law, providing a definition for it, and arguing that the rule of law is the foundation for the 
modern state system). 
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away in 2010, served as Master of the Rolls,625 Lord Chief Justice,626 and 
Senior Law Lord.627 
On November 16, 2006, at the Center for Public Law, University of 
Cambridge,628 Lord Bingham spoke about eight sub-rules, which, he argued, 
comprised the rule of law.629 He went on to argue that “the core of the 
existing principle” of the rule of law is that “all persons and authorities 
within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to 
the benefit of laws publicly made, taking into effect (generally) in the future 
and publicly administered in the courts.”630 Lord Bingham elaborated the 
following sub-rules, which he argued undergird the rule of law in any 
society: 
 
1. the law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, 
clear and predictable; 
2. questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved 
by application of the law and not the exercise of discretion; 
3.the laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent 
that objective differences justify differentiation; 
4. the law must afford adequate protection of fundamental human 
rights; 
5. means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost 
or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties 
themselves are unable to resolve;  
6. ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the 
powers conferred on them reasonably, in good faith, for the 
 
 625. See generally GARY SLAPPER AND DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM (8th 
ed. 2006) (explaining the position and roles of the Keeper or Master of the Rolls and 
Records of the Chancery of England, commonly referred to as the Master of the Rolls). 
 626. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ACT, 2005: REPORT WITH 
EVIDENCE, 2005–6, HL 83, at 5 (UK) (defining and explaining the roles of the Lord Chief 
Justice of England and Wales before and after the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005). 
 627. REBECCA HUXLEY-BINNS & JACQUELINE MARTIN, UNLOCKING THE ENGLISH LEGAL 
SYSTEM (3d ed. 2010) (explaining the “Law Lord” system as it applies to England and 
Wales). 
 628. Bob Hepple, Sir David Williams Obituary, THE GUARDIAN (UK), Sep. 22, 2009, 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/22/david-williams-obituary. 
 629. Thomas Bingham, President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, The 
Rule of Law, Lecture at Sir David Williams Lecture (Nov. 16, 2006), ‘The Rule of Law’ 
Text Transcript, Center for Public Law, University of Cambridge (UK), https://www. 
cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/sir-david-williams-lectures2006-rule-law/rule-law-text-transcript.  
 630. Id.  
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purpose for which the powers were conferred and without 
exceeding the limits of such powers;  
7. that adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair; 
and  
8. the existing principle of the rule of law requires compliance by 
the state with its obligations in international law, the law which 
whether deriving from treaty or international custom and practice 
governs the conduct of nations.631 
 
Another modern scholar who has contributed to the definition of the 
rule of law is Professor Robert Stein.632 In examining the rule of law, Stein 
refers to Lord Bingham’s work and interprets the latter’s sub-rules to mean 
that “the law is superior, applies equally, is known and predictable, and is 
administered through a separation of powers.”633 Stein then proffers his own 
definition of the rule of law and argues that a State, which is governed by 
institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law must be 
characterized by the following:  
 
1. The law is superior to all members of society, including 
government officials vested with either executive, legislative, or 
judicial power.  
2. The law is known, stable, and predictable. Laws are applied 
equally to all persons in like circumstances. Laws are sufficiently 
defined and government discretion sufficiently limited to ensure the 
law is applied non-arbitrarily.  
3. Members of society have the right to participate in the creation 
and refinement of laws that regulate their behaviors.  
4. The law is just and protects the human rights and dignity of all 
members of society. Legal processes are sufficiently robust and 
accessible to ensure enforcement of these protections by an 
independent legal profession.  
5. Judicial power is exercised independently of either the executive 
or legislative powers and individual judges base their decisions 
solely on facts and law of individual cases.634 
 
 
 631. Id.  
 632. At the time of writing this paper, Robert Stein was the Everett Fraser Professor of 
Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. See generally Robert Stein, Rule of Law: 
What Does It Mean?, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 293 (2009) (examining the rule of law generally). 
 633. Id. at 301. 
 634. See id. at 302. Stein argues that although his definition is not revolutionary, it is 
based on the writings of experts in legal philosophy. 
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Among organizations that have also taken an active part in defining and 
promoting the rule of law are the American Bar Association (“ABA”) and 
the United Nations.  Arguing that “t]he rule of law does not depend upon a 
U.S.-style separation of powers,” the ABA states that “[t]he key point is that 
every form of government has to have some system to ensure that no one in 
the government has so much power that they can act above the law.”635 
Although the rule of law consists of several elements, the most important for 
the fight against impunity in Africa is that no one, “not even the people who 
hold leadership positions in the government, including the executive, judicial 
officers, and legislators, is above the law—the law is supreme.”636  
The United Nations has also provided a definition for the rule of law 
and in doing so, it stated as follows: 
 
The ‘rule of law’ refers to a principle of governance in which all 
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the 
State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It 
requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of 
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the 
law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, 
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.637 
 
Despite the tremendous improvements in governance systems in many 
African countries and the fact that many of these countries have actually 
transitioned to democratic electoral systems, the rule of law remains an ideal 
that most citizens seek and hope to achieve some day. A governing process 
that is undergirded by the rule of law will ultimately enhance the prosecution 
of anyone, regardless of his economic and political position, for both 
domestic and international crimes. Hence, within such a governance system, 





 635. Part I: What is the Rule of Law? ABA DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., DIALOGUE ON THE 
RULE OF LAW 4, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/ 
Part1DialogueROL.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Aug.14, 2018). 
 636. Id.  
 637. U.N., United Nations and the Rule of Law: What is the Rule of Law? 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2018). 
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 ii. Elements of the Rule of Law 
 
Where there is fidelity to the rule of law, even individuals who serve in 
government must obey the law. This implies that everyone is subject to the 
law and are bound by it. Thus, the first element of the rule of law is that the 
law is supreme. Former Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, has stated that “[t]he Law rests upon known, general 
principles applicable on equal terms to all persons. It follows that the Law is 
superior to, and thus binds, the government and all of its officials.”638 
It is not possible for a country to effectively maintain the rule of law if 
the majority of its citizens do not voluntarily accept and respect the law. If 
the majority of a State’s citizens do not voluntarily accept and respect the 
laws, it would be very difficult and perhaps, impossible, for the enforcement 
arm of the government to fully and effectively enforce the law—that is, to 
maintain law and order. Within such a State, ensuring compliance to the laws 
would be very costly and the government would be forced to devote a 
significant portion of the gross domestic product to maintaining law and 
order. Where governments have to devote most public revenues to law-and-
order activities, they may not be able to meet the public’s demand for critical 
services for development, which include health care, child nutrition, clean 
water, affordable housing, and human capital development. Thus, the second 
element of the rule of law is that the majority of citizens must voluntarily 
accept and respect the law.639 
Throughout its existence, the U.S. Supreme Court has made many 
rulings that have contributed to the development of jurisprudence on the rule 
of law. For example, in United States v. United Mine Workers,640 the United 
States Supreme Court held as follows: 
 
In our country law is not a body of technicalities in the keeping of 
specialists or in the service of any special interest. There can be no 
free society without law administered through an independent 
 
 638. Stein, supra note 632, at 299. 
 639. See Margaret Levi, Tom R. Tyler & Audrey Sacks, The Reasons for Compliance 
with Law, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 70 (Ryan 
Goodman, Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods eds., 2012) (arguing, inter alia, that “voluntary 
compliance with the law is influenced by individuals’ views of the government’s 
legitimacy” and that “individuals’ conception of legitimacy depends significantly on the 
government’s trustworthiness (including its perceived competence) and its commitment to 
procedural justice”). 
 640. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (holding that a trial 
court appropriately issued a restraining order to prevent a strike). 
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judiciary. If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what 
is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny.641 
 
Virtually all of the definitions for the rule of law that one can find in the 
legal literature share the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in U.S. v. United Mine 
Workers642 that “[t]here can be no free society without law administered 
through an independent judiciary.”643 According to Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky,644 “[a]n independent judiciary is essential to the rule of 
law.”645 While stating that “[t]he ‘rule of law’ refers to a principle of 
governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public or private, 
including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated,”646 the United 
Nations also acknowledged that the independent judiciary is a very important 
element of the rule of law. Thus, the third element of the rule of law is 
judicial independence. 
In every State, the law can only function effectively if citizens “are 
aware of, understand, and appreciate the law.”647 Robust and broad-based 
educational programs, including especially those targeting heretofore 
marginalized and deprived groups,648 can help citizens, not only understand 
the laws, but also appreciate them and the role that they play in their daily 
lives. These educational programs must be considered as supplementing but 
not replacing the participation of citizens in constitutional design and the 
enactment of post-constitutional laws. Both processes—the design of the 
 
 641. Id. at 312. 
 642. Id. (citing historical legal authority). 
 643. Id. (warning of the chaos that could arise should a man be allowed to determine for 
himself what the law is). 
 644. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Toward a Practical Definition of the Rule of Law, 46 
JUDGES’ J. 4, 6 (2007) (quoting Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, LIBERTY AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 3–21 (Robert J. Cunningham ed. 1979) (emphasizing that this element is 
part of the definition of the rule of law). 
 645. Id. at 8 (emphasizing this principle as “unassailable”). 
 646. See Robert H. Wagstaff, The Aftermath of Terrorism: Rule of Law Applies to 
Detainees in U.S. and U.K., 58 VA. LAWYER Mag., February 2010, at 32 (quoting U.N. 
Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies, para. 6, U.N. doc. S/2004/616.23 (August 2004) (stating the principle must also 
conform with international human rights principles)). 
 647. John M. Mbaku, Providing a Foundation for Wealth Creation and Development in 
Africa: The Role of the Rule of Law, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 959, 999 (2013). 
 648. That is, groups that have historically been marginalized and excluded from 
participation in political discourse, such as women, young people, rural inhabitants, 
religious and ethnic minorities, and the urban poor.  
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constitution and the enactment of post-constitutional laws—must be open, 
transparent and participatory.  The application of laws must be predictable 
and uniform and must not be capricious or arbitrary.649 Thus, the fourth and 
fifth elements of the rule of law are openness and transparency, and 
predictability. 
It is argued that the rule of law developed in many countries “around the 
belief that a primary purpose of the rule of law is the protection of certain 
basic rights.”650 In fact, many of the freedom fighters who participated in the 
struggle against colonialism and for independence in the African colonies 
believed that independence would provide them with the opportunity to rid 
themselves of the dysfunctional European institutions and replace them with 
institutional arrangements designed exclusively by Africans and which 
would be undergirded by the rule of law.651 It was generally hoped that the 
post-independence constitutional order would adequately constrain the state 
and prevent all government workers, including even high-ranking elites from 
immunizing themselves from being held accountable for their criminal 
activities. Most importantly, post-independence laws and institutions were 
expected to guarantee recognition and respect for human rights, as well as 
fully constrain non-state actors so that they, too, could not violate the 
fundamental human rights of their fellow citizens, including especially those 
of women, children, and ethnic and religious minorities. Thus, the sixth 
element of the rule of law is the recognition and protection of the 
fundamental human rights of citizens. 
 
 iii. The Rule of Law and the Struggle to Combat Impunity in Africa 
 
Impunity takes place when the government is either unwilling or unable 
to enforce the law or selectively does so, allowing some individuals to act 
above the law. Where the government is not enforcing the law because it 
does not have the capacity to do so, the solution lies in the reconstruction of 
the state to provide it with the wherewithal to do so. If the government is 
simply unwilling to enforce the laws, then the people, through a participatory 
and inclusive constitution-making process, should reconstruct the state and 
provide laws and institutions that adequately constrain the government and 
 
 649. Part I: What is the Rule of Law?, supra note 635, at 5. 
 650. Part I: What is the Rule of Law?, supra note 635 (stating that the United States was 
the first nation to produce a document that gives rights to its people and binds the 
government to those rights). 
 651. See generally John M. Mbaku and Julius O. Ihonvbere, Introduction: Issues in 
Africa’s Political Adjustment in the New Global Era, THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 1, 2 (John M. Mbaku & Julius O. 
Ihonvbere eds., 2003). 
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place those who serve in it in a position in which they cannot avoid being 
held accountable to both the constitution and the people.  
In a study of administrative tribunals and common-law courts in the 
United States, John Dickinson652 determined that the law is an important 
check on the exercise of government power.653 Not only can the law force 
government officials to perform their assigned jobs, but it can also prevent 
them from acting opportunistically and engaging in activities that violate the 
fundamental human rights of citizens. Hence, the ability of the people to 
effectively check on the activities of those who serve in government is 
critical to the minimization of impunity. Legal scholars and practitioners who 
deal with rule-of-law issues are aware that in order for the rule of law to 
work effectively and fully in any country, all of that country’s citizens, 
including its civil servants and political elites, must be subject to the laws 
that were agreed upon in earlier period.654 
In such a legal regime, civil servants and politicians are not granted 
wide discretion to “either make their own laws, or subvert existing ones”655 
in an effort to benefit themselves or their supporters or benefactors. All the 
people who work in the government, including the Head of State and 
Government, like their fellow citizens, “must accept and respect the 
country’s laws, subject themselves to these laws”656 and refrain from 
engaging in activities that violate international human rights and international 
humanitarian law. Thus, where the law is supreme, immunity is unlikely to 
become pervasive. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that in countries, such as the United 
States, which have strong and fully-functioning rule-of-law systems, 
individuals or groups can still commit crimes against humanity. However, 
the critical point is that where the governing process is undergirded by the 
supremacy of law, those who commit atrocities, such as mass murder, are 
usually brought to justice by the country’s legal and judicial system. In other 
words, the country’s democratic institutions serve to make certain that 
impunity is minimized.657 Thus, for African countries that are interested in 
 
 652. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 32 (1927). 
 653. Dickinson, supra 652, at 32. 
 654. See, e.g., Mbaku, supra note 647, at 964; Stein, supra note 632, at 301–02. 
 655. Mbaku, supra note 647, at 955. 
 656. John Mukum Mbaku, Rule of Law, State Capture, and Human Development in 
Africa, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 771, 826 (2018). 
 657. For example, Dylann Roof, a 21-year-old white supremacist, murdered 9 (nine) 
African Americans at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in downtown 
Charleston, South Carolina on the evening of June 17, 2015. The dead included the church’s 
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minimizing impunity, the principle of the supremacy of law must be a central 
feature of their governing processes.658 
Combating impunity would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, if a 
majority of an African country’s citizens do not voluntarily accept and 
respect the law. As has been stated by many legal scholars, “[i]t is very 
difficult for a nation to maintain the rule of law if its citizens do not respect 
the law.”659 The police, the judiciary, and other organs of the State, whose 
job is to maintain law and order, are most likely to perform their job more 
effectively and fully if the majority of the citizens voluntarily accept and 
respect the law. Therefore, voluntary acceptance and respect of the law by a 
majority of each African country’s citizens is critical for the minimization of 
impunity. 
But, how can an African country make certain that the majority of its 
citizens voluntarily accept and respect the laws? First, the laws that the 
country chooses must be “relevant to the lives of the people whose behaviors 
the laws are expected to regulate, reflecting their values.”660 Second, the laws 
must be developed by the people themselves and not imposed by some 
external actor and they must be those that “the people understand, respect, 
and are able and willing to obey.”661 If the people design the laws by 
themselves, without outside interference, they are likely to pick only those 
laws that are relevant to their daily lives and which they can obey.662 
 
senior pastor, as well as state senator, Clementa C. Pinckney. In December 2016, Roof was 
convicted of 33 federal hate crime and murder charges stemming from the massacre. In 
addition, the State of South Carolina also charged Roof with nine counts of murder. In April 
2017, Roof pleaded guilty to all 9 state charges and was sentenced to life imprisonment for 
each count. On January 17, 2017, Roof was sentenced to death. See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, 
Charleston Church Shooter: ‘I Would Like to Make It Crystal Clear, I Do Not Regret What I 
Did,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ 
charleston-church-shooter-i-would-like-to-make-it-crystal-clear-i-do-not-regret-what-i-did/ 
2017/01/04/05b0061e-d1da-11e6-a783-cd3fa950f2fd_story.html?utmterm=.339bb86ee66f; 
Jason Horowitz, Nick Corasaniti & Asley Southall, Nine Killed in Shooting at Black Church 
in Charleston, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/church-
attacked-in-charleston-south-carolina.html; Glenn Smith, Jennifer Berry and Abigail 
Darlington, Dylann Roof Sentenced to Death for Emanuel AMC Church Massacre, THE 
POST AND COURIER (Charleston, South Carolina), Jan. 10, 2017, https://www.postand 
courier.com/church_shooting/dylann-roof-sentenced-to-death-for-emanuel-ame-church-
massacre/article_3c24cc44-d729-11e6-9e5d-2f037e89bdd c.html. 
 658. Mbaku, supra note 656, at 827. 
 659. See Part I: What is the Rule of Law?, supra note 635, at 5 (stating that the rule of 
law is an essential element of the social contract). 
 660. Mbaku, supra note 647, at 1003. 
 661. Id. 
 662. Mbaku, supra note 656, at 827–28. 
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The third way that an African country can secure support for its laws is 
to make certain that the process through which the laws are designed and 
adopted is open and transparent. Such a process will significantly enhance 
and maximize participation, as well as help citizens “know what the law is, 
understand the law, and make certain that the law reflects their values and is 
relevant to their lives, effectively enhancing compliance.”663 Within such an 
open and transparent process, “citizens will be able to understand why some 
laws have been selected instead of others and why they must obey the 
laws.”664 
Finally, in order to make certain that citizens accept and respect the 
laws, the laws chosen must be those that are relevant to citizens’ lives and the 
issues and problems that they face on a daily basis. It is critical that citizens 
see the law as a tool or mechanism that they can use to (1) confront their 
everyday problems, including organizing their private lives; (2) peacefully 
resolve their conflicts, including those that arise from trade and other forms 
of free exchange; and (3) significantly enhance their ability to undertake 
various activities (e.g., get married and raise a family; start a business to 
create wealth; and bequeath their property to their progeny) to improve their 
standard of living. 
A major problem for governance in Africa and a source of impunity, is 
that the majority of citizens in each country see their institutional 
arrangements as foreign impositions—remnants of the dysfunctional 
institutions left behind by the European colonialists or, in the case of post-
independence constitutions, documents that were “cobbled together by a 
compliant constitution-making conference or convention, and then adopted 
by a ‘controlled’ plebiscite.”665 A critical part of the effort to fight impunity 
is that citizens in each country take ownership of their laws and institutions 
so that they can utilize them, not only to organize their private lives and 
undertake those activities that help them maximize their values, but also so 
that they can effectively check on the exercise of government power and 
prevent or minimize impunity. 
Independence of the judiciary is very important for the fight against 
impunity and the minimization of atrocities committed against citizens, either 
by state or non-state actors. Judiciary independence is a multifaceted concept 
that calls for all judicial officers to be granted “security of tenure,” “financial 
 
 663. Mbaku, supra note 647, at 1003. 
 664. Mbaku, supra note 656, at 828. 
 665. Victor T. LeVine, The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa, 35 J. 
MOD. AFR. STUD. 181, 188 (1997). 
  
2019]         International Law and the Struggle Against Government Impunity in Africa 197 
 
security,” and “institutional independence.”666 Unless a country has an 
independent judiciary, it would not be able to deal effectively with impunity. 
Thus, African countries that seek to fully and effectively prosecute all those 
who commit international crimes within their jurisdictions, must make 
certain that they have judiciaries that are independent of the executive and 
legislative branches of government.667 
Finally, openness and transparency are absolutely necessary and 
important inputs into an effective anti-impunity project. First, openness and 
transparency make certain that citizens have adequate access to relevant 
information about “the functioning of the polity,” making it possible for the 
people to check on the exercise of government power and force civil servants 
and political elites to be accountable to both the people and the constitution.  
Such accountability invariably minimizes impunity. 
Second, since corruption, which by definition, “violates generally 
accepted standards of behavior, greater transparency should discourage 
corrupt actions, or at least facilitate appropriate mechanisms of punishment 
(legal, administrative or electoral).”668 Since impunity is pervasive in 
countries pervaded by corruption, minimizing the latter is critical to the fight 
against impunity.  
Openness and transparency in government communication are 
important to the fight against impunity because they enhance the ability of 
citizens to effectively and fully monitor and check on the activities of their 
governors. Perhaps, more importantly is the fact that “transparency enhances 
the ability of an individual who is interested in a public policy, or thinks or 
believes a decision might affect them, to understand and appreciate how that 
decision was made or arrived at and why.”669 In addition to the fact that this 
 
 666. See, e.g., CONST. OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA art. III (showing that the 
framers saw these elements as very important to the independence of the judiciary. See also 
the South African Constitutional Court case, De Lange v. Smuts, 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) ¶ 59 
(holding that judicial independence . . . is foundational to and indispensable for the 
discharge of the judicial function in a constitutional democracy based on the rule of law.” 
The Court endorsed the ruling of the Canadian Supreme Court in Valente v. The Queen, 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, ¶¶ IV, V, VI (setting the standard for judicial independence in 
Canada).  
 667. This necessarily calls for a governing process within the country that is undergirded 
by the separation of powers with effective checks and balances. See, e.g., James Fowkes & 
Charles M. Fombad, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 1–9 (Charles 
M. Fombad ed., 2016) (presenting a series of essays that examine, inter alia, efforts by 
various African countries to introduce the concept of separation of powers into their 
constitutions). 
 668. John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role 
of Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 295, 316 (2004). 
 669. See, e.g., Mbaku, supra note 647, at 1012–13. 
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will improve the chances that the majority of citizens will voluntarily accept 
and respect the law and hence, enhance compliance and the maintenance of 
law and order, it will also make it much more difficult for those who engage 
in criminal activities to go unpunished. 
In general, openness and transparency provide citizens with the 
information that they need to monitor and check on the activities of political 
elites and civil servants, forcing the government to remain accountable to the 
constitution and the people. In addition to the fact that accountability of the 
government to the people and the constitution can significantly minimize 
corruption, it can also ensure that the laws are enforced, hence, minimizing 
impunity.  
The key to combatting impunity in Africa lies in recognizing the fact 
that a country’s ability to deal with impunity is highly dependent on the 
quality of its governing process. For, countries that have governing processes 
that are undergirded by a separation of powers with effective checks and 
balances (e.g., an independent judiciary, a robust and politically active civil 
society, and an independent press) are more likely to be able to bring to 
justice all those individuals who commit serious and egregious crimes, 
effectively minimizing impunity. 
 
D. International Law and the Fight Against Impunity in Africa 
 
While making certain that African countries have legal and judicial systems 
that are capable of bringing to justice individuals who commit international 
crimes in their jurisdictions is the first line of the fight against impunity in the 
continent, the second line of the struggle is international law.  As discussed 
earlier, the international justice system, as embodied in the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”), is now being recognized as the last line of defense 
against international crimes.  In situations where certain serious crimes (e.g., 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and genocide) have been 
committed and the courts of the jurisdiction where the crimes were 
committed are either unwilling or unable to bring the perpetrators to justice, 
the ICC can be called upon, by the U.N. Security Council, or other relevant 
authority, to intervene and prosecute the perpetrators.670 
 
 670. Richard Dicker, ICC: The Court of Last Resort, FOREIGN POLICY, June 29, 2012, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/29/the-court-of-last-resort/; International Criminal Court 
serves as a “court of last resort,” 2010 Jonathan I. Charney Distinguished Lecture in 
International Law, Vanderbilt Law School (Nashville, Tennessee) delivered by Christian 
Wenaweser, President of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court, 
Apr. 6, 2010, https://law.vanderbilt.edu/news/international-criminal-court-serves-as-a-court-
of-last-resort/. 
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The ICC has been criticized, supposedly, for being an ineffective 
international tool for the fight against impunity. The Court’s critics have 
referred to the ICC’s failure to successfully prove its cases against President 
Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto of Kenya, as well as the 
recent reversal of the conviction of Jean-Pierre Bemba, as evidence that the 
Court does not have the wherewithal to fight impunity and bring perpetrators 
of serious human rights violations to justice. In addition, many Africans have 
criticized the ICC and argued that it is essentially a tool of Western 
imperialism, designed to continue the oppression of Africa and its peoples 
that began in the late-19th century.671 Nevertheless, some of Africa’s most 
important moral and political leaders have argued that the ICC, rather than 
being a tool of Western imperialism, is actually a mechanism to force 
accountability in African governments and bring an end to impunity.672  
Since the ICC came into being in 2002, it has indicted exclusively only 
Africans. The Court’s first judgment was delivered in 2012 in a case against 
Congolese rebel leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who was convicted of war 
crimes related to the forced recruitment of children and their subsequent use 
as child soldiers.673 Nevertheless, the ICC has begun investigations into the 
possibility of ethnic cleansing in the 2008 war in the Republic of Georgia.674 
Despite these and other shortcomings of the ICC, and until African countries 
arm themselves with democratic institutions that can fully ensure the 
prosecution of those who commit international crimes, the ICC will remain 
an important player in the struggle against impunity in the continent. 
As the successful prosecution of Charles Taylor by the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, a court that was created by the United Nations, in 
cooperation with the Government of Sierra Leone, has shown, the 
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international community, working with African governments, as well as 
regional organizations, such as the African Union, can effectively bring to 
justice, perpetrators of international crimes, who, otherwise, would escape 
prosecution.675 In addition, the successful trial and conviction of former 
Chadian dictator, Hissène Habré, by the Extraordinary African Chambers in 
the courts of the Republic of Senegal, has shown that with determination, the 
African Union, working with its Member States and other actors, can 
contribute significantly to the elimination of impunity in Africa.  
Finally, since the early-1990s, the international community has taken a 
more concerted effort to fight impunity globally and in Africa in particular.  
As part of that determination to fight impunity, the international community 
has adopted programs, such as the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) and the 
Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through 
Action to Combat Impunity, that are expected to significantly enhance the 
ability of the international community to combat impunity. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Impunity, which can be defined as “the impossibility, de jure or de 
factor, of bringing the perpetrators of human rights violations to account,”676 
has become pervasive throughout virtually all African countries. In some 
African countries, the existence of impunity is due to the inability of the 
government to bring to justice individuals that are engaged in the 
commission of international crimes. In others, such as South Sudan, Somalia, 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, central governments no longer have 
control of many geographic parts of the country and as a consequence, it has 
become quite difficult for the forces of law and order to deal with all those 
people who engage in criminal activities.  In fact, in these countries, many 
non-state actors who commit international crimes, such as serious violations 
of human rights, are not being held to account for these crimes. 
In other countries, such as Sudan, both state- and non-state actors 
routinely engage in the violation of international human rights and 
humanitarian law without being held responsible. Although the lack of 
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capacity to fully investigate and bring perpetrators of international crimes to 
justice is a problem for Sudan and many other countries in Africa, the more 
important reason why impunity is pervasive in Sudan is the lack of political 
will—the unwillingness of the government in Khartoum to forcefully pursue 
those engaged in the commission of serious international crimes.  For one 
thing, especially with respect to human rights violations in the Darfur region 
of the country, most of the atrocities are committed by the government and 
its agents.677 This state of affairs is not due, necessarily, to the lack of 
capacity but to the unwillingness of the government to act within the law and 
bring criminals, whether they are members of the government or not, to 
justice. 
Effectively combatting impunity in Africa, then, must begin with the 
reconstruction of African states, through a democratic process, to create 
democratic institutions that are capable of adequately constraining the 
government and preventing civil servants and political elites from acting with 
impunity.  Each African country must provide itself with a governing process 
that can make possible the bringing of perpetrators of human rights 
violations to account—“whether in criminal, civil, administrative or 
disciplinary proceedings.”678 Where there exist governing processes 
undergirded by a separation of powers with effective checks and balances, 
which include an independent judiciary, a robust and politically active civil 
society, and an independent press, it is likely the case that impunity will be 
minimized. 
In the meantime, continental legal mechanisms, similar to the 
Extraordinary African Chambers, and specially-constituted international 
tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, can be used to deal with 
impunity and improve the institutional environment for the recognition and 
respect of human rights. Finally, the International Criminal Court remains a 
court of last resort—the ICC can be called upon to intervene and assume 
jurisdiction where African countries are either unwilling or unable to bring to 
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